MOVERS AND SHAKERS IN THE BASRAH COMMUNITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000049

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/7/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PINR SOCI KISL IZ
SUBJECT: MOVERS AND SHAKERS IN THE BASRAH COMMUNITY

REF: A) BASRAH 43, B) BASRAH 38, C) BASRAH 45, D) 05 BASRAH 142

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CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: Wielders of power and influence in Basrah
outside of the local government can be classified into three
general categories: highly respected sheikhs and imams, thugs
and militia leaders, and a nebulous third category of
individuals in positions of power but whose influence on the
Basrah community is neither definitively positive nor negative.
The current security situation in Basrah, however, discourages
any but the most powerful and wealthy from taking an active role
in civil society. By no means an exhaustive list of community
leaders in Basrah, this cable builds on Ref A in identifying
some of Basrah's key players and how they affect the province's
current economic and security situation. End Summary.

Sheikhs and Imams: Benefactors and Businessmen
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2. (C) Seyid Ali Al Musawi is the most prominent Shia imam in
Basrah and one of the wealthiest individuals in the city. He is
the spiritual leader of the Al Shakheyah sect, a minority Shia
sect founded by Sheikh Ahmad Al Insa'i in the nineteenth century
that has followers in several countries in the Middle East. Al
Musawi's political leanings are moderate; he shows tolerance
toward Sunni and Christian minorities, and he is not actively
engaged in local politics. He owns and runs a private hospital,
a construction company and a handful of small stores in central
Basrah, in addition to leading the largest mosque in the city
(Comment: Al Musawi describes his mosque as the largest in Iraq
in terms of square footage and available prayer space. End
comment). His mosque attracts an unknown amount of funding from
Shia communities outside Iraq, but the massive and ornate
chandeliers, air conditioning in every room, and wall-to-wall
carpeting inside the huge mosque suggest that these funds are
considerable.


3. (C) Al Musawi is described by contacts as a "shrewd
businessman" who "takes care of his followers." His private
hospital in Basrah supplies much-needed medical services in
Basrah. Another contact pointed out, however, that Al Musawi's
hospital only performs expensive surgical operations and
technical procedures and not routine health care. The private
hospital enhances Al Musawi's image as benefactor to society,
but it is above all a moneymaking enterprise. Al Musawi likely
could have a positive impact on Basrah's political leadership if
he diverted his attention in that direction. Because of his
advanced age and health problem (he suffers from diabetes and
has had prostate problems),his son, Seyid Abd Ali Al Musawi, is
now the driving force behind the Al Musawi business empire and
eventually will take over the spiritual leadership of the Al
Shakheyah when his father passes from the scene.


4. (C) Sheikh Mohamed Falik Al Malkee is a prominent Shia
cleric who represents Ayatollah Sistani in Zubair, a town
located 30 miles outside of Basrah, and whose influence extends
to Basrah. His sister, Seknaa, serves on the Basrah Provincial
Council (BPC) as a political independent (Reftel A). Openly
critical of the political extremists in control of the BPC, he
has attributed the recent decline in security in Basrah to the
poor performance of the local government.


5. (C) Sheikh Mansour Al Kanaan is the leader of the Al Kanaan
tribe and a former member of the Transitional National Assembly
representing the Iraqi Unified Alliance. Though no longer
serving as an elected official, Sheikh Mansour wields
considerable influence in the community because of his tribal
leadership. The Al Kanaan tribe, one of the largest, is known
for looking after the interests of its members and providing
them with a measure of security from militias and other tribes.
A lawyer by training, Sheikh Mansour acted as a tribal judge,
and his good relations with other tribes in Basrah enhances his
reputation. He also is a businessman and owns a newspaper, "Al
Ashar," a construction company, Al Rahila, and an organization
that promotes human rights called Al Rahmah. A harsh critic of
the dysfunctional BPC, Sheikh Mansour is seeking to establish a
sort of counterweight, a movement that would have representation
from a wide variety of non-political interests from "the best
groups in Basrah." It would be an informal council that could
present its views, suggestions and criticisms to the BPC and,
because of its membership, would assume some moral authority.
The idea, while intriguing, is still in the developmental stage.

Thugs and Militia Leaders
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6. (C) Ismail Al Wah'il, brother to Governor Mohammed Moassibh

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Al Wah'il (Fadillah),wields undeniable influence over Basrah's
local government and is even rumored to occupy an office in the
governorate building despite not being an elected official or an
employee. He is rumored to take over the Governor's role when
Governor Mohammed is out of Basrah. Contacts report that Ismail
is in charge of the Fadillah party's militia in Basrah and is
responsible for death squads in the city that conduct political
assassinations. Ismail ran for a seat in Parliament in the
December 15 election on his own ticket, but did not win enough
votes to secure a seat. A thug with political aspirations and
not much education, Ismail could wreak havoc on an already
dismal political situation in Basrah should he win office in the
provincial elections.


7. (C) Seyid Yusif Al Batat, head of the Thar Allah militia, is
a notorious figure in Basrah, and may soon occupy a seat on the
Basrah Provincial Council (BPC). Iranian funds reportedly
supply his militia with uniforms and weapons. Seyid Yusif keeps
the streets of Basrah busy by waging undeclared war on Governor
Mohammed's private militia and by trying to take out the
Governor himself. An arrest warrant was issued for Seyid Yusif
in the fall of 2005 for the theft of a government vehicle but
was subsequently removed when the car was returned to the local
government. With two BPC members elected to Parliament in the
December 15 election, Seyid Yusif's name is next on the list to
take one of the empty seats at the provincial council level. He
increasingly is insinuating himself into the political scene in
Basrah and professes to have transformed Thar Allah from a
militia into a political party that follows democratic ideals.

Neither Here nor There
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8. (C) South Oil Company (SOC) Director Jabbar Ali Husayn
al-Lu'aybi wields enormous economic influence in Basrah (see
reftels B, C and D),but his political leanings are unclear.
With 25,000 employees and supplying most of the country's oil,
SOC is the source of a significant percentage of the nation's,
let alone the province's, income. At the helm of the SOC is
Jabbar, who asserts that he has no political aspirations of his
own, but on whom the economic survival of the region rests.
Knowing that his skill set and experience make him indispensable
to the success of the SOC, Jabbar is in a position to influence,
rather than be influenced by, local politics. Still, he
portrays himself as a non-political technocrat, only interested
in running the company well. In meetings with REO Basrah staff,
Jabbar has made it clear that he would accept financial
assistance from any country with the wherewithal to rebuild
Iraq's crumbling oil infrastructure -- whether from the United
States, Iran or Russia.


9. (C) Chief of Police Hasan Sewadi Al Saadi describes himself
as a political independent. He was appointed to his current
position in January 2005 and has fought to retain it ever since.
The BPC has repeatedly sought to remove him, but he somehow
continues to cling to his position, perhaps through his growing
affiliation with the Governor. Although he "talks the talk" of
the need to replace most of the police force because of
infiltration by militias, he is unable to effectively "walk the
walk" and enforce much real change. Militia infiltration
continues to hamper the efficiency of the Basrah police. Sewadi
is well-respected and liked by the public, but his attempts to
stop militia infiltration into the police and his role in
disbanding Governor Wa'hil's internal affairs division in
November 2005 have made him increasingly unpopular with local
government leaders. Sewadi clings tenuously to his position and
may not be able to achieve any further changes in the police
force, which would suit political extremists and their militias
just fine.

Comment
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10. (C) Influential members of the Basrah community are not
limited to the pool of elected officials. Without effective
leadership in the provincial government and competent council
members, however, Basrah's few benevolent and moderate leaders
cannot promote economic growth and responsible government alone.
Worse, the rise in death squads and militias in Basrah makes
wealthy and vocal figures prime targets for kidnapping and
murder and dissuades them from taking a more active role in
civil society. Murders and assassinations in Basrah have spiked
in number and audacity over the past month, some occurring in
broad daylight, and thus far the perpetrators go unpunished. A
veil of fear and silence has fallen over Basrah, and the few
vocal dissidents in the city risk their lives every time they
open their mouths or appear in public.
GROSS