COUNCIL DITHERS AS BASRAH SECURITY WORSENS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000048

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/6/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER KISL IZ
SUBJECT: COUNCIL DITHERS AS BASRAH SECURITY WORSENS

REF: A) BASRAH 19, B) BASRAH 17

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CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: On April 3, the Basrah Regional Coordinator
(RC) met with Hakim Abdul Sahib Kadum (Independent- Basrah
Islamic Coalition),Basrah Provincial Council (BPC) member and
Head of the Supervisory Security Committee of the council. He
insisted that the U.S. REO take an "active role" in convincing
the British to give in to BPC demands for ending the ongoing
boycott. The RC delivered the message that the REO would assist
in mediation but would not deliver ultimatums to the British on
behalf of the BPC. The boycott on the Danish Mission in Basrah
continues, and the BPC has to weigh the value of the Danish
programs before ending it. Tactical Support Unit (TSU)
demonstrations were held on April 2 in Basrah to protest the
decision to place the unit under the control of the local Iraqi
police. Hakim blamed the worsening security situation in Basrah
on the British, but admitted that there were many other factors
influencing security. At least 100- possibly 230- families have
arrived in Basrah province fleeing sectarian violence in the
north. End Summary.

Boycotts Must Be Resolved through Negotiations, Not Ultimatums
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2. (C) On April 3, the Basrah RC met with Hakim Abdul Sahib
Kadum, BPC member and Head of the Supervisory Security Committee
of the council. Hakim has been in contact with the REO over the
course of the BPC's boycott of the British and Danish
established on February 13 (see Reftel A). His message to the
REO on this occasion was a request for the United States to take
what he termed a "more active role" in breaking the impasse on
the boycott. When pressed to specify what sort of role he
envisioned for the United States, he clarified that he wanted
the REO to pressure the British to give in to the demands of the
BPC (see Reftel B). The RC stressed that the U.S. REO
considered it important to end the boycott and would be happy to
serve as a mediator in direct negotiations between the British
forces and the BPC. However, the RC emphasized that both sides
must meet and discuss their differences with each other.
Expecting the United States to deliver the council's ultimatums
to the British would do nothing to end the impasse and was no
substitution for direct negotiations.


3. (C) As for the boycott on cooperation with the Danish
Mission in Basrah, Hakim shrugged and said that Denmark
transgressed against the Prophet Mohammed, and as such, the
boycott could not be resolved at the provincial level, only at
the national level. The RC relayed the information that the
Danish Mission would most likely close its office in Basrah
within the next month if work with its Iraqi counterparts on the
council could not continue. Hakim did not appear overly
concerned about the possible pullout of the Danish, saying that
the BPC would have to consider the impact that the Danish
Mission's pullout would have on project work and vote on whether
or not to abandon the boycott on the Danish. He added that the
agenda for the council's meeting the next day was already full,
so the council would not be able to discuss the Danish until the
next meeting.

TSU Demonstrations Over Status

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4. (C) Hakim explained that the Tactical Support Unit (TSU)
forces demonstrated in Basrah on April 2 because they opposed
the Ministry of Interior's decision to absorb the TSU into an
Emergency Battalion with the Disturbance Battalion under the
Iraqi Police (IP) in Basrah. Accustomed to operating
semi-independently and benefiting from receiving better
equipment than most of the rest of the IP, the TSU saw the
decision as a demotion in prestige. Hakim said that the
Supervisory Security Committee was working on resolving the
issue by mediating between the IP and the TSU, and that the TSU
had been advised to work through the BPC to air their grievances
and not demonstrate in the streets.

Basrah Security Situation Worse for Many Reasons
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5. (C) Hakim attributed the worsening security situation in
Basrah to several factors: the power vacuum in the national
government, the current Chief of Police Hassan Sewadi's
incompetence, Iranian interference, British meddling, militias
and tribal warfare. He said that until a new government is
formed, long-term solutions to the security problems would not
be found. He foresaw militia activity continuing to be a

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problem in Basrah through provincial elections, saying that
losing parties would take their anger out through their
militias. When the RC pushed the security issue, noting that a
four-year-old boy had been killed in a drive-by shooting in the
central marketplace in Basrah on April 2, Hakim said that it was
dangerous everywhere in Iraq and blamed the deteriorating
situation in Basrah on the British for not coordinating their
moves with Iraqi security.

Internal Displacement Due to Sectarian Violence
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6. (C) Hakim estimated that since February about one hundred
Shia families had arrived in Basrah province from the north due
to sectarian violence (Note: An April 2 International Office for
Migration report puts the number of displaced families in Basrah
at 230. End Note). He said a committee was investigating the
issue of refugee Shia families on April 3 and were registering
them. Most of the displaced families originated in the "hot"
zones of Fallujah and Ramadi, he said, and were re-settling
throughout the province, but in the cities of Basrah and Safwan
in particular. He said that the BPC had considered offering
special assistance to the families but decided against it out of
concern that doing so would attract unmanageable numbers of
people. Instead, families were receiving assistance through
various humanitarian non-governmental organizations and through
the Ministry of Migration and Displacement (Note: Poloff has
received reports of Red Crescent delivering food and supplies to
displaced families throughout the southern region. End Note).
Hakim said that he had no knowledge of Sunni families fleeing
Basrah (Comment: Other REO contacts report that "hundreds" of
Sunnis are leaving Basrah because of increased violence. End
Comment).

Comment
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7. (C) Hakim, knowledgeable about specific issues, offered no
helpful suggestions as to how to bring the two-month long
boycott on the British and Danish to an end. The meeting was an
important opportunity, however, to deliver the message to a
council member that the REO would mediate negotiations, but that
the BPC itself would have to resolve its differences directly
with the British and Danish. The dysfunctional BPC, identified
by nearly all other REO contacts as contributing to the security
problem in Basrah, was glaringly absent from Hakim's list of
reasons why security in Basrah was deteriorating. Hakim's
defensive stance toward Basrah's security crisis and unworkable
strategy for resolving the boycott on Coalition partners in
Basrah point in the direction of a further decline in local
government performance until the provincial election takes place.
GROSS