GOOD GUYS AND BAD GUYS ON THE BASRAH PROVINCIAL COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000043

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/31/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR KISL IZ
SUBJECT: GOOD GUYS AND BAD GUYS ON THE BASRAH PROVINCIAL COUNCIL

REF: A) BASRAH 36, B) BASRAH 19, C) 05 BASRAH 153, D) BASRAH 29, E) BASRAH 30;
F) 05 BASRAH 157, G) BASRAH 36

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CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: The current structure of Basrah politics
allows religious extremism to flourish. In order to survive in
the Basrah political scene today, political figures must portray
themselves as devout Shia to the public. A small number of
extremists on the Basrah Provincial Council have been able to
hijack the legislative process to push through an agenda of
anti-Coalition sentiment, authoritarianism, and an increasingly
fundamentalist Islamic regulation of society. The few
influential political moderates on the Basrah Provincial Council
are those who are able to draw upon their religious background
or religious family connections as a source of political power.
Influential leaders in the Basrah community outside of the
Council will be discussed in septel. End Summary.

Few Movers and Shakers on the Basrah Provincial Council
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2. (C) Mired in in-fighting, the 41 members of the Basrah
Provincial Council have scarcely managed to meet, let alone
enact much useful legislation during the first three months of

2006. The political party breakdown of the BPC is as follows:
six Da'awa party members, three SCIRI/Badr members, 11 Fadillah
party members, 15 independent Islamic Coalition members, two
Future of Iraq Assembly party members, and four Iraqi National
Accord party members. (Comment: Discrepancy in the numbers of
members in each party as per Basrah 41 is due to several
"independents" of the Islamic Coalition known to have strong
ties to either the Da'awa or SCIRI/Badr parties. End Comment.)


3. (C) Although all but four members of the BPC are from
Unified Iraqi Coalition (List 555) parties, there is little
agreement or cohesion between these members, and significant
disagreements exist among members of the same party. Chairman
Mohammed Saadon Sahed Al Obadi (Da'awa) has isolated himself
from many of the other members by continuously declaring
boycotts on communications with Coalition partners and on the
British in particular, thereby hampering the Reconstruction and
Development Committee and the Security Committee in their
efforts to improving the infrastructure and security situation
in Basrah. Even other Da'awa party members have confided in REO
poloffs that they privately do not agree with the Chairman's
policies but will not refute them in public (Reftel A).

Basrah Bad Boys
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4. (C) Of the 41 members, three members in particular stand out
for being particularly unhelpful in their extremist and
anti-Coalition platforms.


5. (C) Chairman Mohammed Saadon Sahed Al Obadi (Da'awa),
despite his sterling reputation gained from being imprisoned
during the former regime, is a weak political leader who has not
been able to control the unruly council. Since September 2005,
he has taken an increasingly anti-MNF-I stance, imposing a
boycott on communications with Coalition partners and the
British on three separate occasions (Reftel B). These boycotts
enhance the Chairman's image as a strongman who is not afraid to
stand up to the Coalition. Other council members admit that the
boycotts have backfired, blocking progress in the development
and security of Basrah.


6. (C) The Chairman has proven to be beyond the reach of
reasonable discussion. At meetings with REO staff, he
degenerates into ranting monologues after a few minutes. Other
council members present at meetings with him ignore his rages.
In December 2005, the Chairman put in place regulations
requiring that all routine paperwork and correspondence pass
through his hands for personal clearance, an authoritarian move
that further isolated him from other BPC members and resulted in
an increased decline in productivity. The dysfunctionality of
the BPC is not entirely the responsibility of the Chairman - the
council is so divided that it would not function well even with
expert leadership - but a more competent political leader would
have been able to guide the BPC through differences and effect
change in Basrah for the better.


7. (C) Governor Mohammed Moassibh Al Wah'il (Fadillah) is best
described as a duplicitous crook whose primary goal is personal
enrichment (Reftel C). The internal affairs division of the
Iraqi police, which he was forced to disband in November 2005,
functioned as a private militia that took orders directly from
the Governor, bypassing rule of law and the chain of command in

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the police. Fadillah party adherents also work in various other
units in the police force and the Facilities Protection Service
and act as an unofficial militia for the party. A compromise
candidate for governor in January 2005, Governor Mohammed
secured his current position because he was neither strong
enough nor extreme enough to worry either OMS or SCIRI. Since
then, however, he has shown decidedly Sadrist tendencies,
appearing in public with Moqtada al Sadr during a February 26
visit to Basrah (Reftel D). Though he publicly states that the
current boycott against the Coalition is none of his doing, he
has taken no action to stop them.


8. (C) Khazl Jaloob Falih, aka Abu Salam (Fadillah) also falls
into the category of "Basrah Bad Boys" for his extremist views,
anti-Coalition viewpoints, and his platform of fundamentalist
Islam. Described as a "simple man" by some REO contacts and as
an out-and-out criminal by others, he dominates discussions in
the BPC. By using extremist Islamic rhetoric, he has been able
to hijack dialogue in the BPC on much legislation, denouncing
BPC members who question him. REO contacts describe Abu Salam
as gaining in political power within the Fadillah party (Reftel
E) and as the real power behind the Governor.

The Good Guys
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9. (C) The few political moderates on the council who are
influential enough to counter the extremists are those who have
a religious reputation, or are known as charitable individuals
who have donated generously from their personal finances,
rendering them immune to attacks from fundamentalist extremists.
The most influential of the political moderates is Seyid Baha
Ahmed Jamal Al Deen (Da'awa),a Shia Imam from a well-known and
respected family. Seyid Baha managed a non-governmental charity
organization before being elected to the council, and he has an
untouchable reputation as a religious man who cares for the poor
and needy. His interest in serving the people, as opposed to
using his position to pillage for profit, is clear. He
maintains open lines of communication with Coalition partners
and has expressed interest in mounting projects to employ poor
people in Basrah.


10. (C) Seyid Gali Najem Muter (Iraqi National Accord) is a
secular political moderate who is not afraid to voice his own
opinions in public (see reftel F for more background on Gali).
He commands considerable public support and respect. His
religious background as a descendant of the prophet makes his
message on the secular separation of religion from government
all the more powerful. His personable demeanor and charisma
have won him much public sympathy. Known to crack jokes during
council sessions, Gali is one of the few council members able to
break tensions and move negotiations forward. When he talks,
people listen. He has told REO staff that he would like to
start a project on public information to educate the public on
important issues leading up to the provincial elections.


11. (C) Dr. Wathib Salman Al Gamud (Da'awa) also has a sterling
reputation in Basrah as an educated doctor who has used his
wealth to found an orphanage in the city (see reftel G for more
background on Dr. Wathib). As a British citizen who spent over
20 years in Great Britain during the Saddam years, Dr. Wathib
must deal with being seen as someone who deserted Iraq during
the hard times and came back when he stood to gain politically.
Nevertheless, he exerts considerable clout in the local
community and has learned how to work the system for
international support.


12. (C) Of the female BPC members, many are moderate but few
stand up and voice opposition to extremists. Two of the more
vocal female candidates, Jenan Abdul Jabbar Yassin (Da'awa) and
Haifa Malij Jaafir (Islamic independent) were elected as
national parliamentarians in the December 15 election and will
be replaced at the provincial level.


13. (C) One woman who has the political and religious authority
to push back in council sessions is Dr. Seknaa Falak Al Malkee
(Independent). She is from a well-known and well-respected
religious family in Zubair. Her youngest brother, Sheikh
Mohamed Falik, is a cleric who represents Ayatollah Sistani in
Zubair. Both Dr. Seknaa and her brother are active in their
charity organization that provides assistance to widows,
orphans, and poor families. Her religious character is
untouchable, and when she speaks in council sessions, the
religious authority of the Ayatollah is in everyone's minds.
Intelligent and active in her own right, Dr. Seknaa is a
legitimate political figure who would do well regardless of her
family connections. In the cutthroat environment of the BPC
today, however, Dr. Seknaa's connections are the only thing that
keeps her afloat in a rising tide of religious extremism on the
council.


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Comment
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14. (C) The streets of Basrah pile up with garbage and the
security situation in the city spirals downward as council
members bicker and plot against each other. The "holier than
thou" attitude that the majority Shia party members on the
council have taken in order to push through personal agendas,
rather than thoughtful legislation, has turned the political
battleground into one where minority parties representing Sunni,
Christian, and secular interests stand little chance of success.
At best, the Iraqi National Accord may be able maintain the
same small number of seats it now has on the Council in the next
provincial election. It is entirely possible that only Shia
political parties will be represented on the council in the
future. Shia political moderates with strong religious
backgrounds are the only political moderates in Basrah who will
realistically be able to compete with the extremists in the next
provincial election.
GROSS