Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH36
2006-03-18 12:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

SOUTHERN SHIA PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT POLITICS

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR KDEM IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4029
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHBC #0036/01 0771230
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181230Z MAR 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0274
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0292
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000036 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN SHIA PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT POLITICS

REF: A) BASRAH 35, B) BASRAH 32

BASRAH 00000036 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000036

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN SHIA PERCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT POLITICS

REF: A) BASRAH 35, B) BASRAH 32

BASRAH 00000036 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: On March 15, the Basrah Regional Coordinator
(RC) and Deputy Regional Coordinator (DRC) met with Dr. Wathib
Salman Al Gamud, a senior political figure in the Da'awa party
in Basrah and member of the Basrah Provincial Council (BPC).
Dr. Wathib said that the Shia population in the south would
never be able to accept a non-Shia Prime Minister and that moves
to replace Ibrahim Jafari were viewed as a Sunni ploy to gain
more control in the national government. Dr. Wathib said having
a Sunni Vice President or Sunni co-Deputy Prime Minister was a
tolerable compromise, but that the southern Shia could not
"swallow" having Saleh Mutlak in a high ranking position. The
Shia in southern Iraq, he said, interpreted U.S. Ambassador
Khalilzad's statement on "non-sectarianism" as an expression of
bias toward Sunnis, and they believe that the Sunnis are
attempting to manipulate the United States into supporting a
greater role for Sunnis in the national government than their
minority population merits. End Summary.

Shia Deserve to Rule
--------------


2. (C) On March 15, the Basrah RC and DRC met with Dr. Wathib
Salman Al Gamud. Dr. Wathib explained that the Shia in southern
Iraq realized that Shia make up more than 50 percent of the
population of Iraq, and that because they were the majority,
this gave them the right to have a Shia Prime Minister. No
matter what his weaknesses, Dr. Wathib said, Jafari was
infinitely more acceptable as Prime Minister to the southern
Shia than any possible non-Shia alternative. The RC stressed
that the goal of the U.S. government was to establish a national
unity government. Dr. Wathib pointed out that public reaction
to the nomination of Jafari as Prime Minister had not been
strongly negative; if the public were strongly opposed to
Jafari, they would have made their views known through
demonstrations. The absence of demonstrations against Jafari,

he said, indicated that there was a high degree of tolerance for
Jafari as Prime Minister. Dr. Wathib sidestepped the issue of
Jafari's negative press coverage.


3. (C) Representing 20-30 percent of the total population, Dr.
Wathib said, Sunnis could not expect to take on leadership of
the country. Sunnis had a sense of entitlement developed over
the past twenty years of over-representation in the national
government and were trying to manipulate the outcome of the
election to secure a greater role than their numbers merited.
As an example of "Sunni manipulation," Dr. Wathib described how
the borders of Anbar province had been drawn so that it
represented 30 percent of Iraq's territory, even though its
predominantly Sunni population made up only a tiny fraction of
the nation. This "gerrymandering," he said, showed the extent
to which Sunnis were willing to manipulate facts to serve their
interests.


4. (C) Dr. Wathib said that Shia in the south could accept
Sunnis holding about 44 seats in the Parliament and about 3 or 4
Ministries because it is proportionately fair. He said that
southern Shia accepted having a Sunni Vice President. He
described a power-sharing arrangement of two Deputy Prime
Ministers, a Sunni and a Kurd, with a Shia as Prime Minister, as
being the most acceptable solution to the current impasse on the
position of Prime Minister. This way, each of the three major
groups in Iraq would be represented at the highest level. Under
no circumstance, he said, would southern Shia be able to
"swallow" having Saleh Mutlak in a position of power. Mutlak is
viewed by southern Shia as a close supporter and collaborator
with Saddam. He named Ayad Allawi as a much more acceptable
alternative. (Comment: Dr. Wathib also mentioned that Allawi
was one of his distant cousins. This may be his personal bias.
End Comment)

What the Shia Want From Us
--------------


5. (C) Dr. Wathib said that Shia in the south want the United
States to convince Sunnis to accept their minority position and
not harbor unreasonable expectations for representation in the
new government. There is a misperception, he said, of how many
Sunnis are actually left in the country. Sunnis believe there
are many more of them than there actually are, and this leads
them to the conviction that they deserve more control of the
government than they are democratically entitled to. Before the
Iran-Iraq war, he said, Sunnis made up 30-40 percent of Basrah
province. During the Iran-Iraq war and during the 1991
uprising, however, many Sunnis left. The last municipal

BASRAH 00000036 002.2 OF 003


election revealed that only about eight percent of the
population was Sunni. Dr. Wathib said that most of the Sunnis
who left Basrah went to other countries, not other places in
Iraq. (Comment: We find Dr. Wathib's estimation of the Sunni
population in Basrah province at eight percent plausible. The
estimation of Sunnis at five to ten percent of the population
has been reported to the REO by election officials and media
polls. Moreover, we believe that Sunnis continue to flee the
area. End Comment)


6. (C) U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad's February 20 remarks on
"non-sectarianism" sparked a backlash of anti-Americanism among
the southern Shia population because these remarks were
interpreted as criticism of the Shia, and therefore as support
for the Sunni, Dr. Wathib explained. (Comment: Dr. Wathib was
careful to explain that these were not his opinions, but that he
could understand how the "Shia on the street" would see it this
way. End Comment.) By drawing attention to the deepening
sectarian divide, this was seen as public criticism of how the
Shia government handles its responsibilities, implying that
Sunnis would be able to do a better job. These remarks "gave a
green light" to Sunnis to attack the Shia, both physically
through terrorism and politically by aspiring to more and higher
positions in the government.

No Viable Solutions to Ending the British Boycott
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Dr. Wathib commented that the current suspension of
cooperation with the British forces by the BPC arose because the
British had unilaterally acted to raid houses and make arrests
in Basrah without consulting the BPC. This boycott would last,
he said, until the British began consulting with the BPC on a
regular basis and working in concert with them. He suggested
that if the British had a Basrah police escort with them when it
conducted its arrests on January 23, there would have been no
public sentiment backlash. The presence of the Basrah police
would have reassured the public that the raids were being
conducted with local government approval.


8. (C) Dr. Wathib clarified remarks that he had made at a
recent Reconstruction and Development Meeting in which he
suggested that the BPC boycott include the United States because
of Ambassador Khalilzad's February 20th remarks on
non-sectarianism. He said that what he had meant was that the
BPC should have a universal policy toward all Coalition
partners. If they were going to boycott one partner, they
should boycott them all. He said that personally, he believed
that the BPC decision to boycott the British was becoming more
of a hindrance for the council than helping win support for
their agenda. Dr. Wathib stated that he believed that the
Coalition Forces were in Iraq to help, not as occupiers.


In Sync But Out of Touch
--------------


9. (C) Comment: Dr. Wathib's willingness to spend nearly two
hours with REO personnel demonstrates that he is open to
communication with Coalition partners and does not personally
support the boycott. His bi-cultural, bilingual background was
invaluable in providing insight into how the southern Shia
population interprets national politics and what their trigger
points might be for even greater sectarian strife.


10. (C) Comment continued: In sync with the Shia on the
street, Dr. Wathib was a useful contact for gauging Shia public
opinion, but less reliable on nearly all other matters. His
suggestion of having the British military conduct joint raids
with the Basrah police was simply out-of-touch with reality. He
was unwilling to accept that militias had infiltrated the Basrah
police and were implicated in attacks on the British military.
While he was credible in his assessment that the Sunni
population of Basrah had greatly diminished over the past twenty
years, he also asserted that Sunnis were no longer leaving the
region because they were trying to "increase their numbers" in
Basrah and take more political control. On the contrary, REO
contacts report that Sunni emigration has increased in the past
few months because of sectarian violence (reftel A). Dr.
Wathib's ineffectual suggestions and inaccurate assessments
coincide with reports that the Da'awa party is losing political
significance in Basrah (reftel B). Its senior politicians may
understand their electorate's concerns, but they are incapable
of effective political leadership. End Comment.


11. (C) BIONOTE: Dr. Wathib is a neurophysiologist who was
educated in the United Kingdom and in Sudan. He left Iraq in
1981 for the United Kingdom, where he taught in medical school
for twenty-three years. He holds dual citizenship with Great
Britain, and his wife and children reside in Bristol. An active
humanitarian, he helped found an orphanage in Basrah that

BASRAH 00000036 003.2 OF 003


currently houses 70 children aged 2-16 and teaches skills
courses for homeless teenagers.
GROSS