FAULT LINES IN SOUTHERN SHIA PARTIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000032

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/6/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: FAULT LINES IN SOUTHERN SHIA PARTIES

REF: A) 05 BAGHDAD 4329, B) BASRAH 13, C) 05 BASRAH 140, D) BASRAH 27, E) BASRAH 29, F) 05 BASRAH 77, G) 05 BASRAH 68, H) BASRAH 19

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CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Deputy REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO
BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: In Basrah, the Shia parties of the Unified
Iraqi Coalition (UIC) of List 555 show signs of splitting, with
the Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) lining up against the
Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) and Badr
Organization. Fadillah and Da'awa parties exhibit signs of
waning influence. The Fadillah party and OMS usually act in
concert in the south, and Da'awa party is losing its voters to
SCIRI and Badr. SCIRI and Badr's electoral population is aging,
while OMS appeals to the growing population of unemployed and
disaffected youth. End Summary.

Unified Iraqi Coalition Not Unified
--------------


2. (C) In Basrah, the main political parties that made up the
UIC- List 555 show signs of splitting, with OMS lining up
against SCIRI and Badr. Able to campaign effectively as a
unified political list in the December 15, 2005 elections, 555
parties secured an overwhelming victory in all four of the
southernmost Iraqi provinces. However, with its mission of
winning a National Assembly majority accomplished, the Coalition
no longer presents a unified front to Basrah residents.


3. (C) The most significant rift in the Shia parties is
between OMS and SCIRI/Badr.
In all four of the southernmost provinces, Jayish al Mahdi
(JAM),the militant branch of OMS, and Badr Corps, the military
wing of SCIRI, vie for control on the streets. Before the
December 15 elections, the REO received regular reports of JAM
and Badr skirmishes in Maysan and Basrah provinces; fighting
among all militias has intensified since the December 15
election. In the post-electoral period, JAM has made headway
into the SCIRI stronghold of Muthanna province, which previously
had the reputation of being one of the most peaceful provinces
in Iraq. Similar turf wars are now taking place in Dhi Qar
province.

Lines between Fadillah and OMS Blurred
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4. (C) In the post-December 15 election period, Fadillah party
leadership in Basrah has colluded more with OMS and JAM. An REO
journalist contact even reported that, "JAM and Fadillah are the
same party. They work together, support each other." He said
that at Basrah Provincial Council meetings, only about half of
the forty-one members attend meetings, and those who attend are
of the OMS/Fadillah block, along with a few independents.


5. (C) The Basrah Fadillah party appears to diverge from the
Baghdad Fadillah party. The BPC and the Basrah Governor have
called for boycotting relations with Coalition forces three
times in the past six months, and as much as the Governor has
tried to pass the boycott off as a creation of the BPC, it is
clear that he has stood behind the suspension of communications
with the Coalition each time (reftels A, B). Where the Baghdad
Fadillah party espouses open relations with the Coalition and
other political parties, such as the secular Iraqi National
Accord (INA),the Basrah Fadillah party has made no appreciable
efforts to engage non-Shia, non-555 parties. Following the
growing trend of "Islamification" in Basrah (reftel C),Fadillah
party members in Basrah have aligned themselves more and more
closely with the conservative party line of the 555 List
parties. It is now difficult to discern any significant
differences in the actions and stances of Fadillah party leaders
and those of OMS in Basrah.


6. (C) The Fadillah party, although technically the
front-running political party in Basrah, has more closely
aligned its party platform to that of OMS. The events of the
past two months in Basrah have demonstrated the ineffectuality
of the current local government, while OMS has upped its public
image as that of a security provider. Basrah Governor Mohammed
Waeli of the Fadillah party is an unpopular figure and continues
to lose support. Since the December 15 elections, he has sought
to distance himself from the BPC, led by Chairman Muhammed
Sa'adoon al-Abaadi (Da'awa). During the days of chaos that
followed the Samarra mosque destruction, JAM militia patrolled
the streets of Basrah while the Iraqi police were mostly absent
(reftel D). During the February 25 visit of Moqtada al Sadr to
Basrah, Governor Waeli appeared on television standing directly
behind Moqtada (reftel E).


7. (C) The prevalence of OMS members at Fadillah party
meetings in Basrah further blurs the lines between the two

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parties. The current BPC coordinator for OMS in Basrah, Aqeel
Kadhim described himself as a Fadillah party member with OMS
links (reftel F). OMS leader Sheikh Asaad Al Basri said that
OMS received enough support from the Fadillah party that it did
not need to run its own candidates in the last provincial
elections in Basrah (reftel G).

Da'awa Weakening, Losing Voters to Badr, SCIRI
-------------- --------------


8. (C) A National Democratic Institute (NDI) contact described
the Da'awa Party in Basrah as a "wrinkled, wizened raisin of a
political party." Unable to adapt and change its political
message to appeal to younger voters, Da'awa is losing votes to
the stronger Badr Organization. BPC Chairman Abaadi has angered
many BPC members by his increasing authoritarianism, requiring
each BPC decision to be signed by him. Chairman Abaadi's
decision to suspend communications with the British and Danish
(reftel H) has further isolated him from other council members.

Electoral fault Lines: Age and Federalism
-------------- --------------


9. (C) Da'awa, SCIRI, and Badr all draw from the same
electorate in the south: Iraqis in the 35-60 age range who
suffered greatly under the Saddam regime, many of whom have
close ties to Iran, and who support federalism as a way to
ensure that the south retains control over its own resources.
Leaders of these political parties tend to be war heroes from
the resistance to Saddam, sport battle wounds, and are well
known as having been imprisoned or had family members killed or
imprisoned by Saddam. As Da'awa loses support from its
electorate, voters turn toward SCIRI and Badr, parties that
uphold the same principles of protecting the rights of Shia
Muslims through federalism. However, this electoral population
is aging. The political messages of SCIRI, Badr, and Da'awa do
little to address the economic concerns of younger Iraqis.


10. (C) In contrast, OMS appeals to the younger Iraqi age
group of 18-30 that faces economic uncertainty and high
unemployment and that did not develop the strong ties to Iran
that the previous generation of Shia in the south did. This
population distrusts the idea of federalism. Wary of SCIRI and
Badr because of these parties' links to the Iranian government,
this electorate is susceptible to Moqtada al-Sadr's national
unity message, as well as anti-Coalition sentiment.

Electorate Favors OMS
--------------


11. (C) Comment: The most significant rift in the Shia
parties in the southernmost provinces is between OMS and
SCIRI/Badr. The Fadillah party in the south has demonstrated
that it is unwilling to take a position that opposes OMS. On
the other side, Da'awa is losing voters to SCIRI and Badr. The
polarization of the political playing field between SCIRI-Badr
and OMS has intensified in Basrah since the December 15
election, and the electoral division favors OMS over the long
term. The younger population shows increasing support for the
OMS party because of its messages on economic conditions,
independence from outside influence, and distrust of federalism.
The older generation supports the SCIRI/Badr parties, with
their emphasis on securing control over resources and
independence from the Baghdad government. Unless SCIRI and Badr
are able to adapt their political message to appeal to younger
voters, they risk losing ground in the upcoming provincial
elections. End Comment.
GROSS