MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ADVISOR ON BASRAH'S "PROPHYLACTIC"

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000030

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/1/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR IZ
SUBJECT: MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ADVISOR ON BASRAH'S "PROPHYLACTIC"
GOVERNOR

REF: BASRAH 19

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CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Deputy REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO
BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: On February 28, the Basrah Regional
Coordinator (RC) and Deputy Regional Coordinator (DRC) met with
Majed al Sari, Advisor to the Minister of Defense for Southern
Iraq. Blatant in his dislike for Basrah Governor Mohamed Waeli
(Fadillah),Majed said the Basrah Provincial Council (BPC) was
five votes shy of voting the Governor out of office. Majed's
assessed that public support for Moqtada in Basrah was not very
high, but this opinion most likely was colored by his clear bias
toward SCIRI and Badr Corps. End Summary.

Governor Mohammed Being Used by Smarter Council Member
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2. (C) On February 28, the Basrah RC and DRC met with Majed al
Sari, Advisor to the Minister of Defense for Southern Iraq. A
long-time contact of the Basrah REO, the tone of the meeting was
open and relaxed, and Majed laughed frequently throughout the
meeting. Majed frankly stated that, "Governor Mohammed Waeli
does not like me. I don't like him either." He referred to
being the target of a roadside explosion in Basrah in December
2005 and chuckled, saying, "The Governor probably set the bomb
himself."


3. (C) Majed stated that the Governor is not well liked by the
BPC members and that 22 out of the 41 members were ready to vote
him out of office. This is 5 votes shy of the 27 votes needed
to remove Governor Mohammed from his position. More BPC members
would be willing to vote against Governor Mohammed, he hinted,
but thus far there was no consensus on who would replace him as
Basrah governor. Majed made no effort to hide his preference
for former Governor Hassan Rashed (Badr Corps) as a possible
replacement.


4. (C) Majed accused the Governor of close ties to Saddam
Hussein's regime, alleging that he had been brought before the
De-Ba'athification Committee. He said that the Governor had
been hiding out in his house in Basrah for the past month and
did not travel to Italy as his office reported. Ever since the
arrest of 11 Iraqis by British military on January 23 (see
reftel),the Governor feared that his name would be linked to
the detainees and their crimes, and he was terrified of
retaliation for not being able to force the release of the
prisoners. In the words of Majed, Governor Mohamed is not very
bright and is being used as a front man by more extreme BPC
members, including Abu Salam (Fadillah),to push through a
radical political agenda. (Comment: The actual phrase used by
Majed was that Abu Salam was using the Governor as protection
like a "condom." End Comment.)

Not Worried by Moqtada
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5. (C) When asked his opinion about Moqtada al Sadr's visit to
Basrah on February 26, Majed answered that he did not believe
Moqtada's speech would change anything. During the former
regime, he said, millions of people would appear in the streets
of Basrah to cheer for Saddam when he visited. Orchestrated
crowds, he remarked, were not a true reflection of public
support. Moqtada had come to Basrah straight from Iran, Majed
noted, and this conveyed the perception that Moqtada was serving
as an Iranian spokesperson, not as a free agent. Majed alluded
to his intelligence sources, saying that he had no indication
that Moqtada had any specific objectives of his own in Basrah,
and he did not appear overly concerned by Moqtada's visit.


6. (C) Comment: Majed made no attempt to hide his disdain for
Governor Mohammed or Moqtada al Sadr. His evaluation of
Governor Mohammed as weak, ineffectual, and manipulated by more
adept political extremists is echoed by other REO contacts. His
assessment of Moqtada, on the other hand, probably
underestimates his support in Basrah. His remarks about
carefully orchestrated media coverage not reflecting public
support have some degree of truth, although his comparison of
Moqtada's rabble-rousing to Saddam's former campaign of terror
was not a good one. It is clear that Majed would like the
return of a Badr or SCIRI-led local government in Basrah. End
comment.


7. (C) Biographic note: Majed al Sari was born in Basrah in
1963 and was active in the resistance under the Saddam regime.
He is currently pursuing a master's degree in media relations
from the University of Basrah. His wife and three children

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reside in Sweden and are Swedish citizens. He helped
established the Iraqi Military Intelligence unit in Basrah. He
has been in his position as Advisor to the Minister of Defense
since 2003 and reports directly to the Minister. He does not
speak English.
GROSS