MAYSAN PROVINCE CONTACTS SAY IT IS NOT READY FOR PIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000176

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: MAYSAN PROVINCE CONTACTS SAY IT IS NOT READY FOR PIC

REF: A) BASRAH 47 B) BASRAH 158 C) BASRAH 160 D) BASRAH 166

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CLASSIFIED BY: Andrea F. Gastaldo, Acting Regional Coordinator,
REO Basrah, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b)


1. (C) SUMMARY: On December 5 and 10, the Acting Regional
Coordinator (ARC) and poloff met with frequent contacts Hussein
Jaloob al-Saadi and Abdul Kareem Mahod respectively, from Maysan
province. Both men told the ARC that following days of fighting
between Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM) and the Iraqi Police Service (IPS)
in al-Amarah in late October that things in the city are quiet
but that JAM is in complete control of security. JAM has taken
over the area by intimidation, on-the-spot Sharia judicial
punishments, and targeted killings. Both men echoed each
other's sentiments that the province is not ready for Provincial
Iraqi Control (PIC) in the near future. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) According to two of the REO's regular contacts from
Maysan Province, the province is not ready for turnover to
Provincial Iraqi Control. The ARC and poloff met with Hussein
Jaloob al-Saadi (Abu Muslim) on December 5 and with Abdul Kareem
Mahod (Abu Hatem) on December 10. Both men have previously
voiced the same sentiments to REO personnel (see refs B and C).
According to both, following the October 18-21 fight in the
provincial capital al-Amarah between members of JAM and the
Badr Corps-dominated IPS, which left 30 dead and 206 injured,
the situation in al-Amarah is quiet but not necessarily peaceful
or stable. Abu Hatem was specific in stating that "quiet should
not be confused with stability" and added that the security
situation was "crumbling".(For background information on Abu
Muslim and Abu Hatem, see Ref A.)

JAM's Control of the Streets


3. (C) Following the skirmish in October, a truce was brokered
between the two groups (see ref D). A three-person emergency
security committee (ESC) was sent down by Prime Minister
al-Maliki and is currently still in al-Amarah. Although things
have been quiet in al-Amarah since the truce, the reality on the
ground, according to both Abu Muslim and Abu Hatem, is that JAM
is now in control of the streets and overall security in the
capital. Both separately reported instances where JAM picked up
both men and women in the streets and instituted their version
of Sharia street justice for alleged crimes. In one instance a
man, his brother, and a cousin were shot to death for the man's
public intoxication; a crime that Abu Muslim reaffirmed was not
punishable by death. In another account, women who were not
properly dressed (NFI) were beaten in public to set an example
for others.


4. (C) Abu Muslim told the ARC that the IPS were not out on the
streets but sitting idle in police stations and noted that since
the October skirmish JAM has increased its interactions with
Iran through increased training, arms supplies, and funding.
Abu Hatem stated that the ESC is ineffective and that they
cannot even agree among themselves how the situation in Maysan
should be handled. He added that with one member of the ESC
being a JAM member, one moderate, and one pro-government,
decisions were not being made and they were not responding to
reports of killings and increased violence. However, the ESC
has submitted a proposal to Baghdad to have the Chief of Police,
Ismail Arrar al-Majidi (Abu Maythem) (ref A) removed from office
but there has been no response from Baghdad to date.

Not Ready For PIC


5. (C) When asked about the transfer to Provincial Iraqi
Control (PIC) both men stressed to the ARC that Maysan is not
ready. If the transfer were to happen in the near future, Abu
Hatem questioned who the responsibility would be transferred to
- the militias, the Iraqi Security Forces, or the ESC. He said
that with 13,000 IPS officers and 4500 Iraqi Army (IA) they
still cannot secure the province. He believes that Maysan will
be ready for PIC when Coalition Forces or international
non-governmental organizations can drive freely around the
province without being attacked. As for central government
intervention to help secure the province, Abu Hatem repeated
what he had said during his last meeting with the REO, that
since the central government could not even secure the
International Zone, how could it be expected to help out
anywhere else. Abu Muslim said that the security forces, both
IPS and IA, still had a ways to go in terms of taking
responsibility for the province. He cited the example of the
IPS "running away" and leaving the city during the fighting with
JAM. When asked if there was any intervention by the IA during
the days of fighting, Abu Muslim replied that they did not play
a role during the incident but were seen in the days afterwards
manning checkpoints.

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6. (C) Comment: Since their last meetings with the REO in
early October when both men described a deteriorating security
situation in Maysan, things did indeed take a turn for the worse
with the fight between JAM and IPS later that month. Although
things in al-Amarah are "quiet" it is of great concern that the
reason for the current state of calm is due to total security
control of the city by JAM. The question of who the security
will be turned over to if the province retains an ESC has yet to
be worked out. It seems clear to both our contacts and the REO
that if there is a need for an ESC in a province, then that
province is not ready for PIC. It is a question for Maysan
province now but Basrah province also has an ESC and a premature
turnover to PIC is likely to escalate the violence and
bloodshed. End comment.
GASTALDO