BASRAH COUNCIL MEMBER ON MAYSAN FIGHTING AND OPERATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000166

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH COUNCIL MEMBER ON MAYSAN FIGHTING AND OPERATION
SINBAD

REF: A) BASRAH 160 B) BASRAH 158 C) BASRAH 47

CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)

1) Summary: On October 22, the Regional Coordinator (RC) and
poloff met with Basrah Provincial Council (BPC) member Aquil
Talib to discuss the recent fighting between Badr and JAM in
al-Amarah. Aquil said that he and Basrah Governor Wa'eli
traveled to Maysan on October 21 to assist in mediation between
the warring factions. Fighting broke out when the Chief of
Intelligence, Kasim al-Timimi, was assassinated on September 18.
Aquil also discussed Operation Sinbad and said that it is not
having any effect on the security situation in Basrah. End
summary.

FIGHTING AND MEDIATION IN AL-AMARAH

2) (C) Aquil Talib, member of the BPC and close Regional
Embassy Office contact, met with the RC and poloff on October

22. Aquil said he recently returned from al-Amarah where he,
Basrah Governor Mohammed al-Wa'eli and tribal leaders assisted
in mediating among the warring factions in the capital of Maysan
province. According to Aquil, the trouble in Maysan began a
couple of weeks ago with an increase in assassinations in Maysan
(Refs A and B). The event that set in motion the eruption of
bombings and firefights in al-Amarah was the assassination of
the Chief of Intelligence of Maysan province, Kasim al-Timimi,
on October 18. Aquil said that al-Timimi had evidence on the
individuals responsible for the violence and sought support from
the Governor and local council to arrest these individuals. Two
days after meeting with them, al-Timimi was assassinated.
Fighting broke out after the Chief of Police, Ismail Arrar Al
Majidi, arrested the individuals named by al-Timimi. (Note:
The Badr Organization dominates the security forces in Maysan,
and its members include the Chief of Police and Chief of
Intelligence. The local government, including the Governor and
Chairman of the provincial council, are affiliated with the
Office of the Martyr Sadr. For more on Maysan province see Ref

C. End note.)

3) (C) Aquil reported that the situation in Maysan is currently
calm due to a 20-day truce brokered by a delegation sent by
Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a delegation sent by Muqtada
al-Sadr and the delegation from Basrah. He told the RC that
Governor Wa'eli strongly believed that he should help end the
fighting before it spread to Basrah. He said that the OMS
representatives insisted that Iranian intelligence was present
at the beginning of the fighting and helped to increase its
intensity. When asked how the friction between Badr and OMS/JAM
could be eased, Aquil opined that a new, independent Chief of
Police should be appointed and JAM should give up its weapons
and obey the law. Aquil cautioned that the situation in Maysan
"remains very dangerous" and trouble could spread to Basrah.

OPERATION SINBAD

4) (C) In describing the effects of Operation Sinbad to the RC,
Aquil said that it had absolutely no effect on the security
situation in Basrah. Aquil said he believed the British were
failing in everything in the south from reconstruction to
security. He claimed that the British have "zero influence" in
Basrah and that relations with the local government are not
good. However, Aquil stressed that he did not believe that
Coalition Forces should leave Basrah. He added that if
Coalition Forces left Basrah in the current situation "it would
be suicide;" he urged that Coalition Forces needed to involve
local government authorities more and to work closer with local
communities.

COMMENT

5) (C) Comment: Aquil, a member of the Fadillah party and
close supporter of Governor Wa'eli, is open and positive in
discussions, but evidenced increasing concern with the
deteriorating security situation in Basrah. This is the first
time we have heard him be so critical of UK forces, and his
frustration with lack of progress in improving security was
apparent. Though his claims that he and the governor helped
resolve the crisis in Maysan are vastly overblown, his
apprehension about the violence spreading was real. Aquil made
an interesting point on security in the south - he chided the
coalition for looking at security on a province-by-province
basis. He said that with the tribal web and family connections
throughout the south, it made more sense to view Maysan, Dhi Qar
and Basrah as one region for security purposes. End Comment.

GROSS