Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH162
2006-10-16 07:21:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

REO BASRAH EAC MEETING ON 10/15/2006

Tags:  ASEC PTER AMGT IZ 
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VZCZCXRO9875
PP RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0162 2890721
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160721Z OCT 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0472
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0492
C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000162 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DS, DS/DSS, DS/ITA/NEA, NEA/EX

E.O. 12958: E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/16
TAGS: ASEC PTER AMGT IZ
SUBJECT: REO BASRAH EAC MEETING ON 10/15/2006

REF: A) BASRAH 154 B) BAGHDAD 3559 C) BASRAH 159

CLASSIFIED BY: Bryan T. Bachmann, RSO, REO Basrah, Department of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (g)


C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000162

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DS, DS/DSS, DS/ITA/NEA, NEA/EX

E.O. 12958: E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/16
TAGS: ASEC PTER AMGT IZ
SUBJECT: REO BASRAH EAC MEETING ON 10/15/2006

REF: A) BASRAH 154 B) BAGHDAD 3559 C) BASRAH 159

CLASSIFIED BY: Bryan T. Bachmann, RSO, REO Basrah, Department of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (g)



1. (C) The Regional Coordinator (RC) chaired a meeting of the
Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on October 15, 2006, to discuss
the latest indirect fire (IDF) attacks against the Regional
Embassy Office (REO) and the general security situation.
Attending the meeting were the Regional Security Officer,
Management Officer, Political Officer, Information Processing
Officer and representatives from the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, Triple Canopy, Strategic Counter-Intelligence
Directorate, and Kellogg Brown and Root.


2. (C) Indirect fire (IDF) attacks on Basrah Palace have
occurred on an almost daily basis during the past month. The
frequency and accuracy of the attacks prompted the EAC to meet
to discuss the safety of personnel at post.


3. (C) Employees' safety at REO Basrah cannot be guaranteed
because of the frequent indirect fire attacks. In the general
discussion of security, everyone agreed that they are still able
to perform their duties even in light of the REO's reduced
staffing level (see Refs A and B). The consensus of the
members of the EAC is that if the security situation is viewed
without reference to the value of our reporting, then people
should be withdrawn from the REO because on the on-going IDF
threat. However, if the importance of the USG presence and
reporting is considered along with the security threat, EAC
members agreed that staffing should stay at its current level.
This assessment, of course, could change rapidly if the IDF
increases or becomes more accurate. Security at the REO and the
safety of REO personnel is assessed on a daily basis in
conjunction with Embassy Baghdad.


4. (C) EAC members also expressed the strong opinion that
effective counter IDF measures are needed to reduce the threat
of IDF. Militia members presently operate with impunity in
firing rockets and mortars at Basrah Palace; the UK military
runs counter IDF operations, but its resources and personnel are
limited. Aggressive counter IDF efforts are needed.


5. (C) REO Basrah appreciates the concern expressed by Embassy
Baghdad and Washington for the safety of its employees. If the
current operations of the REO still have value, the EAC believes
that the present level of IDF should not force a further
reduction in the REO's staffing level. However, without the
implementation of strong counter IDF measures, the security
situation at REO Basrah will deteriorate and eventually force
post to ask that its personnel be evacuated

GROSS