Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH160
2006-10-13 10:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

SECURITY IN MAYSAN PROVINCE DETERIORATES

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8300
PP RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0160 2861001
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 131001Z OCT 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0470
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0490
C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000160 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SECURITY IN MAYSAN PROVINCE DETERIORATES

REF: A) BASRAH 142; B) BASRAH 158

CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000160

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SECURITY IN MAYSAN PROVINCE DETERIORATES

REF: A) BASRAH 142; B) BASRAH 158

CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)


1. (U) Summary: In an October 12 meeting between Maysan
contact Abdul Kareem Mahod (Abu Hatem) and the Regional
Coordinator (RC) at the REO, the discussion centered on the
deteriorating security situation in Maysan. Violence and
assassinations have markedly increased since the departure of
Coalition Forces from Camp Abu Naji at the end of August.
Before the province can be turned over to Iraqi control, the
security forces must be cleaned out, he said. The overall
situation is worsening and he believes that the United States
must lend its support to moderate and independent groups in
order for change. He stated that with employment, militia
membership would dwindle because membership is mainly seen as a
source of income to many. End summary.


2. (C) Leader of Maysan's Noble Council, Abdul Kareem Mahod
(Abu Hatem) lamented Maysan's deteriorating security situation
during a meeting with the RC and poloff on October 12. Abu
Hatem reiterated his belief previously shared with the RC (Ref
B) that Maysan was not ready to transition to Provincial Iraqi
Control (PIC). He told the RC that since their last meeting on
August 31, the security situation in Maysan has markedly
worsened. He said that since the withdrawal of Coalition Forces
from Camp Abu Naji in August, violence and assassinations have
increased, echoing the sentiments of another close REO contact
from Maysan (Ref A). Abu Hatem said that with the success of
the Iranian-backed militias to drive out British forces from
Camp Abu Naji, the militias have turned their attention to
intimidating and assassinating independent members of the Maysan
government along with members of the Sunni, Christian and
Mandean communities, sectarian violence previously unseen in
Maysan. In addition, he said that Iran is funding assassination
teams to foment instability in the province.


3. (C) Abu Hatem emphasized that Iraqi Security Forces would
have to be "cleaned out" before PIC could be seriously
considered. Abu Hatem said he met with the Minister of
Interior, Jawad al-Boulani last week, and al-Boulani allegedly
reported that that Chief of Police Ismail al-Majidi (Abu
Maythem) was involved in smuggling goods and weapons across the
border from Iran. Abu Hatem laughed off any assertion that the
central government could ameliorate the violence in Maysan by
saying that it could not even control the Green Zone


4. (C) Abu Hatem strongly urged that the United States throw
its support to independent and moderate groups since they were
the only hope for Iraq. Without more support, Abu Hatem said
that Iran would use the militias to increase instability
throughout the country. The only remedy to increased militia
influence is more employment opportunities for Iraqi youth, Abu
Hatem said. He estimated that 80 percent of militia members are
merely working for a paycheck


5. (C) Comment: Abu Hatem is the leader of the Noble Council
in Maysan and has his own agenda, but he genuinely seems to
value improving the lot of the average Iraqi. His reputation as
the "Prince of the Marshes" during the Saddam regime makes him a
popular figure, and the support he requested for independent
political leaders obviously referred to him and the Noble
Council. His view of Maysan's readiness for PIC coincides with
the views of other REO contacts, as do his tales of increasing
assassinations and Iranian influence. Abu Hatem could well be a
viable counterweight to the current Sadr/JAM government and
Badr-led security forces in Maysan. End comment.

GROSS