Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH159
2006-10-08 13:13:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:
REO BASRAH EAC MEETING ON 10/06/06
how-toVZCZCXRO3292 PP RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK DE RUEHBC #0159 2811313 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 081313Z OCT 06 FM REO BASRAH TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0469 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0489
C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000159
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/ITA/NEA,NEA/WEX
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/6/2016
TAGS: ASEC PTER AMGT IZ
SUBJECT: REO BASRAH EAC MEETING ON 10/06/06
REF: A) BASRAH 154 B) BAGHDAD 3559
CLASSIFIED BY: Bryan T. Bachmann, RSO, REO Basrah, Department of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (g)
C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000159
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/ITA/NEA,NEA/WEX
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/6/2016
TAGS: ASEC PTER AMGT IZ
SUBJECT: REO BASRAH EAC MEETING ON 10/06/06
REF: A) BASRAH 154 B) BAGHDAD 3559
CLASSIFIED BY: Bryan T. Bachmann, RSO, REO Basrah, Department of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (g)
1. (C) The Regional Coordinator (RC) chaired a meeting of the
Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on October 6, 2006, to discuss
the latest indirect fire (IDF) attacks against the Regional
Embassy Office (REO) and the general security situation. The
EAC was prompted by almost daily IDF and mortar attacks on the
REO. Attending the meeting were the Regional Security Officer,
Management Officer, and representatives from the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, Triple Canopy, Strategic Counter-Intelligence
Directorate, Kellogg Brown and Root and the Office of Regional
Affairs.
2. (C) Indirect fire (IDF) attacks on Basrah Palace have
occurred on an almost daily basis during the past month. The
attacks have become more accurate and more frequent. Recently, a
heavy volley of mortar fire and a rocket came dangerously close
to occupied residential and office areas.
3. (C) As discussed in Refs A and B, Post personnel was
reduced on the REO compound by approximately 25 percent through
a temporary redeployment of personnel in country and by
extensions of leave for those out of country. Because of the
enduring threat posed by indirect fire, REO Basrah has further
reduced the number of personnel by another eight percent. Post
is working closely with Embassy Baghdad to coordinate these
efforts. The DCM is in close consultation with the Basrah
Regional Coordinator, Baghdad RSO, and Baghdad Management
Counselor and approved the eight percent redeployment.
4. (U) The long awaited Overhead Cover Project for REO Basrah
has just begun and will require the contractor to house
approximately 70 personnel on the compound. This will include
contract American staff members, and the laborers will be third
country nationals. If Post were to go to minimal staffing
levels, the project would have to be suspended.
5. (U) REO Basrah is working in close coordination with Embassy
Baghdad's EAC to reduce the REO's footprint and improve the
security situation in Basrah.
GROSS
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR DS/DSS, DS/IP/NEA, DS/ITA/NEA,NEA/WEX
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/6/2016
TAGS: ASEC PTER AMGT IZ
SUBJECT: REO BASRAH EAC MEETING ON 10/06/06
REF: A) BASRAH 154 B) BAGHDAD 3559
CLASSIFIED BY: Bryan T. Bachmann, RSO, REO Basrah, Department of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (g)
1. (C) The Regional Coordinator (RC) chaired a meeting of the
Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on October 6, 2006, to discuss
the latest indirect fire (IDF) attacks against the Regional
Embassy Office (REO) and the general security situation. The
EAC was prompted by almost daily IDF and mortar attacks on the
REO. Attending the meeting were the Regional Security Officer,
Management Officer, and representatives from the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, Triple Canopy, Strategic Counter-Intelligence
Directorate, Kellogg Brown and Root and the Office of Regional
Affairs.
2. (C) Indirect fire (IDF) attacks on Basrah Palace have
occurred on an almost daily basis during the past month. The
attacks have become more accurate and more frequent. Recently, a
heavy volley of mortar fire and a rocket came dangerously close
to occupied residential and office areas.
3. (C) As discussed in Refs A and B, Post personnel was
reduced on the REO compound by approximately 25 percent through
a temporary redeployment of personnel in country and by
extensions of leave for those out of country. Because of the
enduring threat posed by indirect fire, REO Basrah has further
reduced the number of personnel by another eight percent. Post
is working closely with Embassy Baghdad to coordinate these
efforts. The DCM is in close consultation with the Basrah
Regional Coordinator, Baghdad RSO, and Baghdad Management
Counselor and approved the eight percent redeployment.
4. (U) The long awaited Overhead Cover Project for REO Basrah
has just begun and will require the contractor to house
approximately 70 personnel on the compound. This will include
contract American staff members, and the laborers will be third
country nationals. If Post were to go to minimal staffing
levels, the project would have to be suspended.
5. (U) REO Basrah is working in close coordination with Embassy
Baghdad's EAC to reduce the REO's footprint and improve the
security situation in Basrah.
GROSS