Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH137
2006-08-24 06:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

IRAQI GENERAL HOLDS DIM VIEW OF BASRAH'S NEW SECURITY CHIEF

Tags:  PGOV PREL IR IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9424
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0137/01 2360631
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 240631Z AUG 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0437
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0456
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000137 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI GENERAL HOLDS DIM VIEW OF BASRAH'S NEW SECURITY CHIEF

REF: (A) BASRAH 104; (B) BASRAH 135; (C) BASRAH 117

BASRAH 00000137 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Andrea Gastaldo, Deputy Regional Coordinator, REO
Basrah, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000137

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI GENERAL HOLDS DIM VIEW OF BASRAH'S NEW SECURITY CHIEF

REF: (A) BASRAH 104; (B) BASRAH 135; (C) BASRAH 117

BASRAH 00000137 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Andrea Gastaldo, Deputy Regional Coordinator, REO
Basrah, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b)


1. (C) Summary. Major General Abdul Latif, commander of the
Iraqi Army's 10th division responsible for the four southern
provinces, told the Regional Coordinator (RC) on August 22 that
he has low expectations that the chairman of the newly formed
Basrah security committee, Major General Ali Hammadi, will
succeed in his mission to pacify the city. Latif stated that
Hammadi, who has a reputation for corruption, has no clear plan
of action and has asked the IA to carry out functions normally
handled by the police force. Latif also discussed the IA's
plans to seize unregistered vehicles and weapons and described
Iranian efforts to destabilize Basrah. End Summary.

-------------- --------------
VIEW OF NEW SECURITY COMMITTEE CHIEF
-------------- --------------


2. (C) On August 22, Major General Abdul Latif, the commander
of the Iraqi Army's (IA) 10th division in charge of Basrah,
Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Maysaan provinces, told the RC that the
chairman of the newly formed Basrah security committee, Major
General Ali Hammadi, was a poor choice to lead the security
committee responsible for stabilizing Basrah. (See Ref A for
more on General Latif.) Latif said that Hammadi, who has a
reputation for being corrupt, has no serious plan of action and
already had asked for IA assistance with security for police
stations, a task normally performed by the police themselves.
Latif informed the RC that while he and Hammadi operate in
separate chains of command, he is supportive of Hammadi's
efforts but would have advised the Prime Minister not to choose
Hammadi since he was from Basrah and had a shady past from his
time serving in the border forces. Latif added that he is
trying to stay out of the current dispute between Hamadi and
Basrah Governor Mohammed al-Wa'eli, which al-Wa'eli claims he
will take to the PM this week (ref B).


3. (C) Illustrating Hammadi's helplessness, Latif recounted an
anecdote in which Hammadi appealed for IA intervention to

support a police station with military force when the station
came under threat of attack from militias. Latif responded to
Hammadi that with 15,000 policemen in the Basrah force, they
should have sufficient personnel to secure their own stations.
According to Latif, Hammadi shot back with his usual retort,
that "police are corrupt and untrustworthy." (Note. The same
response was often given by former Chief of Police Hassan Sewady
al-Saad, who left office at the end of July after a long feud
with Governor al-Wa'eli and the Basrah Provincial Council (ref
C) End note.). In Latif's view, honest policemen do exist, but
they are cowed into silence and inaction by militia death
threats and the lack of good leadership. The general commented
that he believed Hammadi should appeal to the public for support
and that police officers should be transferred around the
provinces to lessen the chance they will become corrupt.

-------------- --------------
SEIZURE OF UNREGISTERED VEHICLES
-------------- --------------


4. (C) In a step toward disarming the militias, General Latif
revealed that beginning on August 23, his forces would set up
traffic checkpoints in Basrah and seize unregistered motorcycles
and cars, which he said are used to carry out assassinations and
kidnappings. (Note. New military checkpoints were observed in
Basrah streets on August 23. End note.) The general added that
his IA forces will arrest people carrying weapons without
permits, another step in the gargantuan task of attempting to
re-establish public order.

-------------- --------------
--------------
POROUS BORDER WITH IRAN NEEDS TO BE SEALED
-------------- --------------
--------------


5. (C) General Latif also discussed Iran's efforts to
destabilize Basrah. He said that the Basrah could not become
secure until the border with Iran is sealed and the flow of
Iranian rockets, guns, snipers, money and agents into Iraq is
staunched. The general said that Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) and other
militias are at the receiving end of Iran's largesse. He
commented that Iranian agents are teaching JAM fighters to
launch rockets at coalition targets and are paying them money to
do so. The general recommended that rewards in the form of
promotions and money be given to soldiers who seize Iranian
munitions smuggled across the border.


BASRAH 00000137 002.2 OF 002



6. (C) Comment. General Latif, a non-political soldier's
soldier, is one of the few points of light in a darkening
picture of Basrah's descent into lawlessness. He has proven his
effectiveness in various security operations, but the record
shows that after his reassignment to other missions, his impact
was short-lived. Latif's comments about Hammadi's incompetence
are consistent with assessments from nearly all of our contacts.
End Comment.
GROSS