Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH121
2006-07-21 16:41:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

DETERIORATING SECURITY IMPACTING REO BASRAH

Tags:  ASEC AMGT PTER IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO7917
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0121/01 2021641
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211641Z JUL 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0412
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0431
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000121 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/21/2016
TAGS: ASEC AMGT PTER IZ
SUBJECT: DETERIORATING SECURITY IMPACTING REO BASRAH

REF: A) BASRAH 73, B) BASRAH 79, C) BASRAH 84

BASRAH 00000121 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Marrano, DEPUTY REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO
BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(g)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000121

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/21/2016
TAGS: ASEC AMGT PTER IZ
SUBJECT: DETERIORATING SECURITY IMPACTING REO BASRAH

REF: A) BASRAH 73, B) BASRAH 79, C) BASRAH 84

BASRAH 00000121 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Mark Marrano, DEPUTY REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO
BASRAH, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(g)

1. (C) Summary: Following the arrest of a high ranking Jaysh
al Mahdi (JAM) member on July 16 by the British military, the
REO Basrah Palace compound has come under significant increased
indirect fire (IDF) attacks, severely impacting REO operations.
There is insufficient space in hard buildings for all 390 REO
personnel, and long hours spent in poorly ventilated and cramped
bunkers over the course of the past five days has affected all
personnel and REO operations adversely. Air transport into and
out of the palace compound has been reduced significantly since
the increased attacks began, resulting in the cancellation of
meetings and delays in personal leave. The increased attacks
that began with the arrest campaign of JAM members are likely to
continue as long as the arrest campaign itself does. The
British and Danish Missions also housed on the compound are
pursuing staff reductions as a result of the attacks.
Alternatives for staffing and operations at the U.S. REO also
need to be explored. End summary.

Significant Increase in IDF Attacks
--------------


2. (C) Following an arrest operation of a high ranking JAM
member Sajed Badr, aka Abu Aya, by British forces during the
early morning of July 16, REO Basrah has experienced an increase
in IDF attacks. There have also been increased attacks on other
MNF-I bases and targets in Basrah since July 16, contributing to
an overall significant decrease in Basrah's security
environment. A breakdown of IDF is as follows:

- On the night of July 16 at 2140, Basrah Palace was attacked
with nine rockets and four mortars from three separate firing
points. One rocket landed within the REO compound in the water
barrier that separates the US REO from the Romanian compound.
The rest of the indirect fire landed in the vicinity of just
outside front gate of the REO or overshot the compound and
landed in the Shatt Al Arab River. No injuries to personnel or

damage to property resulted from the incident.

- Later on July 16 at 2340, Basrah Palace was hit with an
additional four rockets. Three rounds landed in the Romanian
compound and one landed 100 meters from an REO guard tower. No
injuries to personnel or damage to property resulted from the
incident. However, an Iraqi woman living in a house near the
REO was killed by one of the rockets that missed the REO
compound. Two additional mortars were launched toward the
palace during the early morning of July 17.

- On July 17 at 2355, Basrah Palace was attacked by four rounds
of IDF mortars. One round landed on a house on the perimeter of
the REO's front gate. The other rounds landed on the British
and Romanian compounds. No injuries to personnel or damage to
property resulted from the incident.

- On July 18 at 0530, three mortars were launched against the
palace with one landing and detonating just inside the REO's
front gate. A third country national guard sustained shrapnel
injuries to both of his legs as well as his head and was
evacuated to Shaibah Logistics Base for medical attention.

- On July 18 between 1430 and 1500, the palace was fired upon
again with four mortars that overshot the compound and landed in
the Shatt Al Arab River. No injuries to personnel or damage to
property resulted from the incident.

- On July 19 at 2200, three rockets were launched at the
palace. One of the rockets detonated inside the residential
trailer area of the REO, the first time a rocket has landed in
this area, and another rocket landed on the helicopter landing
area inside the British side of the compound. The rocket landed
and detonated about three feet from the front door of a
residential trailer. No injuries were sustained by REO
personnel. The concrete barrier in front of the row of trailers
took the brunt of the damage, and damage to the trailers in the
area was caused.

- On July 20 at 2225, five rockets were launched against the REO
compound. None of the rockets landed inside the compound. The
impacts were at least one kilometer to the south and to the east
of the compound.

Adverse Impact on REO Operations
--------------


3. (C) REO activities have been severely impacted by the
ongoing attacks. State Department personnel have cancelled all
scheduled meetings inside the compound since July 17 due to the
threat of daylight attacks. Iraqi contacts have cancelled
meetings with REO staff at locations outside the compound since
July 16. A PSD run to the Basrah Airport for July 21 was
cancelled by the British military headquarters due to the
inability to provide QRF support. The remaining locally engaged
political/economic assistant has been advised not to appear for

BASRAH 00000121 002.2 OF 003


work at the REO since July 18 due to the threat of daylight IDF
attacks. Increased security measures have further constrained
travel to the other side of the compound where the British
Consulate and PRT Building are located. Attacks against MNF-I
targets in Basrah city have increased since July 16, including
contractor personal security detail (PSD) teams.


4. (C) REO personnel reside in trailers without hard cover and
are evacuated to bunkers during IDF attacks. These bunkers
provide adequate protection against IDF for short periods of
time, but are poorly ventilated, cramped and not designed to
serve as accommodation for an entire night. According to the
KBR Project Lead, sleep deprivation is adversely impacting staff
performance, many of whom are already over-extended due to the
minimal number of local nationals still working at Basrah Palace
(Ref C).


5. (C) If further sustained IDF attacks occur, the REO will be
faced with a significant challenge to accommodate all REO
personnel under hard cover overnight or for extended periods of
time. The U.S. REO side of the compound has only five hard
structures, of indeterminate protective standards, that are too
small to accommodate all 390 personnel. Following the July 19
attack, REO personnel were evacuated from trailers and bunkers
within a 200 meter radius of the rocket impact site until
British artillery personnel could ascertain that the rocket had
already detonated and posed no further threat. As a result, the
EOB housed an additional 50 people for approximately three hours
in offices and hallways on available floor space. Remaining
personnel stayed in bunkers or in one of the other smaller
hardened buildings on the compound. The REO has allowed State
and USAID personnel to sleep in the EOB since July 17, but the
building contains no cots and only one functioning bathroom.
KBR is currently working with the RSO to install air
conditioning units in the existing hardened conex boxes that
serve as bunkers until hardened concrete bunkers can be
constructed that allow for better airflow and greater capacity
for personnel.

Other Missions Considering Drawdown
-------------- ---


6. (C) At a July 20 Provincial Reconstruction Team meeting, the
British military liaison announced that the British mission was
in the process of identifying mission essential personnel in
order to reduce numbers on the compound due to security concerns.


7. (C) Since July 17, the 16 Danish Mission personnel have been
sleeping in the hard building that serves as their office
because of the threat of constant IDF. The head of the Danish
Mission has advised the Deputy Regional Coordinator that further
sustained IDF attacks on the compound will result in an
evacuation of all non-essential personnel. On July 21, five
Danish Mission personnel requested to leave the Basrah Palace
compound.

Air Transport
--------------


8. (C) Movement into and out of Basrah Palace by helicopter
became significantly more challenging following the attack on a
British helicopter on May 6 that resulted in the deaths of five
British military personnel. Since this attack, helicopter
traffic into and out of Basrah Palace has been limited to
nighttime hours. The already serious problem of air travel has
been exacerbated by nighttime IDF attacks as helicopters have
been unable to land at the palace at night since July 16.
Consequently, there is a backlog of over 100 passengers waiting
for transport out of Basrah Palace.

Local Nationals
--------------


9. (C) Out of 220 Local National (LN) personnel contracted to
KBR, 108 LNs appeared for duty on July 17. Following the July
18 early morning attack, no LNs were allowed in to the REO
compound for work that day. On July 19, 98 LNs appeared for
duty, and on July 20, 101 LNs appeared. These LNs perform
routine cleaning and maintenance duties; their appearance is not
essential for REO operations to continue. Their absence results
in longer waits for laundry service, trash collection, and
processing work request orders to be completed. All basic life
support services are currently being performed by KBR
direct-hire personnel.


10. (C) Comment: The current drain on REO personnel and
resources as a result of the sustained IDF attacks on the
compound is unsustainable. State Department personnel are
currently unable to conduct normal business. Transport into and
out of the Basrah Palace compound by helicopter has become
significantly more difficult, and this is currently the only
means of transportation, particularly to the airport for onward
flights. The REO does not have the capacity to house all of its

BASRAH 00000121 003.2 OF 003


personnel in hardened structures, and its bunkers are not
designed for the extended residence required for protection from
a sustained campaign of IDF over a long period. This increase
in violent activity does not just impact the REO; other MNF-I
bases, Coalition targets and personnel in southern Iraq are also
being impacted by the surge in violence. REO activities have
been adversely impacted to the point that alternatives to
staffing and operations, such as being considered by the Danish
and British Missions also housed on the compound, need to be
considered. End comment.
MARRANO