TWO DIFFERENT VIEWS OF SECURITY IN BASRAH

C O N F I D E N T I A L BASRAH 000112

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/4/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: TWO DIFFERENT VIEWS OF SECURITY IN BASRAH

REF: A) BASRAH 49 B) BASRAH 65 C) BASRAH 81

CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)


1. (C) On July 3, the Regional Coordinator (RC) met with Hassan
al-Rashid, leader of Badr Organization in Basrah and a member of
the Basrah Provincial Council (BPC). Al-Rashid discussed the
migration of Sunni families from the Zubair and Al Khassib areas
because of threats and intimidation and told the RC that a group
of Sunni and Shia leaders had met to promote unity and address
the mass departure of the Sunni population. (Note: Despite
frequent inquiries to REO contacts, this is the first that we
have heard of a Sunni-Shia group that is trying to forestall the
exodus of Sunni families. End Note.) Besides citing the
existence of such a group, al-Rashid could not give many
specifics on the members and their activities.


2. (C) Al-Rashid tied the threats against the Sunnis to the
security situation in Basrah. He opined that the situation has
improved since the Prime Minister declared the State of
Emergency in Basrah on May 1, but believes that the Iraqi Police
Service (IPS) is the weakest link. Al-Rashid said that he had
heard of a new Baghdad security plan for Basrah that would
include participation by both the Iraqi Security Forces and
Coalition Forces, but did not know more details. In an aside
after discussing Governor al-Wa'eli's role in the security plan,
the RC asked about oft-reported plans (Refs B, C, and previous)
for the BPC to vote the governor out. Al-Rashid said that it is
now a dead issue and he expects the governor to remain in office
until the provincial election. The reason the governor was not
ousted, he said, was because some BPC members had been directly
threatened and were too frightened to vote al-Wa'eli out.


3. (C) The RC met with the governor's brother, Ismail
al-Wa'eli, on July 2 to discuss security in Basrah (see Ref. A
for more on Ismail al-Wa'eli). In a disjointed and rambling
conversation, Ismail admitted many people thought he was behind
political assassinations in Basrah, but professed his innocence
and blamed this "false impression" on his numerous disputes with
people in many political parties. He expressed frustration that
he is always the number one suspect for assassinations and
blamed Badr and SCIRI for many of the killings. When asked
about the intimidation and assassination of Sunnis and the REO's
local staff, Ismail said that the British knew who were behind
the killings but were not doing anything about it. He told the
RC that aside from the assassinations, the Governor was doing a
good job with the security plan even without the support of the
IPS or Chief of Police. He described his future plans as being
apolitical and focusing on humanitarian work.


4. (C) Comment: Hassan al-Rashid, a politician who is very
careful with his words, was even more circumspect in this
meeting. He spoke in broad generalities, did not provide
specific information and, quite frankly, simply seemed to be
meeting to keep up contact with the REO. (Note: in the
previous five days he also had met with the British Consul
General and the British military.) Al-Rashid was resigned to
Governor al-Wa'eli retaining the governorship. The meeting with
Ismail al-Wa'eli was a farrago of names and events as he spewed
out "suspects" in the murders and related his relationship to
various people at different points in his life.

GROSS