PROVINCIAL ELECTION IN BASRAH LIKELY TO BE WAR BETWEEN THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000110

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR PINS KDEM KISL IZ
SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL ELECTION IN BASRAH LIKELY TO BE WAR BETWEEN THE
5'S

REF: A) BASRAH 001

BASRAH 00000110 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, Regional Coordinator, REO Basrah,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)


1. (C) Summary: In meetings on June 15 and June 19, Hazim
Joda, the branch manager for the Independent Electoral
Commission of Iraq (IECI),and Osama Khalil, the Basrah IECI
media manager, gave Basrah Regional Embassy Office (REO) Poloff
an overview of issues in the pre-provincial election season in
Basrah. Both officials said that they expected the provincial
election in Basrah to be particularly competitive and
contentious, as the different political parties that make up the
Unified Iraqi Coalition (UIC)- List 555- compete for power
against each other. Security in Basrah has degraded
considerably since the December 15 election and is likely to be
much more of an issue in the provincial election. The issue of
out-of-province voting for Iraqis displaced by sectarian
violence was identified as a growing concern. End Summary.

List 555: Each 5 For Himself
--------------


2. (C) In meetings on June 15 and June 19, Hazim Joda, the
Basrah IECI branch manager, and Osama Khalil, the Basrah IECI
media manager, gave an overview of issues leading up to the
provincial election season in Basrah. Neither Hazim nor Osama
speculated about when they thought the provincial election would
take place, but both said that they were aware the issue was
currently under discussion in parliament. Those parties
currently in power were pushing for a later provincial election
date, they said, while those parties that would likely gain
seats were pushing for an early election.


3. (C) Osama and Hazim said they believed that Fadhila would
separate from the rest of the Unified Iraqi Coalition (UIC) List
555 for the provincial election. Osama also said that it was
possible that the two Da'awa parties and the Office of the
Martyr Sadr (OMS) might separate from the UIC 555. (Note: In
such a scenario, Da'awa and Da'awa Tanzim would remain allied.
End Note.) Both Osama and Hazim said, however, that other
lists' parties, such as those in Iraqi National Accord (INA) 731
List and Basrah Sunni Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) 618 List, were
waiting to see what would happen to the UIC 555 before deciding
whether or not to withdraw from their Lists. If OMS withdrew
from UIC 555, for example, then 731 parties would be more likely
to remain on their list to improve their chances of winning more
votes. (Comment: One REO contact said that in the provincial
election, we would see the complete breakdown of the UIC 555
List. "It will be each 5 for himself." End Comment.)


4. (C) Osama and Hazim both said that they maintained open
communication with IIP party members. The Sunni party had been
disappointed with the outcome of the December 15 election, but
they had also admitted to the IECI that they had not chosen
their political candidates wisely and had therefore lost votes
to the 731 List, which had included a former Ba'athist party on
it (reftel). Because the Sunni parties had lodged so many
complaints after the December 15 election, Osama said that the
IECI planned to welcome as many Sunni election observers as
possible in the future provincial election.

Security in Basrah a Major Concern
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Both Hazim and Osama voiced concern about the security
situation in Basrah and how deteriorating conditions might
adversely affect the provincial election. Osama voiced private
concern that the targeting of Sunnis in Basrah for
assassinations, as well as the attack on the IIP headquarters in
Basrah following the February 22 Golden Mosque attack, would
adversely impact the elections. Both Hazim and Osama expressed
concern that the Sunni IIP headquarters was still closed in
Basrah because it would affect the party's ability to organize
and participate in the provincial election. Hazim stated that,
"2003 was better than 2004, and now 2005 is proving to be better
than 2006."


6. (C) Both IECI officials remarked that the provincial
election in Basrah would be especially competitive and
contentious because the political parties comprising the UIC 555
will compete against each other instead of cooperating with each
other as they did in the December 15 parliamentarian election.
The December 15 election had not been particularly divisive in
Basrah, Hazim pointed out, and the UIC 555 won 13 out of 16
national assembly seats. Largely because of the lack of
controversy, the December 15 election had taken place in an
atmosphere of peace, with relatively few incidents of fraud or
security issues. This would not be the case during the
provincial election, in his view, and he foresaw a greater risk

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for security incidents in the lead-up to the provincial election
in Basrah, as well as more allegations of fraud and voting
irregularities by the political parties.

Getting out the Vote
--------------


7. (C) Osama said that he was focusing on launching an
effective public education campaign in Basrah in order to
improve voter turnout. He said that he was worried that too
many people were becoming apathetic about voting. As media
manager, he saw it as his specific duty to "get out the vote,"
and was working closely with the National Democratic Institute
(NDI) and other non-governmental organizations to do so. He
specifically identified women voters as a target audience,
saying that women made up over half the population but were
historically underrepresented in voter turnout. He said he was
trying to brainstorm possibilities to encourage women to educate
themselves about voting so that they would be less susceptible
to pressure from family members and religious leaders on how to
vote.

Where and How Do IDPs Vote?
-------------- -


8. (C) Osama identified voting for internally displaced people
(IDPs) in Basrah as an issue of concern. Many Shia families
have moved into the Basrah area from other provinces in Iraq,
and these individuals will face difficulty in being able to vote
in the provincial election. These families are too frightened
to return to their home provinces to vote. (Comment: During
the June 19 meeting, Hazim downplayed the issue, saying that he
believed the IDP problem in Basrah was blown out of proportion
by the media. Hazim was not present at the June 15 meeting.
End Comment.)


9. (C) When asked if the IECI could coordinate with the
Ministry of Displacement and Migration to facilitate voting for
displaced families, Osama replied that this would be possible.
He suggested that displaced families be allowed to pre-register
in the 40 days leading up to the provincial election in their
new province of residence with the "Number 91 Form." He
admitted that this might tax IECI logistical capabilities
because, from past experience, he knew that most people waited
until the last few days before the election to pre-register. He
said the IECI had no plans at the moment to allow for absentee
or out-of-province voting. (Comment: Allowing IDPs to vote in
their new places of residence would solve the issue of them
voting. However, it would not enable them to vote for the local
government in their places of habitual residence, which would
pose other problems. In addition, the influx of Shia into
Basrah and the flows of Sunnis out of Basrah may skew the
results of the provincial election if IDPs are not able to
affect the vote in their places of habitual residence. End
Comment.)


9. (C) Comment: The outcome of the December 15 election in
Basrah was largely a foregone conclusion, as the political scene
in Basrah was, and continues to be, dominated by the Fadhila,
Da'awa, SCIRI, and Basrah Islamic List parties. This will not
be the case in the provincial election, because each of these
Islamic political parties will attempt to gain as much control
on the provincial council as possible. The likelihood of
intense political battles, coupled with the unstable security
environment in Basrah, indicates that the provincial election in
Basrah has the potential to take place in a significantly
different atmosphere than the December 15 election and give rise
to increased violence.


10. (C) Comment continued: Despite Hazim's efforts to minimize
of the problem of IDPs in Basrah, it has the potential to
explode in the polling stations during the run-up to the
election because the issue concerns sectarianism between Sunnis
and Shia. In any case, the issue of out-of-province voting must
be resolved on a general level so that Iraqis who are
temporarily displaced from their provinces of habitual residence
have the opportunity to affect political change in their home
provinces. End comment.


11. (C) BIONOTE: Hazim Hammed Joda al-Rubaee was born in 1954
in Basrah. He became the manager of the Basrah branch of the
IECI in December 2005. Prior to that, he was the deputy IECI
manager from October to December 2005. He is not affiliated
with any of the political parties. He obtained a B.S. in
mechanical engineering from the University of Basrah in 1978 and
spent the following sixteen years working in the Ministry of
Transportation as an engineer. In 1994, he fled to Jordan,
where he worked in a transport company. In 1996, he moved to
the United Arab Emirates where he worked in the Muften Company
until he returned to Basrah in 1998. He speaks fluent English.

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He is married and has three children.

12 (C) BIONOTE: Osama Khalil Ibrahim was born in 1965 in
Basrah. He obtained a B.S. in political science from the Shatt
Al Arab University in Basrah and is currently working on his
M.S. in political science at the same university. He does not
speak English. He is married.
GROSS