Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BASRAH104
2006-06-18 06:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Basrah
Cable title:  

MAJOR GENERAL LATIF MOTIVATED TO TACKLE BASRAH SECURITY

Tags:  PGOV PINS PREL PTER IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2553
OO RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHBC #0104/01 1690640
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 180640Z JUN 06
FM REO BASRAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0384
INFO RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0403
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000104 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL PTER IZ
SUBJECT: MAJOR GENERAL LATIF MOTIVATED TO TACKLE BASRAH SECURITY
PROBLEMS

REF: BASRAH 93

BASRAH 00000104 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BASRAH 000104

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS PREL PTER IZ
SUBJECT: MAJOR GENERAL LATIF MOTIVATED TO TACKLE BASRAH SECURITY
PROBLEMS

REF: BASRAH 93

BASRAH 00000104 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: In a June 14 meeting with the Regional
Coordinator (RC) and Deputy Regional Coordinator (DRC),Major
General Abdul Latif of the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army
expressed support for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's recent
visit to Basrah and his efforts to enhance security in Basrah.
Increased security measures have resulted in a recent decrease
in murders, he said. MG Latif agreed to coordinate with the
British military to provide an Iraqi Army presence outside the
main gate of the Regional Embassy Office in Basrah to deter
attacks on local employees. The Iraqi Army was qualified and
capable of carrying out its duties, he said, and morale was high
among the soldiers. In his view, the assassinations were being
carried out by criminal elements whose ultimate aim is to divide
Basrah from the rest of Iraq and control its resources. End
Summary.

Support for the Prime Minister's Visit
-------------- --


2. (C) In a June 14 meeting with the RC and DRC, Major General
(MG) Abdul Latif of the 10th Division of the Iraqi Army
expressed support for Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's recent
visit to Basrah. Citing the political corruption and numerous
assassinations that plague Basrah, MG Latif called the visit "a
new beginning." He said that the PM recognized the extent of
the problem during his visit to Basrah and that the additional
security measure that have been put into place since the visit
resulted in a reduction in murders. (Comment: There were six
murders reported to the Police Joint Operations Center- PJOC- in
Basrah on June 13 and only one murder on June 14. However, it
is still too soon to tell if the murder rate has really dropped.
End Comment.) Exuding confidence, he considered it an honor
that the PM had requested him to take on a leadership role in
Basrah and stated that the Iraqi Army (IA) had been accorded a

large role in implementing the security plan. He firmly stated
that the IA's role was to support the central government.


3. (C) In accordance with the security plan, MG Latif said that
he is in charge of four brigades, with one located in each of
the four southern provinces. One company from each from the
provinces of Muthanna, Dhi Qar, and Maysan, has been brought in
to buttress his forces in Basrah. The increase in troops
results allows him to increase IA presence in the city, MG Latif
said, and these men would not be biased by political party
affiliation or militias since they come from outside Basrah.
The end result, he said, would be to frighten and control the
criminal elements in Basrah responsible for most of the murders.
Even with the recent reduction in murders, he did not intend to
let up on the security campaign.

New Security Committee?
--------------


4. (C) MG Latif alluded to a new security committee that had
been formed in Baghdad without the knowledge of the political
parties to address security in Basrah, and its members are
scheduled to arrive in Basrah soon. This new security committee
is a very good thing, he said, because it shows that Baghdad was
taking the situation in Basrah seriously and recognizing that
the political parties were part of the security problem. He was
unsure of the names of the members of the new committee, but
believed that there were seven people on the committee and that
Minister Safa al-Saafi heads the new committee. The committee
will report directly to the Prime Minister and not to the
governor. (Comment: If this is true, we suspect that Minister
al-Saafi is not unbiased and will act in support of Basrah
Governor Mohammed al-Wa'eli. See reftel. End Comment).

Relations with CoP, Governor
-------------- ---



5. (C) In regards to Basrah Chief of Police (CoP) Hassan Sewady
al-Saad and the Basrah Iraqi Police Services (IPS),MG Latif
said he maintained good relations with the CoP and tried to help
him when possible with security matters, but that he was aware
that the CoP did not trust 80 percent of his own IPS. The crux
of the problem with the IPS in Basrah, he said, was that there
was a lack of field supervision. He said that while on patrols
in Basrah, he would instruct IA soldiers to put on their body
armor and helmets if they were not wearing them, but no real
supervision of IPS exists. Although there is a genuine problem
with militia and political party infiltration into the IPS, he

BASRAH 00000104 002.2 OF 003


said that this problem could be addressed through professional
supervision and direction.


6. (C) MG Latif described his relations with Governor Mohammed
as starting off well at the beginning, but said that his efforts
to maintain communications were not reciprocated by the governor
and that the governor had not attended the funerals of his two
sons. He described taking a trip to Nassiriyah and observing
the close cooperation between the governor of Dhi Qar and the IA
commander. He said that the lack of communication and
cooperation between the IA and the Basrah governor only served
to increase security problems.


7. (C) When asked about the governor's push to have him removed
from his position, the MG scoffed, saying the governor had no
authority over the IA. He acknowledged that the Basrah
Provincial Council had convened on June 11 and voted on
replacing the CoP as well, but said that they were not able to
obtain the necessary number of votes. The BPC, he said, was
"uneducated" because it attempted to get rid of the people they
found difficult to work with instead of seeking ways to maintain
dialogue.

Criminals and Mafia Types Carrying Out Murders
-------------- --------------


8. (C) He acknowledged that Sunnis, academics, and Iraqis
associated with the Coalition were being targeted for murder.
The perpetrators are opportunist "mafia types" that attacked the
only people they can get at. Most of the militias, he said, are
made up of criminals who had records for theft and murder.
Jayish Al Mahdi (JAM) is the worst of the militias, he said, and
is responsible for most of the IEDs and mortar attacks in the
city. These incidents are exacerbated by lack of interest on
the part of the BPC-he described an incident during the PM's
visit to Basrah where Vice President Hashimi specifically
mentioned that Sunnis were being targeted in Basrah and leaving
because of it. BPC Chairman Sadoon al-Obadi had interjected
that the Sunnis in Basrah were free to leave if they wanted, and
no one was forcing them to go. These remarks caused a strong
reaction from the other people in the room.


9. (C) The criminals were targeting teachers, religious leaders,
and minorities in Basrah in order to ultimately divide Basrah
from the rest of Iraq and control its resources, in MG Latif's
view. The Oil Protection Forces (OPF) is heavily infiltrated by
these criminals, he said, because their positions give them easy
access oil and profit from smuggling. Every time the IA was
close to capturing some of the smugglers, he said, these
individuals were killed by other members of the OPF to protect
the group as a whole. Political parties, and Fadillah in
particular, pressures members of the OPF and Facilities
Protection Services (FPS) to join their party, he said.


10. (C) Despite the recent decrease in murders, MG Latif said
that he suspected that many of the criminals were just laying
low and waiting for the 30-day state of emergency to end before
upping their activities again. He said the best way to have a
lasting effect on security in Basrah was to focus on "filtering"
the IPS and removing those who were corrupt and engaged in
criminal activity. He expected this to be the main goal of the
new security committee that was coming down from Baghdad and
that it would take six to nine months to root out the criminals
in the IPS.

Iraqi Army Up to the Challenge
--------------


11. (C) MG Latif was optimistic about the ability of the IA to
carry out its role in the security plan. Gaps in resources
existed, he admitted, but there were enough soldiers to get the
job done. The IA launched a public education campaign in Basrah
to direct people to call a hotline to report killings and
kidnappings and to respect IA convoys and give them the right of
way so they can do their job. He described his soldiers as
well-trained and morale as good, because the soldiers believed
that they were working to protect people.

Increased Protection for REO Employees
-------------- --------------


12. (C) The RC asked the MG to consider increasing IA presence
outside the main gate of the Regional Embassy Office to deter
the monitoring of the movements of local employees and attacks
on them. The MG replied that this should be possible and that
he would coordinate with the British military to do so. He
concurred with the RC that an increase in IPS outside the main
gate would simply frighten local employees even more, because
IPS have become associated in the minds of most Iraqis with
murder campaigns.

BASRAH 00000104 003.2 OF 003




13. (C) Comment: MG Latif was careful and diplomatic in his
descriptions of the governor, the CoP, and other political
figures, and it was clear that he valued the ability to maintain
dialogue and professional relations with all the players on the
field. He was dismissive of the BPC's approach of boycotting
and voting out people they did not agree with, and he believed
that the provincial elections would result in many of the
current political players in Basrah losing their seats. He also
clearly does not believe that only 30 days of emergency security
measures will result in a complete cure to the security
situation in Basrah. However, he was obviously determined to
carry out his role in keeping Basrah from falling into the hands
of separatists that wish to monopolize the province's resources
by forcing a national division. End Comment.
GROSS