BASRAH GOVERNOR RENEWS EFFORTS TO REMOVE POLICE CHIEF,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BASRAH 000102

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER SOCI IZ
SUBJECT: BASRAH GOVERNOR RENEWS EFFORTS TO REMOVE POLICE CHIEF,
BACKTRACKS ON SECURITY PLAN

REF: A) BASRAH 95, B) BASRAH 98, C) BASRAH 75, D) 05 BASRAH 49

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CLASSIFIED BY: Ken Gross, REGIONAL COORDINATOR, REO BASRAH,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) Summary: Basrah Governor Mohammed al-Wa'eli again
renewed his efforts to replace Chief of Police (CoP) Hassan
Sewady al-Saad by calling for a vote of no confidence on June

11. He said that the emergency security plan was not successful
in halting violence in Basrah because the CoP was not qualified
for his position and police efforts were less than robust. The
CoP does not believe the governor will be able to replace him
unless he manages to bribe Minister of Interior officials. The
governor, he said, had been trying to remove him from his
position for months because of his efforts to reform the police.
End Summary.

Governor Says Basrah Police Are the Problem
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2. (C) In a June 13 meeting, the Basrah Regional Coordinator
(RC),Deputy Regional Coordinator (DRC),and Poloff met with
Basrah Governor Mohammed al-Wa'eli to discuss the security
situation in Basrah and the role of the Iraqi Police Service
(IPS) and Iraqi Army (IA) two weeks after the declared State of
Emergency (see Ref A). The Governor said that the current
security plan has many gaps and requires modifications. The
CoP, according to Wa'eli, is not qualified to lead the IPS and
is not cooperating fully in implementing the security plan. The
Governor said he has not received any assistance from the
central government to improve Basrah's security and claimed that
he was responsible for devising and implementing the security
plan.


3. (C) Governor Wa'eli repeatedly stressed that the plan was
not working as well as it should because General Sewady and the
IPS were not doing their jobs. He said that he had observed
firsthand in trips around the city that IPS did not carry out
their duties. Lack of cooperation from the CoP and IPS resulted
in "gaps" in the security plan, the governor said. He
identified weak leadership, militia infiltration, lack of police
discipline and high levels of corruption as the reasons behind
the IPS's poor performance. He said he had proposed a plan to
the central government that would force approximately half of
the IPS to retire to make room to hire more qualified officers.
The Governor expressed frustration that his time was tied up
with security issues and that he did not have time to focus on
other issues, such as corruption. If the IPS had strong
leadership and did their jobs, he said, he would be able to
shift his focus to other matters.


4. (C) In a complete turn-around from his June 5 statements
regarding the role of the Iraqi Army in implementing the
security plan, the governor told the RC and DRC that the plan
would be more successful with increased IA participation (see
Ref B),and he was working to incorporate more IA assistance and
participation in the plan. Governor Wa'eli also said that the
security committee is coordinating with MND-SE forces on
modifications to the plan and is working on a six-month security
plan for Basrah. Even with the problems inherent in the
security plan, the Governor opined that there had been an
improvement in the security situation in the past two weeks.

CoP Presents Alternate View on Security Plan
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5. (C) In a June 12 meeting with the RC, CoP Sewady said that
the security plan was good and that he was attempting to
implement it in spite of interference from the governor. As an
example of the Governor's obstruction, he described an incident
on June 8 when three men were arrested after launching a mortar
attack near police headquarters. Later that day, men wearing
uniforms from the Serious Crimes Unit appeared at the police
station, said that both they and the detainees were "governor's
men," and pressured the police officers into releasing the
detainees. The detainees filed a court case against the police
for imprisoning them without evidence, and they were able to do
this because the governor was in control of the security
committee. (Comment: When asked about the attack on the police
station, Governor Wa'eli said he had heard something about the
attack, but said that no one had been arrested in relation to
it. End Comment).


6. (C) The CoP acknowledged that corruption was a major problem
in the police force and said that this was why it was necessary
to incorporate Iraqi Army and coalition forces into the plan.
As long as there were militias in Basrah, the CoP said, there
would be security problems. The plan itself, he said, consisted

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mostly of increasing vehicle checkpoints and patrols in the "hot
spots" in Basrah. He said he believed a committee from Baghdad
from either the PM's office or the MoI would arrive in Basrah in
the near future to work on implementing the security plan.
(Note: The governor, when asked about a possible visit of a
committee from Baghdad, said he knew of no such committee but
that the Minister of Defense and the Minister of Interior may
visit Basrah in the next few days to discuss the security
situation. End Note.)

Voting Out the Chief of Police
--------------


7. (C) The Governor acknowledged that the Basrah Provincial
Council (BPC) had met on June 11 and voted on the removal of the
Basrah CoP, but that only 24 members voted in favor of the
removal. Only 31 of the 41 BPC members attended the session,
and some members abstained from voting. The Governor said that
if all 41 members were present they might have gotten the 28
votes necessary to remove the Chief of Police. Even though the
necessary 28 votes were not made, the Governor confirmed that
eight names had been forwarded to the Ministry of Interior as
possible replacements for the CoP, but said that all eight
candidates were unqualified.


8. (C) The governor publicly announced his disapproval of the
CoP in a press conference on May 13 (see Ref C). CoP Sewady
expressed doubt that the governor would be able to get rid of
him, noting that he had been attempting to remove him either
through assassination attempts or through the political process
for over a year and had thus far been unsuccessful. He said
that he had strong support from the MoI, as well as from members
of the Basrah Islamic List on the BPC. He expressed disdain for
most BPC members, who constantly request that he supply them
with cars, weapons, ammunition, and bodyguards.


9. (C) CoP Sewady said that he had been informed by his
contacts in the MoI that names had been forwarded to the MoI as
candidates to replace him as CoP. He identified one of the
candidates as General Mohammed Kadhem Ali, a former CoP that CoP
Sewady said "corrupted the police in the first place" by hiring
politically affiliated police (see Ref D). If he does get
replaced, the CoP said, it would be because MoI officials were
bribed into getting rid of him.

Chief of Police Says Basrah Governor Is the Problem
-------------- --------------
--------------


10. (C) The CoP said that the increase in violence in Basrah
since the May 31 declaration of the State of Emergency was, in
his opinion, due to Governor Wa'eli, the Fadillah party, and
their militia reacting to the strong criticism of Sunni Vice
President Hashimi. The marketplace bombing on June 3 with the
subsequent attack on the Sunni mosques was a show of strength to
retaliate against the perceived "meddling" of the central
government in Basrah's affairs. When asked why the governor was
appointed head of the security committee, the CoP replied that
this decision had been made after seeing the negative reaction
of the local government to the PM's visit in order to avoid an
escalation in tension and violence.


11. (C) Comment: The governor was clearly opposed to the PM's
declaration of a State of Emergency in Basrah, while the CoP
expressed support for it - because it resulted in a loss of face
for the Basrah governor. Now that the IA has been accorded a
greater role in implementing the plan, the governor is
supporting the move for the same reasons - because it makes the
CoP look like he is incapable of doing his job. Governor
Wa'eli's proposed police reformation plan sounds very similar to
the reformations that CoP Sewady has been trying to implement
since he assumed his position - reduce the number of unqualified
police in the force and fight corruption. However, the
governor's increasingly desperate attempts to remove CoP Sewady
from his position suggest that his true interests lie in
protecting his militia members on the police force and
maintaining his influence in security matters. The CoP has
always opposed militia infiltration and the influence of the
Islamic political parties on the police force. CoP Sewady was
instrumental in disbanding the Division of Internal Affairs in
December 2005, which functioned as an extrajudicial force under
the personal control of Governor al-Wa'eli that was involved in
criminal activities. End Comment.
GROSS