THE GAMBIA: JAMMEH'S RE-ELECTION AND OUR BILATERAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANJUL 000620

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE PASS EXIM, USTDA, OPIC, USTR, PEACE CORPS; USDOC FOR
ITA; DAKAR PLS PASS TO DAO, ODC, AND RAO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS PHUM KPKO EPET EINV ETRD
BEXP, EAID, MASS, KMCA, KPAO, GA
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: JAMMEH'S RE-ELECTION AND OUR BILATERAL
TIES


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Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Following President Jammeh's re-election September 22,
there are no indications as yet of any major policy or
personnel changes in the offing, but he seemed as volatile
and rough-hewn as ever in his post-election press conference.
The shortcomings in the electoral process highlighted the
top U.S. priority in The Gambia -- promoting respect for
human rights and democratic values, and, in particular,
pressing the GOTG for a reversal of the negative human rights
trend that was a key factor in the June suspension of The
Gambia's MCA eligibility. In pursuit of the top U.S.
priority here, we request increased funding in FY-07 so that
we may implement capacity-building projects with the National
Assembly and judiciary. Another key U.S. priority is
promoting The Gambia's development and poverty alleviation
efforts; our Peace Corps program plays a vital role in this
respect, and we also urge continued involvement here by USAID
and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency.


2. (C) Another crucially important bilateral interest relates
to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT); so far, there is no
discernible impact on the GOTG's GWOT-related cooperation
from Jammeh's overtures to Iran and Venezuela, but careful
monitoring is in order. Yet another key bilateral interest
centers on the Gambian military's contribution to
international and regional peacekeeping operations, including
in Darfur. We recommend that the GOTG be considered for an
ACOTA "lite" program, especially if the Gambians increase
their Darfur contingent from company to battalion size. We
believe that our strategy for getting Jammeh to reverse the
negative policy trends that resulted in suspension of MCA
eligibility should be one primarily of sticks, but that a
carrot or two should also be included -- when it clearly
serves U.S. interests, not as a "favor" to Jammeh. END
SUMMARY.

OVERVIEW
--------------


3. (C) In the aftermath of President Yahya Jammeh's
re-election September 22, there are no indications as yet of
any major policy or personnel changes in the offing. Some
contacts had speculated that Jammeh, known for his frequent
dismissals of cabinet members and other senior officials,
might use his re-election to make some immediate cabinet
changes -- in advance of his formal inauguration following
Ramadan -- but none have occurred to date. In a press
conference the day after his victory, Jammeh stated that he
would use his new five-year mandate to continue pursuing what
he portrayed as his fundamental objective -- the country's
development. In his remarks, Jammeh came across as volatile
and rough-hewn as ever, as he, inter alia, warned the media
against publishing any material that could stir up social
unrest, castigated the West for "400 years of exploitation"
of The Gambia and Africa generally, and asserted his
commitment to developing the country with or without foreign
assistance.


4. (C) In his anti-Western diatribe, he did not mention the
U.S (or any other country) by name. However, we gather from
our post-election discussions with senior GOTG officials --
in particular, the senior presidential advisor, Secretary
General Mambury Njie and Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary
William Joof -- that he remains deeply resentful of the
Millenium Challenge Corporation's (MCC) June 16 decision to
suspend The Gambia's eligibility for the Millenium Challenge
Account (MCA) program due to evidence of the GOTG's slippage
in performance on various eligibility criteria in the "ruling
justly" and "economic freedom" categories. We are told that
Jammeh remains upset over the perceived abruptness of the
decision to suspend and that the embarrassment to him was
heightened by its timing -- in the run-up to the GOTG-hosted
African Union Summit and preparatory meetings June 25-July 2.
(In response, we have noted the advance warning of
suspension given to the GOTG and the fact that its timing was
totally unrelated to the Summit dates.)

ADVANCING THE TOP U.S. PRIORITY

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--------------


5. (C) The shortcomings in the just-completed electoral
process highlighted the top U.S. priority in its Gambian
relationship, advancing respect for human rights and
strengthening democratic institutions. While foreign
election observers judged that Jammeh's re-election
"represented the will of the people," in the Commonwealth's
formulation, such flaws as a campaign playing field
substantially skewed in Jammeh's and his ruling APRC party's
favor were noted. In short, the September 22 presidential
election failed to achieve its potential as a milestone in
The Gambia's democratization. With National Assembly and
municipal elections set for 2007, we and the donor community
generally now face the challenge of promoting improvements in
the electoral process and, in particular, working to
strengthen the capacity and autonomy of the Independent
Electoral Commission (IEC). Other donors, e.g., UNDP, EC,
Britain's aid agency, DFID, will continue to take the lead in
providing election-related financial assistance for these
upcoming contests, given the lack of available USG funds.


6. (C) Promoting good elections, though, is but one element
of our overarching task -- pressing the GOTG to reverse the
negative human rights trend evident over the past year, a
trend that was a key factor in the MCC's decision to suspend
The Gambia's MCA eligibility. The GOTG's backsliding on
human rights included, for example, arbitrary detentions of
opposition politicians, intimidation of journalists and
closure of a privately owned newspaper, and, following a
failed coup plot in March, mistreatment of suspects taken
into custody and their detention without charge beyond the
legal limit of 72 hours. We continue to stress to the GOTG
the imperative of its taking steps to reverse the negative
human rights trend in order to prevent further damage to its
standing at home and abroad -- and to begin to lay the
groundwork for seeking reinstatement of MCA eligibility. So
far, however, the GOTG leadership has made little effort on
this score, doubtless due in part to its preoccupation in
recent months with arrangements for the African Union Summit
and, subsequently, the presidential election campaign.


7. (C) In its efforts on behalf of an improved human rights
environment, The Embassy will continue to use the full array
of tools at its disposal, ranging from dialog with the GOTG
and civil society to public diplomacy initiatives such as
International Visitor Grants for human rights activists and
workshops for journalists. We also intend to seek
Washington funding in FY-07, under the ESF program, for
capacity-building projects targetting the National Assembly
and judiciary, in particular. While mindful of the stringent
resource environment, we believe that additional resources
are needed to maximize the effectiveness of our strategy for
advancing the leading U.S. interest in this country. At
present, our available resources consist largely of a meager
(approx. dols 40,000 annually) DHRF fund. While we will
continue to seek the optimal use of DHRF resources, we regard
as amply justified a larger fund aimed at assisting the
country's legislative and judicial branches in their efforts
to emerge as viable checks on executive power.

PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
--------------


8. (C) Another key U.S. priority is promoting The Gambia's
economic development and efforts at poverty alleviation.
With assistance to The Gambia under the MCA program put on
hold due to the suspension of eligibility, our Peace Corps
program remains the centerpiece of our development aid here,
and it is vital that the program be maintained. We also
deem it vital that, in the ongoing effort to reform U.S.
assistance programs, the small-scale USAID-funded programs at
this non-USAID presence post -- e.g., Self Help program,
Ambassador's Fund for HIV/AIDS -- be preserved. Our Gambian
contacts, both official and private, regularly express their
appreciation for these programs, which invariably receive
favorable coverage in the local media. (COMMENT: With
bilateral assistance to The Gambia of dols 1.5 million to
dols 2 million annually, the U.S. is not among major donors
here; the latter include, inter alia, Taiwan, UK, and, among
multilateral donors, the EC and UNDP. Nonetheless, in our
presentations on U.S./Gambian ties, we emphasize that, as

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the world's leading donor to the UN, much of that
organization's assistance to The Gambia is provided by the
American taxpayer. END COMMENT)


9. (C) We also urge the continuation of support to private
American firms contributing to The Gambia's economic
development by the U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA),
which is currently funding two feasibility studies for
investment projects here, involving construction of a
petroleum storage terminal and coal-fired power plant. At
present, U.S. private sector's investment in The Gambia is
modest, totalling an estimated several million dollars. At
the same time, American firms are showing increasing
interest in The Gambian market, and the inauguration in June
of a weekly direct flight between Baltimore and Banjul by
North American Airlines will facilitate the strengthening of
commercial and other links. True, the current volume of
bilateral trade is minimal, and The Gambia has yet to take
much advantage of its AGOA eligibility, with AGOA-qualified
exports to the U.S. less than dols 100,000 annually. The
Gambia's AGOA-related textile visa is expected to be
finalized soon, although the country's prospects for
significant textile exports to the U.S. are limited.

COOPERATION ON COUNTER-TERRORISM
--------------


10. (C) Another crucially important bilateral interest is the
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). In recent years, Jammeh has
proven to be a useful partner in the GWOT, with the GOTG
providing concrete support in several joint counter-terrorism
(CT) operations. The GOTG has also been responsive in other
CT-related activities; Gambian intelligence and security
officials show no hesitancy in sharing even the most
sensitive information with us and have indicated openness to
whatever forms of cooperation we wish to pursue with them.
(NOTE: We have no evidence at present, following the most
recent joint CT operation in 2005, that Al-Qaida or other
terrorist elements are currently active in The Gambia. While
the country's Lebanese community includes sympathizers of
Hizballah, there is no sign of their actual involvement in
terrorist operations here, although, as elsewhere in
Africa,they are presumably engaged in such activities as
fund-raising on Hizballah's behalf. END NOTE)


11. (C) So far, Jammeh's recent overtures to Iran and
Venezuela have had no discernible impact on Jammeh's and his
government's CT-related cooperation; it remains unclear how
far Jammeh will go in pursuing these overtures and we will
obviously need to monitor them closely. We believe that, so
long as Jammeh maintains the requisite cooperation in the
GWOT, it is in our interest to, at a minimum, continue our
current capacity-building assistance -- managed through other
USG channels -- to the GOTG.

THE MILITARY SPHERE:
--------------


12. (C) A final key bilateral interest centers on the the
Gambian military's contribution to international and
regional peacekeeping operations. Over the years, the
country's tiny, 1,000-man army has participated in various
UN, ECOWAS, and AU peacekeeeping forces, in, for example,
Kosovo, East Timor, Liberia, and currently, Darfur. In
recent discussion with the Ambassador, the Chief of Defense
Staff, COL Lang Tombong Tamba, emphasized the GOTG's
commitment to continued participation in foreign peacekeeping
activities. He indicated the Gambians' willingness to
consider increasing their current troop contingent in Darfur
from a company to a battalion, but added that any such
expansion of the Gambian contingent would require additional
equipment from donors. Ambassador responded that he could
make no commitments on this score, noting that heretofore our
assistance to the AMIS forces in Darfur has been channelled
through the AU, in coordination with other donors, rather
than directly to troop contributing countries.


13. (C) Given what we see as the U.S. interest in
strengthening African forces' peacekeeping capabilities and
The Gambia's peacekeeping record to date, we recommend that
it be considered for an ACOTA partnership, especially if it
expands its Darfur contingent to a battalion. Given the

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Gambian military's small size, we assume that any ACOTA
partnership with this country would be a "lite" version. We
also note that two Gambian military officers attended an
ECOWAS ACOTA-related conference in Accra in September.
(NOTE: Our current military cooperation program here consists
chiefly of a modest (approx. dols 100,000 annually) IMET
program, occasional military-to-military programs in such
areas as riverine operations, and ACSS activities. There is
also a long-pending project, using unspent FMF funds, for a
Navy MTT to provide technical assistance for the
refurbishment of a U.S.-supplied patrol boat. Finally, The
Gambia also benefits from DOD's Humanitarian Assistance,
Excess Property, and Anti-HIV/AIDS programs. END NOTE)

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS ON STICKS AND CARROTS
--------------


14. (C) We believe that our strategy for getting Jammeh to
reverse the negative policy trends that resulted in
suspension of MCA eligibility should be one primarily of
sticks -- the largest one being the suspension itself. At the
same time, we also believe that the strategy should include a
carrot or two, when doing so clearly serves U.S. priorities,
as opposed to granting a "favor" to Jammeh. This is the
rationale behind our proposals for expanded human
rights-related assistance targetting the National Assembly
and judiciary, for continuation of our CT-related assistance,
and for considering The Gambia for an ACOTA "lite"
partnership so as to strengthen Gambian forces' peacekeeping
capabilities. We are also concerned that a policy of only
sticks may well be counterproductive, i.e. simply reinforcing
his resentment toward the U.S. and leaving him -- bolstered
by increasing amounts of aid from Taiwan, in particular --
ever more resistant to our approaches on behalf of an
improved human rights and governance environment.


15. (C) True, the Gambian leader's erratic, autocratic
behavior in past months means that we cannot simply take for
granted his reliability and effectiveness as a partner. We
will need to remain alert to any sign of his attempting to
strengthen ties with Iran and Venezuela at the expense of
U.S. interests. Finally, in pressing the GOTG to address the
policy slippages on human rights and other areas, we will
seek the cooperation of other donors -- the UK and EC, in
particular -- who share our concerns and will, we hope, be
prepared to make similar approaches to the GOTG..




STAFFORD