Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANJUL396
2006-06-22 09:47:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Banjul
Cable title:  

THE GAMBIA: SCENE-SETTER FOR VCI PDAS FORD'S AND

Tags:  PREL PHUM EAID MASS KMCA PTER PINS EINV ETRD 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY BANJUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6760
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
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RUFGNOA/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//POLAD/J2//
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANJUL 000396 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR AF/FO, AF/W, AF/RSA, AND VCI/FO; PRETORIA PLS
PASS TO VCI PDAS FORD; DAKAR PLS PASS TO DAO, ODC, AND RAO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM EAID MASS KMCA PTER PINS EINV ETRD
EAIR, GA, AU
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: SCENE-SETTER FOR VCI PDAS FORD'S AND
AF DAS THOMAS-GREENFIELD'S VISITS


BANJUL 00000396 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D)

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANJUL 000396

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR AF/FO, AF/W, AF/RSA, AND VCI/FO; PRETORIA PLS
PASS TO VCI PDAS FORD; DAKAR PLS PASS TO DAO, ODC, AND RAO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PHUM EAID MASS KMCA PTER PINS EINV ETRD
EAIR, GA, AU
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: SCENE-SETTER FOR VCI PDAS FORD'S AND
AF DAS THOMAS-GREENFIELD'S VISITS


BANJUL 00000396 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) VCI PDAS Ford and AF DAS Thomas-Greenfield will visit
The Gambia against the backdrop of the AU Summit -- for which
the GOTG is feverishly preparing -- but also against the
backdrop of markedly negative human rights trend in this
country, as highlighted by abuses following the coup plot
thwarted March 21. The GOTG has shown little regard for
detainees held in connection with the failed plot, while also
cracking down on private media institutions. The negative
repercussions of the GOTG's backsliding on human rights were
evident in the June 16 suspension of The Gambia's eligibility
for the MCA program. Holding credible Presidential and
National Assembly elections in 2006-7 will be crucial in GOTG
efforts to reverse the negative human rights trend, which
underscores rough-hewn President Jammeh's autocratic
impulses.


2. (C) In the absence of MCA assistance, our Peace Corps
program remains the centerpiece of USG development aid to The
Gambia; annual bilateral assistance totals $1.5 million to $2
million, and half of this amount goes to run the Peace Corps
program. The U.S. private sector's contribution to The
Gambia's development in terms of investment remains modest,
but is growing, and the inauguration of direct flights
between Baltimore and Banjul by North American Airlines will
promote commercial and other links. Other key items in our

bilateral agenda include pursuing the Global War on Terrorism
and promoting regional peace and stability, but President
Jammeh's erratic, autocratic behavior -- and his clumsy
handling of relations with a far more powerful neighbor,
Senegal -- complicates efforts to advance our agenda here.
END SUMMARY.

OVERVIEW: AU SUMMIT
--------------

3.(C) VCI PDAS Christopher Ford and AF DAS Linda
Thomas-Greenfield, scheduled to visit The Gambia next week,
will be the most senior State Department officials to travel
here since the June 2003 visit by then-AF DAS Amb.
Bridgewater. Their visits will occur during the GOTG-hosted
African Union Summit and preparatory meetings June 25-July 2,
for which the GOTG is at present feverishly finalizing
arrangements. The AU Summit will be the largest
international gathering ever hosted by the Gambians, and the
tiny, severely resource-strapped GOTG is all-consumed with
Summit preparations. It remains unclear just how many
African heads of state will be on hand, although GOTG and
other sources estimate that perhaps half of the 53 leaders
will personally attend. Gambian President Yahya Jammeh's
priority for the Summit is clear -- using it to cast himself
as a respected, established African leader.

NEGATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS TREND
--------------


4. (C) But PDAS Ford's and DAS Thomas-Greenfield's visits
will also occur against a backdrop detracting from Jammeh's
image-building efforts: marked deterioration in the GOTG's
record on human rights and respect for democratic norms. The
negative human rights trend has been most evident since
November 2005, when authorities, likely acting at the
President's direct instruction, detained three opposition
politicians on trumped-up charges of sedition and unlawful
possession of official documents. The GOTG subsequently
released the trio on bail, following a month's detention, and
later dropped the charges altogether, but, since the coup
attempt foiled March 21, the deterioration in the country's
human rights situation has only intensified.

THE FOILED COUP PLOT
--------------


5. (C) In response to the failed overthrow attempt, a
vengeful Jammeh publicly vowed that those implicated would be
treated "without mercy" so as to deter future would-be
plotters. In the ensuing months, authorities have detained
over 50 persons -- including military officers, civilian
officials, parliamentarians, and private citizens --
suspected of having any connection with the plot. So far, 15
detainees have been charged and are currently on trial,

BANJUL 00000396 002.2 OF 004


around 28 have been cleared of involvement in the plot and
released without charge, and five or so remain in custody,
but have yet to be charged. A GOTG statement claimed that
five detainees, including former National Intelligence Agency
head Daba Marena, escaped from custody in late March, but
authorities have said nothing since about efforts to
recapture them, amidst persistent rumors that they were
secretly executed.

SIPDIS


6. (C) Our sense is that authorities have shown little regard
for detainees' rights; we have picked up credible reports of
torture. (A senior official, detained but later released,
claimed to us that both he and his children were beaten by
security officials determined to obtain incriminating
information.) We believe that all detainees, including
those released and cleared of suspicion, were held without
charge beyond the maximum 72-hour period stipulated by law.
Jammeh has stated that the accused will receive a fair
trial, but it is hard to imagine those tortured being allowed
to testify to the abuse. As for those detainees who have yet
to be charged, among them is Mariam Denton, lawyer of
prominent defendant and dual U.S.-Gambian national Tamsir
Jasseh. A reliable source tells us that authorities have no
evidence of Denton's involvement in the failed plot, but are
keeping her in custody because of her refusal so far to
divulge information that Jasseh may have shared with her
about the plot.

CRACKDOWN ON THE MEDIA
--------------


7. (C) The country's private media institutions have also
figured prominently in the negative human rights trend. In
October 2005, authorities closed the Sengalese-run radio
station, SUD FM, citing broadcasts that could undermine
Gambian/Senegalese relations. In late March, in the
aftermath of the foiled coup plot, authorities closed a
journal, the "Independent," and detained its General Manager
and Chief Editor -- both later released -- as well as a
journalist, who has been charged with "printing false
information" and is currently on trial. The GOTG has given
no explanation for the continued closure of the
"Independent," but our sources believe that, because of the
paper's well-known anti-government outlook, the GOTG is
unwilling to permit it to resume publication, lest its
anti-Jammeh pieces tarnish his image prior to the AU Summit.
Most recently, the manager of the foreign-based online
"Freedom Newspaper," also known for its anti-Jammeh views,
claimed that pro-GOTG hackers had been responsible for the
disruption of his website and public disclosure of the names
of subscribers; authorities reacted by calling in locally
resident subscribers for questioning. Meanwhile, the
December 2004 murder of prominent journalist Deyda Hydara,
associated with the independent journal, "The Point," remains
unsolved, amidst ongoing allegations of GOTG involvement.

FALLOUT ON BILATERAL TIES: SUSPENSION OF MCA ELIGIBILITY
-------------- --------------


8. (C) The top U.S. objective in The Gambia is promoting
respect for human rights and democratization, and the GOTG's
backsliding in this area is at present overshadowing all
other aspects of our bilateral relationship. Indicative of
the fallout, on June 16 the Millenium Challenge Corporation's
(MCC) Board of Directors voted to suspend The Gambia's
eligibility for the Millenium Challenge Account (MCA)
program. The MCC's decision was based, inter alia, on the
GOTG's declining performance on MCA eligibility criteria in
the "ruling justly" category; slippage in performance on
various criteria in the "promoting economic freedom" category
was also cited. With the GOTG currently all-consumed with AU
Summit preparations, its reaction to the suspension has so
far been muted; Foreign Minister Lamin Kaba Bajo indicated to
the Ambassador the GOTG's desire to work closely with us on
behalf of reinstatement, but it is hard to imagine the GOTG
achieving sufficient improvement on relevant eligibility
criteria within the minimum six-month "waiting period" for
submission of a successful reinstatement request.

THE 2006-7 ELECTIONS
--------------


9. (C) Holding credible Presidential and National Assembly
elections, scheduled for September 2006 and January 2007,
respectively, will be crucial in any GOTG effort to reverse

BANJUL 00000396 003.2 OF 004


the current negative trend in the human rights and political
arenas. Prospects for good elections, though, are uncertain.
To be sure, opposition parties have been allowed in recent
months to conduct public gatherings and other activities to
build popular support. A recent by-election for a National
Assembly seat featured active campaigning by opposition as
well as ruling party candidates, and the opposition accepted
the ruling party's victory as legitimate. Opposition
leaders have assured us that they will participate in the
Presidential and National Assembly contests, asserting their
belief that they will have an adequate opportunity to compete
for votes. (NOTE: The 2002 National Assembly contest,
although judged credible by the international community,
nonetheless featured a boycott by the country's leading
opposition party, the United Democratic Party, UDP. UDP
leaders have repeatedly told us that they will refrain from a
boycott in the upcoming contests. END NOTE)


10. (C) At the same time, the GOTG's backsliding on human
rights in past months has pointed up President Jammeh's
autocratic impulses. While opposition party leaders have not
been targetted in the aftermath of the failed coup plot,
Jammeh's public statements deriding the opposition are not
encouraging. In February, Nigerian President Obasanjo's
mediation brought about improved dialog between Jammeh and
his ruling APRC party, on the one hand, and the opposition
parties, on the other; in Obasanjo's presence, the two sides
signed a MOU setting forth a "code of good conduct" for the
elections. The extent to which Jammeh and his APRC respect
the MOU in the run-up to the elections will likely serve as a
good indicator regarding the credibility of the electoral
process. Meanwhile, our sources express hope that Obasanjo,
perhaps joined by other African leaders, will use the AU
Summit to impress on Jammeh the imperative of reining in his
autocratic tendencies and permitting credible elections. We
will also continue to stress to the GOTG the crucial
importance of good elections for the country's democratic
evolution.

THE GAMBIA'S DEVELOPMENT AND U.S.SUPPORT
--------------


11. (SBU) The Gambia's now-suspended MCA eligibility held out
the prospect of a substantial expansion of U.S. assistance
for the country's efforts at development and poverty
alleviation. Among the world's poorest countries, with per
capita income less than $400, The Gambia relies heavily on
foreign donor assistance. In the absence of MCA assistance,
our Peace Corps program remains the centerpiece of our
development aid. Overall bilateral U.S. aid to The Gambia
currently runs at $1.5 million to $2 million annually, and
about half of this amount represents the cost of the Peace
Corps program. A noteworthy development is the growing
involvement in The Gambia of the U.S. Trade and Development
Agency (USTDA),which is currently supporting two feasibility
studies for investment projects here.


12. (SBU) The U.S. private sector's contribution to The
Gambia's development in terms of investment remains modest;
current investments total an estimated several million
dollars. At the same time, American firms are showing
increasing interest in The Gambian market, and the recent
inauguration of a weekly direct flight between Baltimore and
Banjul by North American Airlines will facilitate the
strengthening of commercial and other links. True, the
current volume of bilateral trade is minimal, and The Gambia
has yet to take much advantage of its AGOA eligibility, with
AGOA-qualified exports to the U.S. less than $100,000
annually. The Gambia's AGOA-related textile visa is expected
to be finalized soon, but the country's prospects for
significant textile exports to the U.S. are limited.

OTHER U.S. INTERESTS
--------------


13. (C) Other noteworthy bilateral interests include the
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and regional peace and
stability. Regarding the GWOT, in recent years, Jammeh and
his government have proven to be useful partners, providing
concrete support for several joint counterterrorism
operations. The GOTG's efforts on behalf of regional peace
and stability are manifested in its participation in
peacekeeping operations, most recently the African Union
Mission in Darfur, where the Gambian contingent includes a
company of troops, around 100 police officers, and various

BANJUL 00000396 004.2 OF 004


military observers. Also noteworthy is the generally
pro-U.S. feeling in this moderate Muslim country, making it
fertile ground for our public diplomacy efforts.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
--------------


14. (C) Following his re-election in 2001, Jammeh undertook
various initiatives to improve ties with the U.S., e.g.,
concluding an Article 98 Agreement, sharply reducing links
with a key patron, Libya, adopting a more moderate foreign
policy generally, and improving the GOTG's human rights
record. The U.S., in turn, responded with such gestures as
lifting the "508 Sanctions" imposed following his 1994 coup
and granting AGOA eligibility; the culmination was the
granting of MCA eligibility. Past months, however, have
served to reaffirm the rough-hewn Gambian leader's penchant
for erratic, autocratic behavior and called into question his
reliability and effectiveness as a partner. His clumsy
handling of ties with his far more powerful neighbor, Senegal
(e.g., the two countries' August/October 2005 dispute over
transport and border issues, provoked by the GOTG, Jammeh's
poor management of bilateral strains resulting from the
failed coup plot) also raises questions as to The Gambia's
status as a force for stability in West Africa. In sum,
Jammeh's pattern of behavior in recent months requires that
we keep up the pressure for a reversal of the negative trends
that led to the suspension of MCA eligibility while working
to maintain cooperation on other key U.S. interests such as
the GWOT.
STAFFORD