Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANJUL31
2006-01-17 12:04:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Banjul
Cable title:  

THE GAMBIA: PROSPECTS FOR THE BILATERAL

Tags:  PGOV PREL PTER PINS PHUM KPKO EPET EINV ETRD 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3131
RR RUEHPA
DE RUEHJL #0031/01 0171204
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 171204Z JAN 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANJUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6316
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0253
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0084
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0081
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
RUFGNOA/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 BANJUL 000031 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE PASS EXIM, USTDA, OPIC, USTR, PEACE CORPS
USDOC FOR ITA
DAKAR PASS ODC, DAO
LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHER
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS PHUM KPKO EPET EINV ETRD
BEXP, EAID, MASS, KMCA, KPAO, GA
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: PROSPECTS FOR THE BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP IN 2006

REF: 05 BANJUL 36

BANJUL 00000031 001.2 OF 006


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D)

SUMMARY
-------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 BANJUL 000031

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE PASS EXIM, USTDA, OPIC, USTR, PEACE CORPS
USDOC FOR ITA
DAKAR PASS ODC, DAO
LONDON FOR AFRICA WATCHER
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER PINS PHUM KPKO EPET EINV ETRD
BEXP, EAID, MASS, KMCA, KPAO, GA
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: PROSPECTS FOR THE BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP IN 2006

REF: 05 BANJUL 36

BANJUL 00000031 001.2 OF 006


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Our assessment of prospects in 2006 for our overall
Gambian relationship is guarded, as the recent slippage in
the GOTG's record on human rights and democracy has
reinforced President Jammeh's reputation for erratic behavior
and overshadowed his government's achievements. Given the
importance of the 2006-7 national elections for The Gambia's
democratic evolution, Embassy strongly recommends a robust
contribution to donor assistance for election-related
preparations and will submit an ESF proposal via septel.

2.(C) Following The Gambia's selection for MCA eligibility,
next steps in the MCA process are contingent on the GOTG's
reversing the current negative human rights trend. Our
bilateral trade and investment links are likely to continue
to register modest expansion in 2006, and the U.S. Trade and
Development Agency is increasingly active here. The Gambia
has yet to take much advantage of its AGOA eligibility.


3. (S/NF) The GOTG's excellent cooperation in the Global War
on Terrorism is underscored by our joint counter-terrorism
operations targetting Al-Qaida, most recently in October


2005. SIMO/DAKAR continues to provide CT capacity-building
assistance to the GOTG by, inter alia, training and equipping
an elite CT unit. Regarding military cooperation, the
Gambian armed forces have an established record of effective
service in foreign peacekeeping operations -- e.g., in
Darfur. However, the small (company-level) size of their
contingents has so far ruled out their inclusion in the ACOTA
Partnership program; the GOTG has indicated willingness to
expand its Darfur contingent to a battalion in 2007.


4. (C) The Gambia, with its reservoir of pro-U.S. feeling, is
fertile ground for the expanded public diplomacy outreach
that the Embassy envisions in 2006. Despite The Gambia's
limited capacity to influence U.S.interests for good or ill,
we see compelling reasons to maintain, indeed, expand, our
level of engagement here. At the same time, managing our
Gambian relationship requires taking into account the
rough-hewn Jammeh's penchant for erratic behavior and working
to keep his expectations for the relationship realistic. END
SUMMARY.

OVERVIEW OF THE RELATIONSHIP
--------------


5. (S) There has been considerable improvement in the
U.S./Gambian relationship in recent years, following The
Gambia's holding of Presidential and National Assembly
elections in 2001-2 that were judged credible by the
international community, including the U.S. The re-elected
President, Yahya Jammeh, whose coup in 1994 had caused
bilateral ties to nosedive, took various steps to reach out
to the U.S.: concluding an Article 98 Agreement (the second
African state to do so),sharply reducing links with a
heretofore key patron, Libya, adopting a more moderate and
pro-Western foreign policy generally, and ending The Gambia's
role as a conduit in sub-regional trafficking in arms and
"conflict diamonds." He proved a useful partner in the
Global War on Terrorism, as demonstrated in the GOTG's joint
counter-terrorism operations with the U.S.


6. (C) The U.S. responded to Jammeh's moves, lifting the "508
Sanctions" imposed following the coup, granting AGOA
eligibility, and restoring modest programs of military and
economic assistance (the latter channeled largely through
USAID's Acra-based West Africa Regional Program due to the

BANJUL 00000031 002.2 OF 006


mid-1990's closure of the bilateral USAID mission here).
Meanwhile, we continued assistance programs not affected by
the "508 Sanctions," e.g. Peace Corps Program, food aid
channeled through the UN's World Food program and a NGO,
Catholic Relief Services, and USAID-funded programs in such
areas as combatting HIV/AIDS and promoting respect for human
rights and democratic norms. Most recently, the Millenium
Challenge Corporation's decision in November 2005 to grant
The Gambia eligibility for the MCA program underscored the
progress in restoring links.

PROSPECTS FOR 2006: FOCUS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY
-------------- --------------


7. (C) In our 2005 forecast (reftel),we judged prospects for
maintaining the overall positive trend in the U.S./Gambian
relationship as good. Our forecast for 2006 is more guarded;
continued expansion of bilateral ties cannot be taken for
granted. The reason: promotion of respect for human rights
and democratic norms remains the top U.S. interest in The
Gambia, but there has been slippage of late in the GOTG's
performance in this area. In November, Jammeh had three
prominent opposition politicians detained on what appear to
be trumped-up charges. The trio was subsequently released on
bail, but still face prosecution, as a rumored
behind-the-scenes arrangement for the dropping of the charges
has yet to materialize. Meanwhile, the relationship between
the GOTG and the media remains strained, as Jammeh makes
little secret of his distaste for the country's several
private journals and their frequent attacks on him and his
government.


8. (C) The current malaise in The Gambia's human rights and
political arenas has reinforced the Gambian leader's
reputation for erratic behavior and overshadowed his
government's achievements in promoting stability and
socio-economic reform and development. Among these
achievements, Jammeh actively supported the National
Assembly's passage in June 2005 of the progressive
"Children's Act." In this predominantly Muslim country, the
President has fostered harmony with the Christian and animist
minorities and made clear that propagation of radical Islamic
views will not be tolerated. The GOTG, concerned at its
relegation to the Category Two Watchlist in our 2005 TIP
report, has markedly expanded its efforts to combat TIP in
past months. The Gambia's status as a country on the path of
reform and development seemed borne out in the relatively
high rankings that it received in the MCA eligibility review
process last fall in the "Investing in People" and
"Encouraging Economic Freedom" categories. (NOTE: The
Gambia's relatively positive 2005 rankings in the "Ruling
Justly" category are at considerable risk of sharp decline
unless the current slippage in the GOTG's human
rights/democracy record is halted. END NOTE.)


9. (C) The Presidential and National Assembly elections
scheduled for 2006-7 are potentially crucial milestones in
The Gambia's still-fragile democratization process. These
contests will serve as an important test of Jammeh's
professed commitment to democratic values; his actions of
late against the opposition have generated new doubts about
the depth of that commitment. On a positive note,
representatives of the respected NGO, International
Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES),observed The
Gambia's National Assembly by-elections in September 2005 and
judged them to be credible. Given our interest in promoting
good elections in 2006-7 here, Embassy strongly recommends a
robust U.S. contribution to donor assistance for
election-related preparations and will submit an ESF proposal
via septel; our proposal will be based on that submitted to
us by IFES, which has indicated interest in assisting in The
Gambia's election preparations.


BANJUL 00000031 003.2 OF 006


DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE: MCA AND OTHER PROGRAMS
-------------- -


10. (C) The Millenium Challenge Corporation's (MCC) selection
of The Gambia for MCA eligibility in November 2005 raised the
prospect of a major expansion of our efforts on behalf of
another key U.S.objective in The Gambia: promoting economic
growth and development. At present, though, next steps in the
MCA process -- in particular, an initial visit by a senior
MCC delegation -- are on hold, because of the slippage in the
GOTG's record on human rights and democracy. We will
continue to use MCA eligibility as leverage with the
Gambians, stressing that progress toward a MCA compact as
well as retention of MCA eligibility itself are contingent on
efforts by the GOTG to reverse the current negative human
rights trend.


11. (SBU) Meanwhile, the Peace Corps program, involving 100
volunteers deployed throughout the country, remains a key
component of U.S. grassroots-level development and
humanitarian assistance to The Gambia. Other efforts range
from the Ambassador's funds for Self-Help projects and
combating HIV/AIDS to a program fostering girls' school
enrollment (Ambassadors' Girls Scholarship program) to DOD's
Humanitarian Assistance and HIV/AIDS programs. In the past,
the U.S. was a major donor of food aid, channelled through
the World Food Program and a prominent, U.S.-based NGO,
Catholic Relief Services; over the past year or so, our food
aid has virtually ended due to growing emergency aid needs in
other countries. A major British medical research
institution, the Medical Research Center, is the beneficiary
of a multi-year, two-million dollar grant from the The
National Institutes of Health (NIH). Apart from the NIH
grant, our bilateral assistance totals dols 1.5 million to 2
million annually, about half of which represents the cost of
our Peace Corps program.

COMMERCIAL LINKS
--------------


12. (SBU) The modest growth in bilateral trade and investment
links in recent years is likely to continue this year. In
2005 there were new U.S. investments here estimated at
several million dollars, one project involving the kickoff of
the Seaboard company's construction of a flour mill. U.S.
investors also started work on a hotel and casino complex and
finalized arrangements to take over a local fishing company.
Another U.S. company, the Maryland-based BTI Construction and
Supply, in partnership with the GOTG's Social Security and
Housing Finance Corporation, recently broke ground on the
first phase of a project to construct over 200 pre-fabricated
houses in The Gambia. Indicative of The growing USG effort
to promote commercial links, 2005 witnessed the U.S. Trade
and Development Agency's (USTDA) signing of its first
agreement in The Gambia, involving funding of almost dols
400,000 for a feasability study for a petroleum storage
facility. While prospects for implementation of the
agreement are fading, due to other commitments of the U.S.
firm contracted to do the study, USTDA recently signed a
second agreement for a feasibility study, covering a Gambian
entrepreneur's proposal for construction of a coal-fired
power plant. Following the GOTG's December 2005 signing of a
preliminary agreement with a Canadian firm for oil
exploration, the Gambians indicate that they remain keen to
elicit the interest of American firms as well. However, U.S.
oil companies have so far been reluctant to pursue an
exploration license due to uncertainty as to whether The
Gambia's oil deposits are sufficent to make production
commercially viable.


13. (SBU) The Gambia has yet to take much advantage of its
AGOA eligibility (renewed for 2006); the annual value of its
AGOA-qualified exports to the U.S. remains under dols

BANJUL 00000031 004.2 OF 006


100,000. The Embassy will continue to seek Department and
USAID support to organize seminars for the Gambian government
and business community on AGOA's "rules of the road" and
prospects for increasing exports to the U.S. We will also
continue to assist the GOTG in obtaining the AGOA-related
"textile visa." The current lack of direct air and sea
transport links between the two countries hampers the
expansion of trade, but there are reports of several
airlines' possible interest in establishing direct flights.
The Gambian Civil Aviation Authority's (GCAA) progress to
date in meeting relevant FAA requirements raises the
possibility of Gambian-registered aircraft being authorized
for direct flights to the U.S. in 2006.

COUNTER-TERRORISM
--------------


14. (S/NF) The global war on terrorism (GWOT) is an area in
which bilateral cooperation is particularly strong and is
likely to continue. Jammeh takes a close personal interest
in this dossier and personally authorized the two
counter-terrorism (CT) operations jointly conducted with the
U.S. in recent years. Both operations, one in 2002 and the
other in October 2005, involved the Gambian authorities
detaining and questioning Al-Qaida-linked elements at U.S.
behest. The GOTG has been equally responsive in other
CT-related activities; Gambian intelligence and security
officials show no hesitancy in sharing even the most
sensitive information with us and have indicated openness to
whatever forms of cooperation we wish to pursue with them.
(NOTE: Following the joint CT operation in 2005, we have no
evidence that Al-Qaida or other terrorist elements are
currently active in The Gambia, although such elements may
well be present but maintaining a low profile. While the
country's Lebanese community includes sympathizers of
Hizballah,there is no sign of their actual involvement in
terrorist operations here, although, as elsewhere in Africa,
they are presumably engaged in such activities as
fund-raising on Hizballah's behalf. END NOTE.)


15. (S/NF) The head of the GOTG's National Intelligence
Agency (NIA),Daba Marena, is a confidant of Jammeh, whose
in-depth knowledge of the liaison activities involving NIA
and SIMO/DAKAR testifies to the Gambian President's abiding
interest in those activities. SIMO/DAKAR continues to assume
the lead role in the USG's CT-related cooperation with the
Gambians; its initiatives include, inter alia, assisting the
NIA in the training and equipping of an elite CT unit -- a
personal priority of Jammeh.

MILITARY COOPERATION
--------------


16. (C) 2005 witnessed some growth in our modest military
cooperation programs, which consist chiefly of IMET,
military-to-military contacts in areas ranging from combating
HIV/AIDS to riverine operations, and ACSS activities. Of the
military's small officer corps, many -- including Jammeh
himself -- have participated in IMET training programs in
the U.S., and the Gambians have expressed appreciation for
the increased IMET funding in 2005-6. Jammeh himself has
repeatedly appealed for expeditious action on the U.S. Navy's
long-standing project, using unspent FMF funds, to provide
technical assistance for the refurbishment of a U.S-supplied
patrol boat. (NOTE: The Gambia's miniscule navy consists
largely of several non-operational patrol boats. END NOTE.)




17. (C) Jammeh and his military aides make clear their
desire for further expansion of our military cooperation,
viewing the U.S. as an indispensable partner in their efforts
to expand the capabilities of their tiny, 1,000-man army,

BANJUL 00000031 005.2 OF 006


particularly in the area of international peacekeeping. When
Jammeh contributed a company of troops to the AMIS operation
in Darfur in December 2004, he criticized our perceived
failure to adequately support the deployment by providing
APC's, asserting -- erroneously -- that there was a U.S.
commitment to do so. We continue to impress upon the GOTG
leadership that U.S. policy remains to channel assistance to
troop contributing countries through the AU, in coordination
with other donors. The Gambian military has an established
record of effective service in an array of international and
regional peacekeeping operations, but the small
(company-level) size of its peacekeeping contingents has so
far ruled out its inclusion in the ACOTA Partnership program.
GOTG officials have indicated a willingness to increase
their Darfur contingent to a battalion in 2007. (NOTE: We are
told that furnishing a battalion is not feasible in 2006 due
to the armed forces' domestic security duties, in support of
the country's police force, during the year -- AU summit in
July, Presidential election in fall. END NOTE.)

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: PRO-U.S. ENVIRONMENT
--------------


18. (SBU) The Gambia is fertile ground for the expanded
public diplomacy outreach that the Embassy envisions in

2006. It is a moderate Muslim country in a turbulent region,
and there is a discernible pro-U.S. feeling in the society
that is striking -- and notably warmer than that vis-a-vis
the former colonial power, Britain. Gambians from all walks
of life, both elites and the public at large, make no secret
of their admiration of America's democracy, its economic and
technological prowess, and its culture of openness and
change. While the country's free-wheeling press does not
shrink from criticizing U.S. policies (e.g.,occasional
editorials taking issue with our Mideast policies),Gambians'
overall view of the U.S. is favorable.


19. (SBU) Moreover, for a country so small, a remarkably
large number of Gambians have extensive experience in the
U.S. Numerous senior GOTG officials have pursued university
studies in the U.S. As noted above, the military is replete
with officers that received training in the U.S. under IMET.
The upshot is that, for many Gambians, positive views of the
U.S. are based, not on a distant, utopian image, but on the
reality of daily life in America. As for Gambians without
experience in the U.S., they routinely express eagerness to
know more about American society and to visit -- an
eagerness that accounts in part for the high demand for
visas, relative to other countries in the sub-region. (NOTE:
Of course, as elsewhere, there is also a widespread desire
among Gambians, especially youths, to escape poverty through
immigration, legally or otherwise, to the U.S. END NOTE.)

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
--------------


20. (C) With its population of 1.5 million, annual per capita
income of $350, and severely resource-strapped government,
The Gambia has limited capability to influence U.S.
interests, for good or ill. At the same time, we see various
compelling reasons to maintain -- indeed, expand -- our
engagement with this country. One is the USG's universal
commitment to foster democracy and human rights, promote
sustainable development, and provide humanitarian assistance.
Another reason centers on the U.S.-led Global War on
Terrorism; despite its exceedingly meager resources, the GOTG
has shown that it is capable of serving as an effective
partner in that War. A third reason relates to the key U.S.
interest in promoting regional peace and stability; the GOTG
helps advance that interest by contributing to peacekeeping
operations, most recently, sending troops to Darfur and prior
to that, Liberia. As a fourth reason, there is the reservoir
of pro-U.S. feeling here -- a resource to draw upon in our

BANJUL 00000031 006.2 OF 006


efforts to build popular support for our initiatives
targetting African and Muslim audiences. To be sure,
managing our Gambian relationship requires taking into
account Jammeh's rough-hewn, erratic character -- and working
to keep his expectations for our bilateral ties realistic.
STAFFORD