Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANJUL303
2006-05-15 09:43:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Banjul
Cable title:  

THE GAMBIA: CONVERSATION WITH ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS

Tags:  PREL PGOV PINS PHUM KISL KDEM GA 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO4343
RR RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHMOS RUEHPA RUEHPW
DE RUEHJL #0303/01 1350943
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 150943Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANJUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6661
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORP
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANJUL 000303 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DAKAR PLS PASS RAO, DAO, AND ODC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PHUM KISL KDEM GA
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: CONVERSATION WITH ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS
LEADER

REF: BANJUL 297 AND PREVIOUS

BANJUL 00000303 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD,REASON 1.4 (B AND D)

SUMMARY
--------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANJUL 000303

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DAKAR PLS PASS RAO, DAO, AND ODC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINS PHUM KISL KDEM GA
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: CONVERSATION WITH ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS
LEADER

REF: BANJUL 297 AND PREVIOUS

BANJUL 00000303 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD,REASON 1.4 (B AND D)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Prominent Islamic figure Imam Baba Leigh registered
strong concern over human rights abuses following the failed
coup plot in March. He also indicated frustration over The
Gambia's "cowed and co-opted" Islamic religious establishment
to confront the GOTG over the abuses. Baba Leigh judged that
the country's overall stability remained intact, but pointed
to an apprehensive mood in the capital. He assessed
President Jammeh's popular base in Banjul as slipping
somewhat, but nonetheless predicted his re-election in the
fall, especially if the opposition parties failed to unite
behind a sole candidate. Baba Leigh did not think that
massive rigging of the 2006-7 national elections by the GOTG
and ruling party was likely; we note that the opposition
parties continue to insist that they will participate in
these contests. END SUMMARY.

OVERVIEW
--------------


2. (U) Ambassador met recently with prominent Islamic
religious figure and Embassy contact, Imam Baba Leigh, for
tour d'horizon regarding The Gambia's internal situation in
the aftermath of the coup plot thwarted here March 21
(reftel). A former International Visitor Program (IVP)
grantee, Baba Leigh is known for his progressive, reformist
views, as exemplified by his firm, public opposition to FGM.
He maintains contacts within America's Islamic community and
plans a visit to the U.S. soon.

THE GAMBIA'S "WORRISOME" SITUATION
--------------


3. (C) Asked for his assessment of The Gambia's
socio-political environment following the failed coup plot,
Baba Leigh described it as "worrisome," expressing particular
concern over the GOTG's silence amidst ongoing reports of
authorities' mistreatment of detainees suspected of
involvement in the plot. He said that the GOTG's effort to

ferret out anyone conceivably involved in the plot had
affected him personally, recounting that his nephew had
recently been taken into custody. According to Baba Leigh,
authorities had picked up the nephew, serving as hotel
manager here, not on the basis of any evidence, but merely
because the hotel's Lebanese owner, who was out of the
country on vacation, was suspected of financially supporting
the overthrow attempt. Baba Leigh asserted stated that he was
able to get the nephew freed on bail only after several days
of repeated personal approaches to senior judicial and police
officials.

ISLAMIC RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT'S RESPONSE
--------------


4. (C) In response to Ambassador's query, Baba Leigh said
while other Islamic religious leaders in The Gambia shared
his concern over the GOTG's human rights abuses following the
failed coup plot, they had so far been unwilling to go public
with their concern or confront the GOTG leadership. He
remarked that, "in times past," members of the country's
Islamic religious establishment would have insisted on
meeting with President Jammeh to urge an end to the abuses
and sanctioning of those responsible. Baba Leigh confided
that he personally had asked to see Jammeh, but that
Presidential staffers had told him that an appointment would
have to be requested through the country's Supreme Islamic
Council; the Council's Chairman declined to make the request,
according to Baba Leigh. Explaining the Gambian Islamic
religious leadership's failure to act, he asserted that the
latter was both "cowed and co-opted" by Jammeh.

THE COUNTRY'S STABILITY
--------------


5. (C) Baba Leigh judged that, in the coup plot's aftermath,
The Gambia's stability remained intact. At the same time, he
observed that, amidst the seemingly calm, business-as-usual
atmosphere, an apprehensive mood persisted among many
citizens in the capital. He said that further attempts to
topple Jammeh could not be ruled out, while adding that he
was personally not aware of any current plotting.


BANJUL 00000303 002.2 OF 002


PROSPECTS FOR CREDIBLE ELECTIONS
--------------


6. (C) Baba Leigh, echoing the views of other sources,
anticipated that the opposition parties would be allowed to
run credible campaigns and genuinely compete for votes in the
Presidential and National Assembly elections scheduled for
October 2006 and January 2007, respectively. He hastened to
add that the playing field would hardly be level, as the GOTG
and ruling APRC party would exploit -- and abuse -- the
advantages of incumbency to the hilt in terms of resources
allocated to the electioneering. However, Baba Leigh did
discount prospects for massive GOTG/APRC rigging of these
contests, saying Jammeh wanted to avoid being seen as an
"illegitimate leader" by winning an election clearly seen as
a sham. Baba Leigh judged that, while Jammeh's popular base
of support was slipping somewhat in the capital (primarily
due to the citizenry's economic woes, in Baba Leigh's view)
the President retained enough popularity in the hinterland to
win re-election -- especially if, as seemed increasingly
likely, the opposition parties failed to unite behind a
single candidate to challenge Jammeh.

COMMENT
--------------


7. (C) Baba Leigh made clear his concern over the
deterioration in the country's human rights record of late --
and his frustration over the Islamic religious
establishment's failure to approach the GOTG on this score.
Baba Leigh's progressive views are not shared by all Islamic
clerics here, and the Supreme Islamic Council's leadership,
in particular, strikes us as a bastion of more conservative,
traditional thought. We also find plausible that a "cowed
and co-opted" religious establishment, as characterized by
Baba Leigh, contributes to its lack of activism over the
human rights abuses following the failed overthrow attempt.
As for the 2006-7 elections, it is noteworthy that Baba
Leigh, who claimed to have no partisan leaning, downplayed
prospects of massive rigging by the GOTG/APRC. The opposition
parties themselves continue to tell us that --
notwithstanding Jammeh's backsliding of late on human rights
-- they will refrain from boycotting the elections because
they believe that they will have enough of a chance to
compete for votes to warrant their participation. END
COMMENT.





STAFFORD