THE GAMBIA: CALM, BUT JITTERY ENVIRONMENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANJUL 000194

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DAKAR PASS RAO, DAO,AND ODC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS CASC ASEC PHUM GA
SUBJECT: THE GAMBIA: CALM, BUT JITTERY ENVIRONMENT

REF: A. BANJUL 190 ET AL

B. BANJUL 188

C. BANJUL 193

BANJUL 00000194 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: AMBASSADOR JOSEPH STAFFORD, REASON 1.4 (B AND D)

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Amidst a calm, but jittery atmosphere, there have been
additional televised statements by persons suspected of
involvement in the March 21 coup attempt. A senior police
official noted the release of two military officers cleared
of involvement and estimated the remaining number of
detainees at around 28. He expressed certainty that elements
in the Senegalese military and security services had been
aware and supportive of the coup plot, but expressed doubt
that Senegalese President Wade had been aware or that he
would endorse Jammeh's overthrow. Authorities' closure of
the journal,"The Independent," and detention of its general
manager and editor-in-chief contribute to the jittery
atmosphere. Another daily, "Daily Observer," gave lead
coverage to Ambassador's March 29 statement of USG opposition
to extra-constitutional attempts to change governments.
Despite the jitters here, we have no sense at this point that
Jammeh's hold on power is slipping or that the country's
stability is in jeopardy. END SUMMARY

JITTERS IN AFTERMATH OF COUP ATTEMPT
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2. (SBU) The failed coup attempt March 21 continues to
overshadow events in the Gambian capital (see ref a for
background). Amidst the prevailing calm and general
normality, there is a sense of jitteriness in the air. The
current shortage of fuel in the Banjul area is contributing
to the nervousness, as are the televised confessions of those
suspected of involvement in the failed overthrow attempt.
While we believe that the GOTG is having these confessions
aired in order to convince any doubters that the plot was
real, sources indicate that the broadcasts are also
instilling in some Gambians a sense of unease as to the
country's stability and security. (NOTE: Since the failed
coup attempt, we have detected no sign of threat to
stability; e.g. the incident has generated no significant
public gatherings, except for the show of mass support --
doubtlessly organized by the GOTG -- for President Jammeh
when he appeared in public March 24 (ref B).

TELEVISED CONFESSIONS
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3. (SBU) Ref a reported televised confessions by suspected
plotters March 27; one suspect, Capt Bunja Darboe, read the
statement that the plotters had planned to issue on toppling
the Jammeh government. In their statement, the plotters
cited the country's "social and economic degradation" as
justification for their move and spoke of establishing an
interim government within ten days. There were further
televised confessions on March 29, when statements by two
"marabouts" (traditional Muslim religious guides) were
broadcast. The pair acknowledged having prior awareness of
the overthrow scheme through contact with plotters, but
denied any actual involvement and proclaimed their loyalty to
Jammeh (text being sent to AF/W). The March 29 footage also
featured a statement by a senior civilian official, General
Accountant of the Treasury, Alieu Jobe, who had also appeared
in the March 27 airing. Jobe, who has emerged as a major
figure in the plot, recounted his belief that the ringleader,
former Chief of Defense Staff Lt Col Ndure Cham, would select
him to head a post-coup government.

UPDATE ON DETENTIONS AND RELEASES
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4. (C) A senior police officer familiar with the GOTG's
ongoing investigation into the aborted plot told Ambassador
March 30 that that coup ringleader Cham remained at large and
was probably in the Casamance. This source denied rumors
that Senegalese authorities had located Cham and taken him
into custody. This source estimated the current number of
detainees at around 28 and noted the release earlier this
week of two military officers cleared of involvement in the
plot, Maj Ebrima Bah, commander of the First Infantry
Battalion, and Captain Famara Jammeh, Deputy Commander of the
State Guards (NOTE: Jammeh's release was particularly
noteworthy, as he had been among suspects giving televised
statements March 27; investigators evidently accepted his
assertion that he learned of the plot only on the day it was

BANJUL 00000194 002.2 OF 002


to occur, March 21, and played no part in it. END NOTE) Our
police contact asserted that various civilians -- e.g.,
former Gambian Ports Authority head Adama Deen and former
National Assembly member Ramzia Diab -- had been picked up on
suspicion of supporting the coup, in some cases financially.
Ambassador stressed the importance of authorities' respecting
detainees' rights and avoiding abuses; the police officer
responded that he was not aware of any detainees' being
tortured or otherwise abused.

SENEGALESE ANGLE
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5. (C) Asked about a possible Senegalese hand in the failed
overthrow attempt, the police contact expressed certainty
that elements in the Senegalese military and security forces
were aware of it, although he doubted that Senegalese
President Wade was aware or that he would have approved of
supporting a coup attempt. Noting plotters' televised
statements about ringleader Cham's assertions of Senegalese
forces' readiness to assist coup plotters in securing Gambian
military sites (ref A),our contact said he believed that
Cham had indeed lined up such contingency support from
Senegalese forces. Asked why Senegalese forces would
support Jammeh's overthrow, the source explained that the
former were concerned that Jammeh, given his common Jolla
ethnic background with the majority of Casamance residents,
had supported Casamance rebels in the past and would continue
to do so. (NOTE: According to local press reports March 29,
the Senegalese Embassy here declined to comment on
allegations of Senegalese involvement. END NOTE)


6. (C) According to an Amcit businessman who met March 30
with Jammeh's senior adviser, Secretary General Mambury Njie,
Jammeh was dissuaded, for the time being, from issuing an
anti-GOS statement, but was convinced of Senegalese
involvement in the plot. Njie reportedly said that Jammeh
had sent his Interior Minister to Dakar to discuss the
allegations of Senegalese involvement.

CLOSURE OF DAILY NEWSPAPER
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7. (C) Authorities' March 28 closure of the offices of the
newspaper "The Independent" and ongoing detention of its
General Manager and Editor-in-Chief contribute to the jittery
atmosphere (ref C). The precise reasons for the GOTG's action
remain unclear, but the paper's March 27 articles replaying
opposition concerns about Jammeh's wealth and containing
critical references to his own 1994 coup may well have
prompted authorities to act. As in his March 29 conversation
with the Interior Minister, Ambassador registered concern
over this crackdown on "The Independent" in March 30 call to
the Information Minister and has requested a meeting with her
March 31.

AMBASSADOR' STATEMENT CONDEMNING COUPS
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8. (U) Ambassador's March 29 interview with the
journal,"Daily Observer," in which he stated the USG's firm
opposition to any effort to change governments by
extra-constitutional means such as coups, received lead
coverage in the paper. In a March 30 editorial, the paper
applauded the U.S. statement of opposition to coups and
contrasted it with the Senegalese Embassy's failure to
comment, as reported above.

COMMENT
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9. (C) Despite the jittery atmosphere as the GOTG's
investigation of the failed coup continues, we have no sense
that Jammeh risks losing his hold on power or that the
country's stability is becoming shaky. However, authorities'
move against "The Independent," doubtless with Jammeh's
knowledge if not at his instruction, suggests that, in the
recent aftermath of the ovethrow attempt, his sensitivity to
personal criticism is even greater than usual. END COMMENT.
STAFFORD