SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: TWO YEARS ON, AN EMERGING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000826

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, S/CT
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: TWO YEARS ON, AN EMERGING
REALITY ON THE GROUND

REF: A. BANGKOK 684 (TWO YEARS ON - PART I)

B. 05 BANGKOK 6595 (TEMPLE ATTACK)

C. 05 BANGKOK 1008 (FLIGHT OF BUDDHISTS)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION: The heightened level of
violence seen in southern Thailand since January 4, 2004 has
not spilled over to other parts of Thailand, but it is
beginning to create a new reality on the ground. Reftel A
explained how historic factors may have contained the
violence to the far South. In our view, separatist elements
do not need to conduct attacks outside of the far South
because they are already creating a "separate reality" in the
deep South that meets their objectives. This reality comes
in the form of increasing estrangement between ethnic
Malay-Muslims and ethnic Thai or Chinese-Buddhists, and the
flight of non-Malays from the region. This does not mean
that the violence is a religious conflict -- or that the Thai
government is losing control in the region -- but the
emerging demographic reality is reinforcing the historic
"separation" of the far South from the rest of Thailand. END
SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION

DE FACTO SEPARATION IS ALREADY OCCURRING
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2. (C) Reftel A argued that historic factors, including the
militants' cell structure; local suspicion of outsiders; the
"Yawi" language; and Malay ethnicity have contributed to a
situation whereby the separatists' violence has been
contained to the far South. In fact, the committed militants
really do not need to spread the conflict to other parts of
Thailand because they are beginning to create a reality on
the ground in the South that meets their separatist
objectives. De facto separation is occurring to some degree
between the ethnic Malay-Muslims and ethnic Thai or
Chinese-Buddhists populations in the South, both physically
and psychologically. Because of fear, intimidation and
direct attacks, many non-Malays appear to be leaving the
region. The majority ethnic Thai/Chinese who remain in the
South appear to be pulling away from their Malay-Muslim
neighbors, particularly in the so called "red zones."


3. (C) The "Buddhist flight" phenomenon is hard to
quantify, but we continue to hear anecdotal evidence of
estrangement between the ethnically Thai/Chinese-Buddhists
and Malay-Muslims communities (reftels B, C). Some have
claimed that as many as a quarter of the non-Muslim
population has fled the area. This number may be exaggerated
(it is also difficult to separate the numbers of Buddhists
moving from rural to urban areas from those who are fleeing
the region entirely),but it is clear from on-the-ground
observation that significant numbers of non-Malays have left
or are planning to leave the region.

NOT A RELIGIOUS CONFLICT
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4. (C) Although the divisions that are being reinforced in
the South fall along religious lines, we do not view the
conflict as being primarily religious. Rather, the main
fault line appears to be more ethno-nationalist in nature.
This phenomenon stems in part from long-standing local
historic grievances that many of the ethnic Malay-Muslims
have with the Thai government, coupled with the separatist
aspirations of a committed minority. Admittedly, Islam is
the central identifying cultural factor for the ethnic
Malay-Muslims in the South, but it is only part of the reason
for the violence.

COMMENT: THAI GOVERNMENT STILL IN COMPLETE CONTROL, BUT...
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5. (C) The RTG is not losing its grip on power in the
South. The shadowy militants cannot provide local services
and do not offer an alternate political structure. They have
not articulated any demands nor has any credible leadership
stepped forward. The militants have not shown they can take
and hold territory -- even in the most volatile parts of the
South. And despite the widespread fear, uncertainty, and
sense of grievance among the local Muslim population, the
separatist militants still do not enjoy widespread support.
Seventy-six percent of the local population participated in
the last election, which suggests that the overwhelming
majority of southerners still maintain some degree of
confidence in the Thai national political system.


6. (C) But demographic changes do reflect a shifting
reality on the ground. This shift cannot be demarcated on
any map or organization chart, but it exists in the hearts
and minds of the southern people. A gradual evolution of the
South to a more exclusively Muslim area, combined with the
historic and growing local suspicion of the government by
Muslims, reinforces the perception that the far South is a
distinct, "separate" entity from the rest of Thailand. Over
time, there is concern that the interaction Malay-Muslims in
southern Thailand have with "Buddhists" will be more with the
civilians sent to administer the South and with the
approximately 45,000 security forces there to keep the peace
than with the neighbors they grew up with, and with whom they
shared some sense of common identity.
BOYCE