SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: KEY CONTACT'S NEW TIDBITS ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000080

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2016
TAGS: PTER PREL PHUM TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: KEY CONTACT'S NEW TIDBITS ON
SECURITY FORCES


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Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR SUSAN M. SUTTON FOR REASONS 1.5 (B,D
)


1. (C) Summary. In a 28 December meeting with Polcouns and
poloffs, Dr. Panitan Wattanayagorn, a well-regarded academic
with close ties to the military and the palace, outlined his
continued frustration with Prime Minister Thaksin's
micromanagement of RTG policy towards the South and offered
new details on army and police operations in that region.
Polcouns reiterated our strong concern over the potential for
human rights violations and the negative impact they would
have on our bilateral relationship. End Summary.

TOO MUCH MEDDLING FROM BANGKOK
--------------


2. (C) PolCouns and poloffs met with Chulalongkorn Professor
Panitan Wattanayagorn on December 28 to discuss the South.
Panitan, a longtime Embassy contact and adviser to both the
military and the palace, will be leaving Thailand in the
coming weeks to take up a visiting fellowship at the Johns
Hopkins University School for Advanced International Studies
in Washington for the Spring term.


3. (C) At the macro level, the National Reconciliation
Commission (NRC) plays a vital role, but its members remain
overly fixated on a "utopian" solution, and need to develop
alternatives grounded in the "reality" of the South. RTG
policy, meanwhile, remains bedeviled by overly intense and
erratic attention from the leadership in Bangkok. Efforts by
the PM and his top advisers to micro-manage government
operations in the South lead to new, big overarching plans to
solve the violence but there is rarely any follow-through.
Deputy Prime Minister and Justice Minister Chidchai
Vanasatidya, Thaksin's point man on the South, is starting to
understand the problem, but the military still lacks
confidence in him. The PM may trust Chidchai, but in order
for him to lead successfully, the military must trust him as
well.


4. (C) That said, Panitan believes that the Royal Thai Army
CINC, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, has had success bridging
the traditional divide between the police and army, and has
developed a good relationship with Chidchai. More
importantly, Sonthi is able to "absorb some of the pressure"
from Thaksin and Chidchai, and shield his subordinates on the
ground in the South from their whims. Sonthi's ability to
hand-pick the new commander of the 4th Army Command
(responsible for the South) further represents his clout in
the capital.

NEW TACTICS: SOME BAD, SOME BETTER
--------------


5. (C) From a tactical perspective, Panitan believes that the
picture is mixed. The Southern Border Peace Building Command
(SBPBC)--the organization responsible for coordinating
security in the South--remains far too complicated. The
SBPBC's predecessor (which Thaksin dissolved) was far from
perfect but was much simpler, allowing for easier and faster
coordination and action. The most effective system,
according to Panitan, would strike a balance between the two;
producing better army-police-local government coordination
while also coopting local Muslim leaders.


6. (C) The government's new emphasis on public lists denoting
those southerners involved in the violence is hamstrung by
poor intelligence at the village level. Those people on the
list are now expected to go through a government
"re-education" program in order to be removed from the list
(Septel will further explain this new program). The idea may
be good "but how good are the lists?" According to Panitan,
some villagers are "forced" to cooperate with the insurgents;
for example, threatened with harm if they do not put spikes
on the road at specific times. Locals are "caught between
the government and separatists."


7. (C) When asked about late-2005 rumors that the army had
planned a major shift in tactics in the South, Panitan
explained that the 4th Army is in fact placing 5-10 soldiers
in individual villages as a local guard force, but the
program is not widespread yet. These soldiers will, over
time, be able to forge relationships with the locals, develop

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intelligence and help insulate the villagers from the
insurgency. Panitan believes that the military also needs to
undertake more aggressive jungle operations against the
separatists, but such operations require more trust between
officers and enlisted personnel. Many junior officers do not
have the experience yet to inspire their men to take the
needed tactical risks. When asked if the RTG has enough
forces in the South to conduct both more aggressive
operations as well as garrison duty, Panitan replied that the
15,000 army and 20,000 police on the ground now should be
enough for the task.


8. (C) That said, suspicion and lack of trust between the
army and police on the ground are "worse than (he) expected."
This is, in part, due to Thaksin's (a former police officer)
initial decision to give the police the lead role in the
South. Putting aside his natural bias as an adviser to the
army, Panitan admitted that local police are more effective
than sometimes given credit for, but pressure from Bangkok to
use special police units from outside the South may cause
some "problems." Polcouns repeated our concern that pressure
on some units to produce results could lead to extrajudicial
killings and other violations of human rights, which could
have severe implications for our bilateral programs. Panitan
took the point; he responded somewhat cryptically by saying
that there are many things that the police are doing that are
very secret and "compartmented."

WHO ARE WE FIGHTING?
--------------


9. (C) Panitan also offered some skepticism on recent reports
that the Barisan Revolusi Nasional-Coordinate (BRN-C),a
forty-year old separatist group, was playing a lead role in
the violence. According to Panitan, this is an attempt to
use an old label for new people. The current generation of
separatists look for old, established names to help them win
local respect and revenue. Indeed, Panitan divided those
involved in violence into three groups: a small core group of
separatists with ties to the old movements, segments of the
general population frustrated with corruption and historical
grievances, and finally, a small number of disciplined
radicals who may or may not have ties to the international
jihadist movement. The first group of separatists represent
a trend that will always exist in the South. The general
public must be won over by the government. The final
group--which worries Panitan the most--will be very hard to
stop but must be wiped out.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Panitan is one of our most thoughtful and
well-connected interlocutors on the South. That said, his
influence lies with the army and palace--two institutions
which do not always see eye-to-eye with Thaksin's southern
policy. The army's new village defense tactics are very
interesting and could, if extended, fill a key gap in the
current security picture--minus the pomp and disruptive
fanfare of other "new" tactics. More importantly, they may
represent the army's attempt to quietly play a more
independent role in shaping the RTG response in the South.
ARVIZU