LUNCH WITH PM SURAYUD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 007388

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PACOM FOR FPA HUSO
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: LUNCH WITH PM SURAYUD

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Surayud assessed his
government's progress on key issues during a discussion with
me over lunch on December 8. He said that the government was
improving the security force organization in the South,
although violence there was continuing. He said that police
reform was his "second biggest challenge," and that he
favored a less "Bangkok centered" police force. He also
reported on plans to revitalize the old Internal Security
Command (ISOC),as a way to overcome the chronic problem of
stovepiping in the security forces. He said Thailand would
no longer defend Burma from outside criticism, but did not
respond to the suggestion that they support the UNSC Burma
resolution. Surayud denied rumors that one of the coup
leaders was trying to form a political party as a vehicle for
a future political role. Surayud has correctly identified
some of the biggest problems facing Thailand, but the new
government does not yet have a clear and convincing plan to
fix them. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister does not get much
help from ministries that are expending too much political
capital on much less important issues, like the lottery and
alcohol advertising. End summary.


2. (C) Prime Minister Surayud joined me for lunch on
December 8. He gave a fairly frank account of the main
problems on his mind, starting with the Thai media. He
commented ruefully that he had "never expected dealing with
the press to be such a problem," referring to the decidedly
mixed coverage some of the government's initiatives are
getting from local journalists.

THE SOUTH -- GOOD NEWS AND BAD NEWS
--------------


3. (C) He then immediately turned to the South, clearly one
of the chief issues for him. I said that I believed the
visits by the PM and Army Chief Sonthi, as well as the PM's
apology to the southerners for the previous government's
mistakes, had been well-received by the people in the South.
The violence was still increasing, however - perhaps because
the insurgents wanted to disrupt any progress the government
was making toward reestablishing trust with the people. I
asked whether it was hard to negotiate with shadows. Surayud
responded, "Catching shadows is hard." He acknowledged that
he would not be able to fix the problems in the south during
his brief tenure in office. He compared the situation to an
aircraft carrier -- getting it turned around takes some time,
but, once turned, it can go on the right course. His
administration would try to get the ship turned back on
course. He also noted that his problem was not just with the
insurgents in the South, but with the attitudes of many Thai
people about the southern problem. He recalled something
that former PM Anand had said while he was working on the
unrest in the south -- the problem is not with the five
percent of Malay-Muslims, it's with the other 95 percent of
the population.


4. (C) There were some bright spots in this rather gloomy
current situation. Surayud was very pleased with the
attitude of Malaysian PM Abdullah Badawi. Malaysia clearly
has no territorial aspirations on the three provinces. Badawi
had offered Surayud some helpful insights into Malay culture.
Surayud said that, although he was not a Malay or a Muslim,
he thought that he had some credibility in the South, and
would use it.


5. (C) I asked about the progress of reestablishing the
Southern Border Provinces Administrative Center (SBPAC),
dissolved by PM Thaksin in 2002 -- a decision which many
believe exacerbated the tensions in the region. Surayud said
that the Center start-up was proceeding well, and he thought
that it would be an improvement over its predecessor. He
reminded me that, at one of our last meetings, I had raised
concerns over the structure of the SBPAC that I had heard
from a former ranking official in the south who worried that
the Center would be an empty shell, without sufficient
resources. Surayud said that he had reassured this critic

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that the Center would in fact include representatives from
the relevant agencies, and it would engage in outreach to
community leaders as well.

SECURITY FORCES REFORM
--------------


6. (C) I raised the more general issue of lack of
coordination among national security agencies. Surayud
explained that his government planned to resurrect the
Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) to address the
intractable problem of stovepiping. ISOC would be headed by
Army chief Sonthi and would oversee the security agencies
dealing with trafficking in persons, narcotics smuggling,
counter-terrorism and immigration. The model would be the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (Comment: When
Thailand was combatting the communist insurgency in the 1970s
and 1980s, ISOC was a powerful security agency which
spearheaded the fight. ISOC in recent years was a relatively
weak agency with a special mandate to work on issues related
to border security, especially narcotics trafficking. The
Prime Minister was the head of ISOC, with a general appointed
as his deputy to oversee the day-to-day operations.
Surayud's plan appears to give ISOC a shot of steroids, and
it is not at all clear that this is a good thing. As with
police reform (below),Surayud has correctly identified
systemic problems with the security forces, but may not have
thought through all the ramifications of his proposed
solutions. In both cases, however, the reform plans are still
at an early stage. End comment.)


7. (C) Surayud turned to police reform. He identified this
as the "second biggest challenge" for him, after dealing with
the South. I pointed out the police have not actively opposed
the September 19 coup, but they were also clearly not
enthusiastic supporters. (Note: The police are also viewed as
linked to Thaksin, a former police official.) The police
will likely view any attempts to interfere with them as
"punishment" rather than "reform." Surayud insisted that he
was consulting with respected police officials as part of the
process of planning the reforms. He personally favored
decentralization of the police. He believed that Thailand's
police force was too "capital centered;" decentralization
would make the police more accountable to the population. I
pointed out the US has a law enforcement training program
here (ILEA),and we might be able to provide useful
assistance to the team working on the reform proposals.

"UNDERCURRENTS"
--------------


8. (C) I asked the PM about the "undercurrents" (alleged
pockets of Thaksin supporters prepared to use or provoke
violence to return him to power). I said that, in our
travels and meetings, we had not found evidence of
significant pockets of this kind of resistance. I pointed
out that the citizenry in the areas of Thaksin's greatest
popularity in the North, and especially the Northeast, did
not historically participate in political demonstrations, or
challenge authority. They were more likely to hunker down,
and perhaps show some passive resistance. Surayud replied
that the "undercurrents" that the government and CNS had so
feared did not appear now to be a strong force. He
speculated that the former Thai Rak Thai (TRT) leadership in
some regions had put up "trial balloons" (pamphlets, calls
for demonstrations) to see how people would respond. In the
end, there had not been as much response as the
government/CNS had feared. I conceded that some of the rural
population might participate in anti-government
demonstrations or actions if they were paid to do so. Surayud
answered, "This is our concern."


9. (C) Surayud commented also that it may be very difficult
for the government to come up with any concrete corruption
charges that would stick to Thaksin, as he had been very
clever in all his business dealings. Surayud said that
Thaksin "really shouldn't come back" to Thailand until the
reform process was over. (Note: In a previous meeting,

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Surayud had implied that Thaksin might run in the election
next year. This time, however, he appeared to mean that
Thaksin should sit out this round entirely, returning only
after the 2007 vote. End note.)

DEPORTATION OF LAO-HMONG
--------------


10. (C) I asked Surayud about the apparent move to deport
some 150 Lao-Hmong, many of whom are recognized by the UNHCR.
I remarked that we appreciated Surayud's earlier intervention
to block a proposed deportation of the same group. Surayud
did not respond directly, but asked whether the USG could
help with resettling any of the Hmong, including those at
Petchaboon. I replied that this was an issue that would have
to be considered, and asked whether this would increase the
pull factor and draw more Hmong to Petchaboon. The
Petchaboon group would have to be carefully screened to
determine if they had valid refugee claims. Surayud made no
commitment on what would happen to the Lao-Hmong group at
Nong Khai. (Note: We continue to be in touch with MFA and
UNHCR about this issue. End note.)

GENERAL WITH POLITICAL AMBITIONS?
--------------


11. (C) I asked the Prime Minister about the widespread
rumors that General Winai Phattiyakul, one of the members of
the Council for National Security (CNS),had aspirations for
a political career after the elections next year. (Note:
Winai, one of the key leaders of the coup, met with leading
former Thai Rak Thai MPs last month. This was followed by a
flurry of allegations that Winai was trying to set up a
political party to be a vehicle for the military, and Winai
himself, to remain active in politics after the elections
next year. End note.) Surayud denied unequivocally the
suggestion that Winai had any political ambitions. Surayud
said that Winai, currently Permanent Secretary at the
Ministry of Defense, only wanted to "retire in uniform."

BURMA
--------------


12. (C) Surayud looked rueful when I asked him about his trip
to Burma. He said that he had told the Burmese they needed
to do something "dramatic" to show the international
community that they understood its concerns. But if Burma
was not prepared to take such a step, then Bangkok would not
argue against the UNSC resolution. I underscored the
importance the U.S. places on the resolution, and urged him
to support it. At a minimum, we hoped that Thailand, and
ASEAN, would at least not oppose the resolution. I raised
some recent statements by the foreign minister, who was still
advocating constructive engagement and who was, reportedly,
considering reviving the "Bangkok process," a failed
Thaksin-era policy to engage Rangoon. Surayud categorically
rejected the idea of reviving a special role for Thailand as
an intermediary between Burma and the rest of the world. He
said that he only had a year in office, and he didn't have
time to try to "fix" Burma. He had his hands full with
Thailand. I concluded by asking him point blank to keep an
eye on Foreign Minister Nitya.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) Surayud showed himself, once again, to be a
thoughtful and reasonable man grappling with an overwhelming
array of problems. On a number of issues -- Burma, police
reform, the South -- he is trying to change course from the
failed policies of his predecessor, but exactly how the
government can successfully address these issues is still
unclear. Surayud is aware that he has a very short time to
try to make these changes. Unfortunately, while he is
focused on the insurgency in the South and long-standing
problems with the security forces, his ministers somewhat
inexplicably have chosen to focus on less important issues
like alcohol advertising and the lottery, or suggesting

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unhelpful initiatives on Burma. Unless this changes,
Surayud's problems with the press are unlikely to ease any
time soon.
BOYCE