EXPLAINING THE DECISION TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 007150

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM MOPS TH
SUBJECT: EXPLAINING THE DECISION TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW

REF: A. BANKOK 7132 (CABINET APPROVES LIFTING)


B. BANGKOK 6821 (NLA LIFTS MEETING BAN)

C. BANGKOK 6654 (PROTEST AGAINST COUP)

Classified By: Political Officer David R. Greenberg, reason 1.4 (b) and
(d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) The cabinet's November 28 decision to lift martial law
in a majority of Thailand's provinces was due in no small
part to a desire to respond to international concerns,
although domestic opinion-makers had begun increasingly
questioning the need for restrictions on civil liberties.
Since September 19, the government has not availed itself of
many of the available tools to clamp down on political
activities, but some officials appear to want to retain
martial law as an insurance policy, i.e. in order to contain
potential movements (read Thaksin forces) against the
government. Interim Prime Minister Surayud's administration
has transferred civilian and military officials who appear
loyal to deposed Prime Minister Thaksin, whose popularity has
declined, according to a recent poll by a credible
institution. These developments may make RTG officials more
comfortable with the prospect of gradually lifting martial
law in Thaksin's former strongholds -- a step they
nonetheless are reluctant to take at present. End Summary.

MOVE GREETED WITH SHRUG IN BANGKOK
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2. (C) The November 28 announcement that the cabinet would
seek royal approval for the recision of martial law in much
of Thailand (ref A) made few waves in Bangkok. The
relatively mild reaction and lack of suspense (English
language daily "Bangkok Post" devoted more front page space
to debate over lottery legalization) probably stems from
recent statements by leading officials previewing their
intention to lift martial law. Perhaps more importantly,
although martial law technically enabled the authorities to
conduct searches, seize property, censor publications, and
take similar steps, the Thai government has undertaken few
such efforts.


3. (C) Even before the lifting of martial law, political
restrictions had been falling by the wayside. Shortly after
the September 19 coup d'etat, criticism of the military
leaders began appearing in the newspapers, and it has
continued ever since. Television news broadcasts reported
criticism of the interim administration by high-profile
figures, like former Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh.
Bangkok-based former officials of Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai
(TRT) Party with whom we have spoken have told us they did
not feel intimidated by the new government. Our sense is
that the vast majority of middle- and lower-class citizens of
Bangkok do not feel inconvenienced or intimidated by martial
law. Activists began holding political demonstrations --
admittedly modest in scale -- to promote particular agendas,
and even to criticize the coup (ref C). On November 9, the
National Legislative Assembly (NLA) voted to rescind a
nationwide ban on political gatherings imposed by the coup
leaders. Nonetheless, some NGOs, politicians and journalists
have remained very critical of martial law.

MILITARY REMAINS WARY
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4. (C) Military leaders appear to remain concerned by what
they have termed "undercurrents" of support for deposed Prime
Minister Thaksin. To some extent, these undercurrents simply
represent a favorable sentiment toward Thaksin, who actively
pursued populist programs that redistributed resources from
Bangkok to outlying provinces. Former legislators from TRT
(and other parties),anticipating elections in approximately
one year, are trying to retain their popularity in their
constituencies, and they may be engaging in a type of
activism or networking that soldiers find threatening. Some
figures have cited the distribution of leaflets which condemn
the coup as menacing political activity. At their most
extreme (outside of southern Thailand, where militant
activity is common),unknown figures have burned down
schoolhouses, most likely in order to make a political

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statement, although we cannot rule out other motivations
(e.g., disputes over contracts to build new schools). This
type of activity has been rare, however.

EXPLAINING THE DECISION
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5. (C) The simplest explanation for the decision to lift
martial law throughout much of Thailand at this time is that
the RTG was not using martial law provisions against
potential critics or subversives and considered it more of a
liability than an asset. Thai observers noted that the
retention of martial law made the government appear weak and
insecure, providing critics with a powerful talking point.
International criticism likely added significantly to the
"cost" side of the cost-benefit equation. We believe Surayud
felt an obligation to fulfill his privately expressed
commitment at the APEC Leaders Meeting to lift martial law by
the time of the King's birthday. (In that regard, the
cabinet's decision on November 28 represents Surayud's
fulfillment of that commitment. The cabinet is unlikely to
lift martial law in other provinces in the immediate future,
although senior government leaders have told us that a
partial lifting of martial law in some additional areas is
possible.)


6. (C) The government may have grown more confident that it
can handle possible outbreaks of violent opposition, in light
of some developments since the coup:

- In late September, the annual military reshuffle placed the
coup leaders and their allies in top positions; a November
reshuffle of lower level officers may also have helped to
purge Thaksin sympathizers in the armed forces.

- In late October, Interior Minister Aree Wongarya
transferred some provincial Governors appointed by Thaksin
(and seen as loyal to him).

- A survey by the respected ABAC polling institute, announced
in late November, showed Surayud's approval rating rising to
70 percent, while Thaksin's popularity reportedly fell to 16
percent. (Comment: Despite ABAC's good reputation, we are
wary that these numbers may not accurately reflect public
sentiment.)

- Various government agencies appear to be making progress in
finding evidence of corruption, tax evasion, and other
misdeeds by Thaksin and his family members (septel). Regular
revelations of improprieties may further sully Thaksin's
image and may indicate a basis for prosecution, which would
diminish Thaksin's likelihood of returning to political life.

OUTLOOK
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7. (C) Given Thaksin's pervasive influence, vast wealth and
famous vindictiveness, the interim government's insecurity --
which likely manifests itself in a desire to retain martial
law and whatever other tools they have -- is understandable.
However, recent trends cited above -- the dismantling of
Thaksin's network, his declining popularity -- will likely
increase the comfort level of the cabinet and the Council for
National Security to the point where they can support a
broader lifting of martial law without having to worry about
unleashing pent-up resentment of Thaksin's supporters.

MARTIAL LAW - PAST AND PRESENT
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8. (C) As mentioned in ref A, martial law had been in place
in parts of 19 provinces prior to the coup (with three other
southern provinces covered by an emergency decree). It
appears that the RTG had imposed martial law principally in
border areas, to address security concerns, smuggling, and
illegal migration. Nevertheless, we rarely saw indications
that the security forces were exercising actual martial law
powers. It is very unlikely that the RTG intends to lift
martial law in the sensitive border areas in the foreseeable
future, as it has become an established tradition.


9. (C) Districts in 35 of Thailand's 76 provinces are slated
to remain under martial law for the time being. Eventually,

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however, the government will come under increasing pressure
to lift martial law in much of the North and Northeast, TRT's
geographic strongholds. The RTG flatly admits that it cannot
yet rescind martial law in many parts of those regions out of
fear of "undercurrents" of support for Thaksin. But the RTG
likely understands its interests are ill served by a policy
that might imply certain portions of the population are less
trustworthy than others. It will be important for the USG to
encourage the RTG to continually reevaluate the necessity of
martial law and to rescind it wherever possible, as soon as
possible.
BOYCE