Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK7016
2006-11-21 10:40:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR CALLS ON LEGISLATURE PRESIDENT

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
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ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211040Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3068
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 6312
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1574
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2360
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1214
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 007016 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON LEGISLATURE PRESIDENT


Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 007016

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR CALLS ON LEGISLATURE PRESIDENT


Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Thailand's interim legislature will work actively and
cooperate with the interim administration to advance national
interests, according the legislature President Meechai
Ruchupan. In a November 21 meeting with the Ambassador,
Meechai indicated the parliament would strive to push through
legislation while unencumbered by the constraints elected
legislators would face. Meechai, one of Thailand's foremost
legal experts, declined to suggest features of Thailand's
next constitution, although he noted the system of checks and
balances established by the 1997 Constitution had failed. He
expected progress soon in forming the Constitution Drafting
Assembly but noted that elections next year might take place
a month or two later than expected. End Summary.

NLA TO SUPPORT THE ADMINISTRATION
--------------


2. (U) The Ambassador called on National Legislative Assembly
(NLA) President Meechai Ruchupan on November 21. The NLA
arranged extensive media presence, and more than a dozen NLA
staff members joined the meeting.


3. (C) Meechai opened the meeting by commenting on Prime
Minister Surayud Chulanont's positive exchange with President
Bush at the APEC gathering in Hanoi. Meechai remarked that
it was difficult for foreigners to understand the complex
dynamics that had led to the September 19 coup d'etat. The
Ambassador replied that U.S. policymakers viewed Thailand as
a friend and ally, and the USG would seek to provide help and
understanding when a friend encountered difficulties.


4. (C) The Ambassador asked what sort of role Meechai
envisioned for the NLA. Meechai replied that the NLA should
pass legislation at an expedited pace, compared to previous
parliaments. Because the interim constitution established a
unicameral parliament, and because there was no opposition
group within the parliament, it should be possible for the
NLA to work quickly in support of the administration. When
the Ambassador noted that the interim constitution prohibits

the NLA from holding a vote of no-confidence, Meechai said he
did not imagine this limitation mattered, as the NLA
generally agreed with the administration's policies.

THE NEXT CONSTITUTION
--------------


5. (C) Turning to the next constitution, the Ambassador asked
for Meechai's assessment of the ongoing selection procedure
to form the 2,000-member National People's Assembly (NPA).
(Note: Once formed, the NPA will then select 200 of its own
members, from which the Council for National Security will
select 100, to form the Constitution Drafting Assembly --
CDA. By virtue of his position as President of the NLA,
Meechai will serve as NPA President. End Note.) Meechai
said the procedure was ongoing; once convened, the NPA would
need only a day to select the CDA. He anticipated this
selection would take place by mid-December.


6. (C) Aside from presiding over the NPA during its very
short lifespan, Meechai would have no involvement in drafting
the next constitution, he asserted. He even denied holding
opinions on the substantive matters that the drafters would
decide. Continuing to press, the Ambassador asked Meechai to
explain an analogy he had previously used to argue for a
constitution that addressed uniquely Thai circumstances. (In
October, Meechai publicly compared the 1997 Constitution to a
Rolls Royce, noting that such a vehicle, while desirable in
foreign contexts, was not useful for Thai farmers'
cultivation of rice.)


7. (C) Meechai explained that the system of checks and
balances that the 1997 Constitution had established had
proven inadequate. The 1997 Constitution created numerous
watchdog bodies, to be staffed by independent persons of high
caliber, nominated by a nonpartisan, elected Senate. This
system had failed, however. If Senators were to be elected,
they would surely rely on political parties, and this raised
the possibility of single-party dominance, as had occurred

BANGKOK 00007016 002 OF 002


with Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party.


8. (C) The Ambassador noted USG concern that the CDA complete
work on the new Constitution within the timeframe announced
by the coup leaders, so elections could take place
approximately one year after the coup. Meechai considered
this timeframe realistic, and a deadline in the interim
constitution ensured the process would not drag out
indefinitely. But he noted the target date for elections
might slip by a month or two.

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Given that the Council for National Security appointed
both the Prime Minister and the members of the NLA, we would
not expect the NLA to become adversarial toward the
administration. We believe Meechai accurately represented
his intention to support the Prime Minister's agenda,
although we note that some members of the NLA have publicly
criticized Meechai and might also use their seats in
parliament to criticize the administration and its policies.


10. (C) We are skeptical about Meechai's claim that he will
remain uninvolved in the constitution drafting process, even
informally, and that he has few opinions on the salient
issues. The format of this meeting, and the numerous NLA
staff members in attendance, likely precluded Meechai from
sharing his views more openly. We take note of his belief
that there might be a slight lengthening of the timeframe for
election, although it is too early to prejudge when the CDA
may finish its work and how long it will take to prepare for
elections after the next constitution's promulgation.
BOYCE