Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK6855
2006-11-13 10:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

FORMER DEPUTY PM EXAMINES HIS OPTIONS

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM TH CH 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006855 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM TH CH
SUBJECT: FORMER DEPUTY PM EXAMINES HIS OPTIONS


Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006855

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM TH CH
SUBJECT: FORMER DEPUTY PM EXAMINES HIS OPTIONS


Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Former Deputy Prime Minister Somkid Jatusripitak told
the Ambassador he intends to retire from politics, although
top politicians are angling for his support. In a November 9
meeting, Somkid said public support for Thaksin and the Thai
Rak Thai (TRT) party remains strong; therefore, he surmised
the Constitutional Tribunal will likely order TRT's
dissolution. He said the coup leaders are frustrated that
they take the blame for governance problems, despite having
turned over most authority to the new administration. Somkid
said General Winai Phattiyakul is trying to form a political
party to ensure he retains political influence. Somkid was
generally supportive of the USG's response to the coup but
urged the USG to engage in a friendly manner with the RTG at
APEC. He expressed positive views about China. End Summary.

THE POLITICAL MAP
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador met November 9 with Somkid
Jatusripitak, former Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Leader
of TRT. (Background note: In the final months of the Thaksin
administration, TRT officials saw Somkid as the figure most
capable of holding TRT together in the event of Thaksin's
departure from politics. He also was widely seen as best
able to replace Thaksin as Prime Minister. Thaksin appeared
concerned by Somkid's popularity and ambition, and publicly
adopted an increasingly hostile tone toward Somkid prior to
the coup.)


3. (C) Somkid, accompanied by advisor Uttama Savanayana,
appeared visibly relaxed and claimed he felt relieved to be
out of the political melee and enjoyed having free time to
spend golfing. He quipped that he also had to "play hide and
seek" with former legislators seeking to ally themselves with
him. Former Labor Minister Somsak Thepsutin (leader of the
largest faction of former TRT legislators) and Pracharat
party Leader Sanoh Thienthong had separately approached him,
and both had encouraged public speculation that Somkid would
join their respective teams. Somkid told the Ambassador he

had listened to their pitches but made no commitments. The
time was not yet right, and the rules of the political game
remained unclear.


4. (C) Aside from Sanoh and Somsak, Somkid also saw former
Health Minister Pinij Jarusombat as positioned for future
influence. Somkid expressed low regard for TRT Acting Leader
Chaturon Chaiseng; Chaturon had no option other than staying
in TRT, as he had no power base to make him useful to other
parties. By contrast, TRT Deputy Leader Sudarat Keyuraphan
was more flexible and mobile. The military would feel
threatened by Sudarat's remaining with TRT, Somkid said;
Sudarat knew this and consequently had adopted a low profile.

VIEW OF THAKSIN
--------------


5. (C) Somkid had not spoken directly with Thaksin or
Thaksin's wife since the coup, he said, but he had heard
indirectly that they did not want him to form a new party.
Somkid had sent an indirect message to them that he planned
to retire from politics. Somkid expressed pity for Thaksin,
surmising that the deposed PM had recently traveled to China
because he was heckled by hostile Thai expatriates in London.
Somkid guessed that Thaksin was "very lonely."

VIEW OF THE CNS
--------------


5. (C) Somkid had dined the night before with Council for
National Security (CNS) Chairman Sonthi Boonyaratglin, he
related. Somkid characterized the CNS as "too nice," having
surrendered "all power" to the interim government. The
interim government was not performing well, however, and the
CNS was taking the blame. But it was difficult for the CNS
to confront the interim government, because interim Prime
Minister Surayud Chulanont was the CNS leaders' former senior
officer. Nevertheless, the CNS soon would have to "adjust
the system," Somkid said, implying a more assertive role for

BANGKOK 00006855 002 OF 002


the Generals.


6. (C) Somkid spoke highly of Sonthi, characterizing him as a
professional soldier, very proper in his ways, and someone
who did not seek to promote himself. Sonthi was not
interested a political role. CNS Secretary General Winai
Phattiyakul, on the other hand, was trying to form a
political party, Somkid related with confidence. This new
party would possible involve Pinij Jarusombat, as well as
Deputy PM Pridiyathorn Devakula, but Somkid noted Pinij and
Pridiyathorn seemed unlikely to get along well together.

THE UNDERCURRENT
--------------


7. (C) Both TRT and Thaksin remained highly popular, Somkid
said. He characterized the political situation as
"explosive," particularly as the public would come to realize
the Thaksin administration was more effective than its
successor. Thus, the Constitutional Tribunal, which Somkid
seemed to consider susceptible to politicization, would find
it imperative to dissolve TRT when ruling on a pending
election fraud case.


8. (C) Surayud played a special role in stabilizing the
situation and containing Thaksin's supporters, Somkid said.
Because of his status as a Privy Councilor, Surayud's
accepting the position of interim PM signaled royal support
for the coup and helped to calm those who would otherwise be
more angered by the coup. Somkid also lauded Surayud's lack
of political ambition, his even temperament, and his good
judgment, and Somkid considered it important that Surayud had
the trust of Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda.

VIEW OF USG
--------------


9. (C) The USG had taken a reasonable and appropriate stance
in response to the coup, Somkid said. Thais understood that
the USG would oppose the military takeover and stand up for
democracy. That said, Somkid urged a positive interaction
between President Bush and Surayud at APEC.

VIEW OF THE PRC
--------------


10. (C) Somkid noted he was not dismayed by the speed with
which the Chinese government, previously close to Thaksin,
had welcomed the coup. Thais knew that the Chinese were
pragmatic and not focused on democracy. If he were to travel
to the PRC today, Somkid said, he would still consider the
Chinese as good friends. He also noted parenthetically that
he hoped to study Chinese in his spare time.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Somkid quit TRT soon after the coup, but to many
Thais he still represents much that was good about the
previous administration (effectiveness, competence,
modernity),while his public split with Thaksin also
distances him from some of the negatives (corruption,
arrogance). Somkid is indeed widely courted and would
provide a meaningful boost to whatever party he joins or
forms. We doubt he sincerely wishes to retire from politics
-- even if he is currently thinking along such lines, his
resistance to overtures will surely erode over time.
BOYCE