Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK6854
2006-11-13 10:52:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAI PM PLANS TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM PREF KDEM TH BM KN 
pdf how-to read a cable
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O 131052Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2903
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS PRIORITY
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 6305
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1568
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 2353
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1211
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006854 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PREF KDEM TH BM KN
SUBJECT: THAI PM PLANS TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW

REF: BANGKOK 6816 (PLAN TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006854

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PREF KDEM TH BM KN
SUBJECT: THAI PM PLANS TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW

REF: BANGKOK 6816 (PLAN TO LIFT MARTIAL LAW)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont told the
Ambassador the RTG planned to lift martial law during the
celebrations of the King's December 5 birthday, and might
even take this step earlier. In a November 13 meeting with
the Ambassador, Surayud indicated that he hoped to address
unhelpful remarks by some political figures before lifting
martial law. He said Thaksin should not return to Thailand
before the country's next constitution is complete. Surayud
responded in a positive tone when the Ambassador raised
concern over freedom of the press and over the safety of the
wife of a prominent missing lawyer. Surayud agreed that
militants in southern Thailand had not responded positively
to his efforts to promote reconciliation, but he did not
indicate whether the lack of progress would influence his
future steps. Surayud intends to travel to Burma but will
also monitor discussion of Burma at the UN. He said he would
seek to assist the USG on the resettlement of Burmese, Hmong,
and North Korean refugees, but he also hoped to limit the
influx of North Koreans into Thailand. End Summary.

LIFTING MARTIAL LAW
--------------


2. (C) In a November 13 call on interim Prime Minister
Surayud Chulanont, the Ambassador recounted his November 8
conversation with Council for National Security (CNS)
Chairman Sonthi Boonyaratglin, in which Sonthi said the RTG
planned to rescind martial law during the celebrations of the
King's birthday (reftel). The Ambassador requested to
confirm this plan directly with Surayud. Surayud replied
simply saying "it should be OK, (even) before the King's
birthday." The Ambassador asked what factors would influence
the decision. Surayud replied there were "so many factors,"
including the disposition of former Prime Minister Chavalit
Yongchaiyudh, who in recent days made public statements

antagonistic toward Surayud's administration and the CNS.
Chavalit had also called for former PM Thaksin to be allowed
to return home. Noting the desirability of defusing
Chavalit, Surayud said, "We have to accommodate him."

TIMING THAKSIN'S RETURN
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador asked about Surayud's disposition
toward Thaksin, noting Surayud's public comments on November
12 to the effect that Thaksin should remain outside of
Thailand until a new elected government is in place. Surayud
told the Ambassador that this would indeed be the most
appropriate time for Thaksin's return. However, he would
also consider it legitimate for Thaksin to return prior to
the elections, if he wanted to carry out the duties of a
political party leader under whatever provisions would exist
under the new (not yet drafted) Constitution.

NEW CONSTITUTION: "NOT MY JOB"
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador inquired about the ongoing formation of
the National People's Assembly, which will then select the
Constitutional Drafting Assembly. Surayud indicated he was
not monitoring this process carefully and was not aware of
the timelines for further developments, saying it was "not
his job." (Note: Under the interim Constitution, the CNS
nominates and the King appoints the NPA's members; the
cabinet does not play a role in this procedure. End Note.)

MEDIA RESTRICTIONS
--------------


5. (C) Recalling Surayud's public remarks to the effect that
the government was not constraining the Thai media, the
Ambassador explained reports the Embassy had received that
government officials had contacted officials of television
station iTV and had sought to minimize coverage of the
suicide of a taxi driver who opposed the September 19 coup.
The government had also increased the presence of soldiers at

BANGKOK 00006854 002 OF 002


iTV. Surayud said he had not been aware of this development.

CONCERN FOR MISSING LAWYER'S WIFE
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador noted that Angkana Neelaphaijit, the
wife (and presumed widow) of Somchai Neelaphaijit (a Muslim
lawyer abducted by the security forces in 2004),had
expressed concern about her safety to an Embassy officer.
Progress in investigating Somchai's disappearance could lead
the culprits to engage in further acts to intimidate those
who might provide evidence against them. Surayud expressed
concern on this matter and told his accompanying staff, "We
should help (Angkana)."

SOUTHERN VIOLENCE
--------------


7. (C) Turning to the violence in southern Thailand, the
Ambassador praised Surayud's efforts to advance
reconciliation with the Muslim communities in that region.
It seemed that the militants were responding with increased
violence, however. Surayud said he had noted this trend. It
appeared militants were trying to strengthen their grip on
the local population, focusing on consolidating their hold at
the village and sub-district level, and in the process
driving non-Malays out of the region.

BURMA TRAVEL
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassador asked about Surayud's intention to
travel to Burma. Surayud said he planned to go after the
APEC meeting in Hanoi, although he did not mention whether he
had a specific date arranged, or if he would travel directly
from Vietnam to Burma. Surayud said he also would monitor
Burma-related developments at the UN, implying that the tone
emerging from UNSC consideration of Burma could influence
Thailand's policy toward its neighbor.

REFUGEES
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador thanked Surayud for providing access to
Burmese refugees in Thailand, noting our hopes soon to begin
USG processing for resettlement from the largest of the camps
(Mae La). Surayud said he had no qualms about U.S.
resettling Burmese refugees -- or, for that matter, even
Hmong.


10. (C) Recognizing RTG concerns over a possible influx of
North Koreans to Thailand, the Ambassador said the USG
nevertheless stood ready to resettle North Korean refugees.
Surayud promised to "try my best" to cooperate on this issue.
He indicated he would try to show flexibility on North
Koreans already in Thailand, but he also would encourage Thai
authorities to exert better control over the country's
borders and prevent North Koreans from entering.
BOYCE