Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK684
2006-02-06 00:25:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: TWO YEARS ON, STILL NO ATTACKS

Tags:  PGOV PTER PREL TH 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000684 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, S/CT
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: TWO YEARS ON, STILL NO ATTACKS
OUTSIDE THE SOUTH

REF: A. BANGKOK 258 (CT ASSISTANCE)

B. 05 BANGKOK 7750 (BANGKOK MUSLIMS)

C. 05 BANGKOK 7573 (BRN-C)

D. 05 BANGKOK 3854 (OIC LOOKS AT SOUTH)

E. 05 BANGKOK 3633 (SATUN PROVINCE)

F. 05 BANGKOK 3203 (RUMORS OF U.S. CONSPIRACY)

G. 05 BANGKOK 2603 (SEPARATIST PROPAGANDA)

Classified By: DCM Alexander A. Arvizu. Reason 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000684

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, S/CT
PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: TWO YEARS ON, STILL NO ATTACKS
OUTSIDE THE SOUTH

REF: A. BANGKOK 258 (CT ASSISTANCE)

B. 05 BANGKOK 7750 (BANGKOK MUSLIMS)

C. 05 BANGKOK 7573 (BRN-C)

D. 05 BANGKOK 3854 (OIC LOOKS AT SOUTH)

E. 05 BANGKOK 3633 (SATUN PROVINCE)

F. 05 BANGKOK 3203 (RUMORS OF U.S. CONSPIRACY)

G. 05 BANGKOK 2603 (SEPARATIST PROPAGANDA)

Classified By: DCM Alexander A. Arvizu. Reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION: Since the coordinated raid on
a Thai Army weapons depot in Narathiwat on January 4, 2004,
there have been almost daily attacks and several dramatic
violent incidents attributed to militant Muslim separatists
in far southern Thailand. Over this two year period there
has been serious concern that the violence might spread
further north, yet this scenario has not developed. This
cable (the first of two) argues that historic factors,
including the militants' cell structure; local suspicion of
outsiders; the "Malayu" language; and Malay ethnicity have
contained the violence to the far South. This remains a
localized conflict based on local factors. Septel will
discuss how a "separate" reality is already being
successfully created on the ground in the South. END
SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION

STRUCTURE LIMITS REACH OF THE MILITANTS CELLS
--------------


2. (C) Thus far, Thailand's renewed 100 year-old
separatists insurgency has been largely contained to the far
South. The solidifying consensus is that there is a core
group of militant cells that are tapping into a wider and
looser network of youth to carry out attacks across far
southern Thailand (reftel C). The way that these cells have
evolved, while effective, has limited their ability to
spread. The militant cells are without an identifiable
hierarchical structure and appear to be based on personal
relationships established through Islamic pondok schools.
This loose, personal structure has frustrated Thai
authorities and proven to be an effective way to carry out
attacks and avoid disruption from security forces. However,
the disparate nature of the militant cells also means that
their actions tend to be focused locally among familiar

surroundings and people. It is a challenge for the
militants' cells to operate easily outside of their immediate
surroundings.

SUSPICION OF OUTSIDERS HELPS CONTAIN NETWORKS
--------------


3. (C) The high level of fear and mistrust evident
throughout the South has also limited the ability of
militants to operate outside of their immediate surroundings.
People in the region are highly suspicious of outsiders and
rumors are rife that "dark forces" -- or the U.S. -- are
behind the violence (reftel F). Attacks almost always occur
without anyone taking responsibility, and the RTG has also
consistently failed to successfully investigate or prosecute
cases related to the southern violence (reftel A). These
factors reinforce local suspicion of those outside their
immediate village. In this atmosphere, it is difficult for
outsiders -- be they Muslims from another village, Thai
intelligence operatives, or foreign terrorists -- to quietly
slip into village life without attracting attention. Muslim
villagers in the Muslim majority province of Satun, for
example, are highly suspicious that Muslims from neighboring
Yala, Pattani, or Narathiwat may be connected to unwanted
militant violence (reftel E).

LANGUAGE ACTS AS A BARRIER -- AND A BRAKE
--------------


4. (C) Language is another important factor in
understanding the historic limit of the militants' cells
reach. The "Yawi" or "Malayu" Malay dialect is the primary
language for many southern Muslims, especially in rural
villages. This creates a linguistic barrier that allows
Malayu speaking militants to operate easily in many villages
and limits the ability of Thai security forces to penetrate
the militant networks. While Malayu gives the militants a
degree of freedom of operation in the provinces that have
large populations of Malayu speakers (Narathiwat, Yala,
Pattani),the language also acts as a brake, limiting the
ability of militants to set up cells outside of the Malayu
speaking communities. A Malayu speaking militant might be
able to hide easily among the Malayu speaking Malay-Thais in
the three southernmost provinces, but he sticks out like a
sore thumb anywhere else in Thailand: including in
neighboring Songkhla and Satun provinces, where Thai is the
predominant language.

ETHNICITY SEPARATES MUSLIMS IN THAILAND
--------------


5. (C) Ethnicity is also a factor in explaining why the
violence has not expanded to other Muslim communities in
Thailand. Southern Malay Muslims are, by definition,
different from the ethnic Thai and Sino-Thai who make up the
bulk of Thailand's population, including those Muslim-Thais
found in other parts of the country. An ethnically
Malay-Thai outside of the far South attracts attention and
suspicion. Additionally, Bangkok Muslims do not feel a close
kinship to their ethnically Malay co-religionists from the
South and do not have a deep appreciation for the grievances
of southern Muslims against the government (reftel B).

STILL LOCAL AFTER ALL THESE YEARS, BUT...
--------------


6. (C) The violence in the South primarily stems from local
historic grievances and aspirations (reftel G) and remains
primarily a local ethno-nationalist conflict. The violence
is being committed by locals on local targets, but this does
not guarantee that other parts of Thailand will be spared
from this festering conflict. The violence continues to
attract some degree of attention from the larger Islamic
world (reftel D),and transnational elements may be tempted
to insert themselves in this textbook case of "Muslims being
violently repressed." Still, for reasons described above,
our assessment remains that the southern violence is unlikely
to spread outside the South or take on an international
character, at least not in the near term. That being said,
the character of the South has changed dramatically:
Militants do not need to conduct attacks outside of the far
South because a "separate" reality is already being
successfully created on the ground, as we will discuss in
septel.
BOYCE