Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK6561
2006-10-30 10:51:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAI MFA PERMSEC PROMISES TIMELY DEMOCRATIZATION

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3797
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #6561/01 3031051
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301051Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2623
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3140
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 6224
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2275
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHFJSCC/COMMARFORPAC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 006561 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PACOM FOR FPA HUSO
NSC FOR MORROW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: THAI MFA PERMSEC PROMISES TIMELY DEMOCRATIZATION

REF: BANGKOK 6478 (NEW LEGISLATURE PRESIDENT)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 006561

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PACOM FOR FPA HUSO
NSC FOR MORROW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL KDEM TH
SUBJECT: THAI MFA PERMSEC PROMISES TIMELY DEMOCRATIZATION

REF: BANGKOK 6478 (NEW LEGISLATURE PRESIDENT)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Thai MFA Permanent Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn
assured the Ambassador and visiting DAS John that Thailand
would return to democratic governance in roughly one year.
In an October 26 lunch, Krit said the interim constitution's
deadlines ensured the timely promulgation of a new
constitution; Krit spoke dismissively of an RTG official who
publicly predicted a longer process. Krit said interim Prime
Minister Surayud Chulanont favored lifting martial law, but
it was Surayud's nature to build consensus rather than to
force his views on others. DAS John emphasized the need for
the recision of martial law in the near future, and he
recommended that Surayud assure other leaders at the
mid-November APEC summit that Thailand would send an elected
Prime Minister for the 2007 APEC meeting. Krit's deputy
discussed RTG talks with southern Thai separatist groups,
noting the RTG was unsure that participants in
Malaysian-brokered talks represented the principal
perpetrators of violence, but these talks nevertheless could
provide a psychological benefit. Krit expressed dismay about
a recent raid by immigration police on a shelter for North
Korean refugees, while reinforcing concern that publicizing
the transit of North Korean refugees through Thailand could
prove problematic. End Summary.

TIMEFRAME FOR DEMOCRATIZATION
--------------


2. (C) In an October 26 lunch with DAS John and the
Ambassador, MFA Permanent Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn
assured DAS John that the soon-to-be-formed Constitution
Drafting Assembly (CDA) would complete its work in accordance
with the timeline laid out in the interim consitution. Krit
highlighted the interim constitution's "self destruct
mechanisms" that provided for the CDA's dissolution if it
failed to complete its task in the time provided. The
interim constitution now represented "the law of the land,"
Krit said, and all concerned would respect its provisions.

Krit added that, in Surayud's presence, he had criticized
Thirapat Serirangsan, Minister Attached to the Prime
Minister's Office, for having speculated publicly that the
interim government might remain in office for at least 17
months.

CONSTITUTION DRAFTING COMMISSION
--------------


3. (C) Responding to DAS John's inquiries about the
procedures for drafting Thailand's new constitution, Krit
explained that provincial governors met on October 25 to
receive a briefing on how local administrative mechanisms
would be used in a decentralized process to nominate
representatives for the 2,000-person National People's
Assembly, which would then work with the Council for National
Security (CNS) to select the 200-person CDA and a smaller
Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC). Krit said the CNS
would use its constitutional prerogative to appoint 10 of the
35 members of the CDC in order to ensure the inclusion of
experienced jurists (such as Borwornsak Uwanno and Wissanu
Krea-ngam) with the background necessary to produce a charter
of high quality.

MARTIAL LAW AND BILATERAL RELATIONS
--------------


4. (C) Krit assured DAS John that civil liberties were
already being restored. Although the legislature had not yet
been able to take formal action, the ban on political
gatherings had been implicitly lifted after the cabinet
announced its intention to ease restrictions. Krit noted
thousands of people had gathered for demonstrations critical
of the government, without repercussions. DAS John expressed

BANGKOK 00006561 002 OF 003


dismay that the RTG seemed reluctant to lift martial law
formally; the Ambassador noted the pace of progress on this
matter appeared "glacial." Krit replied that both Surayud
and CNS Chairman GEN Sonthi Boonyaratglin genuinely wanted to
lift martial law and saw it as unnecessary; however, they
needed time to bring other RTG officials (NFI) on board.
Surayud by nature strove for consensus, Krit observed.


5. (C) Citing the long history of U.S.-Thai friendship, Krit
asked that the USG understand that the political crisis
during Thaksin's final year in office had left Thailand
dysfunctional. Prior to the coup, former Prime Minister
Anand Panyarachun had publicly warned Thailand could become a
"failed state." The coup therefore generated relief and
euphoria -- the end was so good that people were in no mood
to denounce the means. With its repeated criticisms, the
USG's condemnation appeared gratuitous and risked generating
a perception of overall American antagonism toward Thailand.
Krit asked that the USG not "punish us more just to get your
message out," and consider instead how the U.S. and Thailand
could continue their history of working together to enhance
security and strategic interests in the region.


6. (C) DAS John noted the Thais could generate a positive
climate by lifting martial law. This could enable a more
normal atmosphere for the APEC summit in mid-November. DAS
John recommended that Surayud assure other APEC leaders that
Thailand would have an elected Prime Minister in office in
time to attend the 2007 APEC summit.

THE NEW LEGISLATURE
--------------


7. (C) Krit, who is also a member of the newly established
National Legislative Assembly (NLA),mentioned that there was
vibrant debate during the recent election for the NLA
presidency (reftel). From observing the debate, one would
not have guessed that the NLA consisted entirely of appointed
members, Krit said. The NGO representatives in the NLA were
particularly active. Krit acknowledged the NLA lacked
representatives of Thailand's rural areas, remarking on the
absence of the provincial godfathers whose local influence
had enabled them to win seats in prior legislatures.

SOUTHERN VIOLENCE
--------------


8. (C) Changing topics, Deputy PermSec Sihasak Phuangketkeow
observed that continuing violence in southern Thailand might
represent an effort of separatists to maintain a high
profile. Sihasak noted there seemed to be no link between
the southern Thai separatists and the al Qaeda-affiliated
international terrorist network, but he expressed concern
that the ideology promoted by international jihadists could
inflame the situation in Thailand. Former Malaysian Prime
Minister Mahathir had gathered views from separatist
organizations PULO, Bersatu, BRN, and Pattani Islamic
Mujahideen Movement; these organization had devised an
eight-point peace proposal, and none of their points appeared
objectionable to the RTG. Although the RTG remained unsure
whether those organizations were the principal instigators of
violence -- intelligence pointed instead to the
BRN-Coordinate, Sihasak said -- reaching an accommodation
with them could provide psychological benefits. Thai
intelligence chief LTG Waipot had the lead for the RTG in the
Mahathir-brokered talks.

NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES
--------------


9. (C) Noting a raid by Thai immigration police on a South
Korean safehouse for North Korean refugees, Krit said the MFA
opposed this action, which appeared to represent attempts at
self-promotion by the immigration police. The RTG was
concerned that media coverage of the movement of North Korean
refugees through Thailand could generate a larger influx from
the DPRK. The Ambassador said the USG was committed to
accepting DPRK refugees for resettlement but also understood

BANGKOK 00006561 003 OF 003


that publicity could undermine the prospects for continuing
the flow of North Koreans through Thailand.


10. (U) DAS John did not have the opportunity to clear this
cable.
BOYCE