DAS JOHN'S MEETING WITH MOD PERMSEC WINAI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 006523

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM PINR TH
SUBJECT: DAS JOHN'S MEETING WITH MOD PERMSEC WINAI


Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary. In a wide-ranging meeting on October 24,
EAP DAS Eric John told Ministry of Defense Permanent
Secretary GEN Winai Phattiyakul that there is strong concern

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in Washington over the continued imposition of martial law
and restrictions on civil liberties. Winai, who is also
Secretary General of the Council on National Security (CNS)

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said that they are working on lifting martial law "as soon as
possible" but cited several reasons for the delay, including
a desire to keep Thaksin from coming back "too early." Winai
also gave a passionate defense of the coup while
acknowledging U.S. concerns. He urged DAS John to convey the
message that the coup makers "don't want to hold on to
power." Winai outlined Prime Minister Surayud's emphasis on
improving policy in dealing with the restive South and his
desire for a tougher line on Burma--"we will have a
completely different policy than the last administration."
End Summary.

JUSTIFYING MARTIAL LAW
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2. (C) DAS John, accompanied by the Ambassador, began by
outlining strong U.S. concern over the continued imposition
of martial law. GEN Winai said that the government is trying
to lift martial law "as soon as possible." Winai explained
that he had just spoken to Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont
about this subject. The PM had tasked Winai and CNS leader
GEN Sonthi Boonyaratglin to take a closer look at how "we can
speed up the process." Lifting martial law will be easier
once "the security situation" is under control.


3. (C) DAS John asked GEN Winai for clarification, citing the
apparent calm in Bangkok (which Winai had pointed out first),
progress in selecting a legislature and no apparent threats
from Thaksin supporters. Why is martial law still in place?
Winai said that martial law had minimal impact on "regular
people." Having martial law now, before there is a problem,
allowed the government to respond more effectively if one
arises, he claimed. Winai said that the government does not
want to be forced to reinstate martial law at later date.


4. (C) When pressed further, Winai indirectly acknowledged
that martial law allowed the interim government to block
efforts by political parties to engage in "undesirable"
public campaigns against the regime. "As soon as we lift
(martial law),it will be full speed to the next election."
Political parties are currently allowed to engage in private
preparations for the election, but are barred from public
attempts to "manipulate" the people or mount a challenge to
national security. "We just don't want to see Thaksin and
Thai Rak Thai come back too early." According to Winai,
martial law in Thailand is not like martial law in other
countries. Citing protests by some left-wing academics,
Winai said "we let them protest for three days
already...please understand, we are not a dictatorship."


5. (C) The Ambassador related comments made by other
government officials citing vague security concerns that
drove the military to launch the coup and justified the
continued imposition of martial law. The Ambassador asked
Winai if he could share specific, concrete details of either.
On martial law, Winai cited "lots of intelligence" pointing
to an "underground movement." Specific examples of this
effort include leaflets in northern Thailand blaming Privy
Councilor Prem Tinsulanond for "supporting the coup."

AN IMPASSIONED DEFENSE OF THE COUP
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6. (C) Winai's explication that Thaksin supporters were
planning on clashing with the PM's opponents soon expanded
into a passionate defense of the coup itself. Winai claimed
that, prior to the coup, Thaksin supporters had already
secured mini-buses and vans in Bangkok to bring in the PM's
supporters from up-country. Thaksin's allies wanted to bring
in one million supporters to push back against a scheduled

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rally by the PM's opponents on September 20. Each Thai Rak
Thai MP was charged with producing 3,000 volunteers from
their province for the effort. Given the threat of
bloodshed, GEN Sonthi and other military leaders felt they
had no choice but to lead the coup. (Note: Several pro-coup
figures have alleged that Thaksin supporters were plotting to
violently confront participants at an anti-Thaksin rally
scheduled for September 20, thus forcing the military seize
power. End Note.)


7. (C) With obvious emotion in his voice, Winai went further;
we "did not want to do that...did not want to have that."
Winai said "we understand U.S. concerns," especially after
calls by PACOM Commander ADM Fallon and frequent
representations by Ambassador Boyce. "We don't want to
impact relations with the U.S., the best friend we've had in
the past 50 years." Winai continued to make an impassioned
defense of the coup, painting a picture of instability
generated by a never-ending cycle of anti-Thaksin rallies and
a stubborn PM that would have resulted in violence. Only the
celebrations of the King's 60th year on the throne had
delayed such a violent confrontation, but it was coming.


8. (C) Moreover, the political system offered no clear way
out. Thaksin had dissolved parliament--"what kind of
democracy is that, not having a parliament for over a
year?"--and there were no effective checks or balances on the
PM's power. Thaksin himself had decided to step back from
politics only to come back again. "Even though an election
was in the near future, we could foresee that after the
election, things will be the same, the big rallies will
return. We regret that the military had to act." Winai
asked that DAS John tell policymakers in Washington, "none of
us in the CNS want to hold on to power."

MOVING ON
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9. (C) Winai noted that the CNS had made good on its public
pledges: drafting an interim constitution within twelve days,
selecting an interim Prime Minister, and passing power to his
government. The legislature had been selected and the
process for selecting drafters for the new constitution was
under way. According to Winai, it should take about six and
a half months to draft a new constitution, a process that
will be easier if the drafters work off of a previous charter
as opposed to starting from scratch. Winai hopes that the
government can hold elections by the end of next year at the
latest.

THE SOUTH AND BURMA
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10. (C) Turning to policy under the new administration, Winai
confirmed that PM Surayud is intent on making changes to
policy on the troubled South and Burma. Surayud wants to use
less force in the South and emphasize justice. As part of
this approach, he is planning on reinstituting the old
Southern Border Provinces Administration Center (the central
task force that Thaksin disbanded in 2002). On Burma, Winai
said that the Surayud's well known desire for a tougher
policy has not changed. "We will have a completely different
policy from the past administration on Burma." In his calls
on ASEAN capitals, Surayud will skip Rangoon. According to
Winai, this decision "will make people on the border
nervous...he is sending a strong signal."

WHAT TO DO ABOUT THAKSIN
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11. (C) Winai turned to the Ambassador and with a sigh said,
"tell me what do with a man who has 100 billion baht in his
pockets." The Ambassador urged that any investigation into
Thaksin's assets or political dealing be undertaken in a
fair, transparent matter consistent with the rule of law. In
fact, any trial or indictment should only occur under a new,
democratically elected government. Winai nodded, but
explained that the interim government is under a lot of

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pressure to go after Thaksin.

COMMENT
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12. (C) Winai provided one of the most impassioned defenses
of the coup we have heard to date. His explanation
underscored the crux of the problem facing Surayud's interim
government and the CNS: how to return to "normal" Thai
democratic politics while ensuring that the "threat" posed by
Thaksin has been neutralized.
BOYCE