AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH THAI FOREIGN MINISTER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006424

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PACOM FOR FPA HUSO
NSC FOR MORROW

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH THAI FOREIGN MINISTER

REF: STATE 174287

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C) The Ambassador met with Foreign Minister Nitya (Nit)
Pibulsonggram on October 20. The Ambassador reviewed the
reftel talking points item by item, describing the concern in
Washington over the pace of the return to democracy. He
highlighted our disappointment in particular that martial law
remained in effect. The Ambassador explained the difficulty
of holding any meeting between President Bush and the Thai
prime minister at APEC in November if significant progress on
the timeline to restore democracy has not been made. The
Ambassador took note of the positive steps which the Thai
have taken, including the installation of a civilian
government, the interim constitution and the National
Assembly. However, in each case, there were some elements
that could leave the impression that the military's timeline
for returning power might be lengthening rather than
shortening. These included the fact that the PM was a
retired military officer and the significant role for the
"coup council" (the Council on National Security) detailed in
the interim constitution. The delay in lifting martial law,
however, stood out as the issue of most immediate concern.


2. (C) Foreign Minister Nit affirmed that the interim
government understood our position. "Off the record" he said
that some members of the government have also asked why
martial law needs to remain in effect. However, the
government is concerned by information that there are efforts
afoot to stir up unrest in the countryside. Leaflets are
being distributed in the countryside, for example, in support
of former Prime Minister Thaksin. The Ambassador asked if
there were more specifics available on the nature of these
threats to security, but Nit was unable to provide further
information, other than to say that there was "credible
intelligence." Nit said that the government would lift
martial law when it believed the time was right. Thailand
could not lift martial law precipitously in early November
just to respond to US pressure over the APEC meeting; that
would "hurt their self-respect." Nit referred repeatedly to
the possibility of lifting martial law for the King's
birthday on December 5, and emphasized that this would be
viewed by the Thai as a very appropriate day. The Ambassador
reminded him that we would view waiting until December 5 as
quite a long delay, calling his attention again to the timing
of the APEC meeting in November. We also noted that, within
Thailand, there were more concerns being raised, even from
people who had initially accepted the coup, largely due to
the continued application of martial law. Nit appeared
surprised by this assessment.


3. (C) Foreign Minister Nit said that he personally found
the benchmarks that the US laid out to be useful. They were
the same goals that the interim government was aiming to
reach, although we might have some differences in our views
on the right timetable. Nit assured us that the government
did not intend to move the goalposts; its plan was to finish
the reform and hold elections within a year. Nit asked for
the US to recognize that the coup was not conducted by people
interested in clinging to power themselves. That said, he
and the cabinet recognized that the one-year schedule would
be very difficult to keep.


4. (C) Comment: From Nit's response, the interim government
and the Council on National Security are very aware of the US
concerns. But it also seems clear that, in their most recent
deliberations, some in the government see the King's birthday
on December 5 as the most auspicious time to lift martial
law. We are struck again how the overburdened interim
government seems to be tone-deaf on this issue, unaware of
the growing unease that martial law is causing among those
Thai who initially accepted the coup as a necessary evil. We
will continue to urge that, in the absence of credible
threats to national security of which we are unaware, the
government get over its fears and lift martial law as soon as
possible, as the necessary next step toward the quick and
full return of civil liberties and elected government.

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BOYCE