Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK6354
2006-10-17 23:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

CIVIL SOCIETY: PATIENCE WEARING THIN

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM TH 
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INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 3091
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 6187
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2239
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHFJSCC/COMMARFORPAC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 006354 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM TH
SUBJECT: CIVIL SOCIETY: PATIENCE WEARING THIN

REF: A. BANGKOK 6269 [AMBASSADOR MAKES JOINT CALL ON

INTERIM PM SURAYUD]

B. BANGKOK 6241 [AMBASSADOR PRESSES CNS TO LIFT
MARTIAL LAW

C. ACCELERATE ELECTIONS]

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BANGKOK 006354

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM TH
SUBJECT: CIVIL SOCIETY: PATIENCE WEARING THIN

REF: A. BANGKOK 6269 [AMBASSADOR MAKES JOINT CALL ON

INTERIM PM SURAYUD]

B. BANGKOK 6241 [AMBASSADOR PRESSES CNS TO LIFT
MARTIAL LAW

C. ACCELERATE ELECTIONS]

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Civil society contacts are extremely
concerned about the continued imposition of martial law and
restrictions on civil liberties. There are more diverse
views on other topics, including the advisability of
accelerating the election timetable. Many are disappointed
by the appointment of a National Legislative Assembly
dominated by Bangkok bureaucrats and military. While there
is continued support for, or at least acceptance of, the
Council on National Security and the interim government, our
conversations show that, for some, patience is starting to
run out, due to the delay in lifting martial law and concerns
about the military's influence over the transitional
political process. END SUMMARY

MARTIAL LAW
--------------


2. (C) The single issue that concerns civil society contacts
more than any other is the continued imposition of martial
law and restrictions on civil liberties. The restrictions on
political party activity and on gathering more than five
people for a political meeting hindered the planning and the
activities of those we spoke to, even though we are unaware
of any instance where the government has actually interfered
with any gathering or demonstration so far. Suriyasai
Katasila, spokesman for the People's Alliance for Democracy
(PAD) complained that NGOs wanted to organize to draft a
parallel Constitution, in order to draw attention to the
issues they believe are most important. The restrictions on
political gatherings mean that the NGOs cannot legally meet
and organize themselves to take on this task. Suriyasai did
point out that some NGOs were meeting and even demonstrating,
without government interference. Since the government was not
enforcing the restrictions, he said, they might as well lift
them.


3. (C) The spokesman of the Democrat Party also noted that
martial law restrictions limit his party's activities. Among

other things, once martial law is lifted, the party officials
may argue for a faster transition back to democracy than the
one year time table laid out by the interim constitution.
The spokesman recognized that the government is worried about
the activities of Thai Rak Thai and diehard Thaksin
supporters writ large. He observed that Thaksin in London is
too quiet, "too polite;" he is probably up to something
behind the scenes. The government probably feared that, once
it lifts martial law, it would be difficult to impose it
again even if the threat to security became more serious.
However, the Democrat argued that the interim government
could at least find a way to lift martial law in stages,
starting with Bangkok, if there were a real reason to fear
unrest in the countryside.


4. (C) Other contacts echoed these concerns. There is general
agreement that there does not seem to be any security
justification for the continuing restrictions. Somchai
Homlaor, the chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the
Lawyers Council of Thailand, said that the fear that TRT
could mobilize its base to challenge the interim government
and the Council on National Security (CNS) is "overstated."
Gothom Areeya, a long-time activist, Chairman of the National
Economic and Social Advisory Council (and member of the
interim National Legislative Assembly) agreed, and questioned
how strong the popular support for TRT in the countryside
really was.


5. (C) Human rights activist Sunai Phasuk noted that the
concerns about martial law and similar issues "puts people
like me in a very difficult and uncomfortable position." He
said that as a staunch anti-Thaksin activist, he was
initially relieved to see the Thaksin administration forced
out, and he wants to be supportive of the interim
government's effort to restore democracy in Thailand. But
the failure of the CNS in responding to repeated calls for

BANGKOK 00006354 002 OF 004


lifting martial law and restrictions on civil liberties is
making it impossible for him (and people like him) who want
to be supportive. He drew a parallel to the 1991 coup and
the initial support for Gen. Suchinda that "disappeared
overnight" when the population determined that the military
planned to retain control of the government. He said that
the justification offered by the CNS and the government for
maintaining martial law are weak. He observed that the
military could certainly contain any perceived threat from
remaining Thaksin loyalists without the imposition martial
law on the entire country.

NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY
--------------


6. (C) The announcement of the 242-member National
Legislative Assembly (NLA) has met with a more negative
reception than the earlier announcement of the new Cabinet.
Many of the newspapers commented on the large number of
serving military officers (35),bureaucrats, and retired
military, and the absence of "grassroots" representatives,
meaning mostly people from outside Bangkok. Several also
commented on the predominance of "Prem's men:" military and
civilians associated with Privy Councillor Prem Tinsulanonda.
(Comment: It is worth noting that Prem's advanced age and
long tenure in government (he was PM for over eight years in
the 1980's) mean that many political figures are less than
six degrees of separation from the Privy Councillor.
However, the observation that Prem's former proteges and
colleagues are well-represented seems fair. End comment).
NLA member Gothom pointed out that, in the Thai system, the
winners expect to be able give out spoils; he was concerned
that at least some of the NLA seats had been awarded on the
basis of cronyism. In any case, the NLA membership was "not
representative." One solution was to appoint a several more
members from the "grass roots." The interim constitution
allows for up to 250 members in the NLA, so there is room for
a few more.


7. (C) There is some controversy over the participation of
journalists and civil society representatives in the NLA.
The selection of journalist members seems to have followed an
informal quota system, which we have heard is also how some
of the other seats were filled. Many of the major news
organizations (the TV stations and largest newspapers) are
represented, including the respected daily "Matichon" and the
tabloid "Thai Rath" -- represented, for some reason, by its
gossip columnist. Some journalist NGOs are calling for media
representatives to leave the NLA in order to maintain their
objectivity. (Journalists covering the NLA are also
complaining, but perhaps mainly because they fear that the
insiders will scoop them.) We heard also that several of the
civil society representatives, including Gothom Areeya,
sought the advice of other civil society organizations before
agreeing to take seats in the NLA. They agreed that some
would accept seats in the NLA, while others would work from
the outside, but all with the same goal of facilitating the
return of democracy.


8. (C) Many activists are now concerned about who will be
chosen to head the NLA. General Sonthi has said that the CNS
will not choose the President of the NLA, although the
interim constitution appears to give CNS that right.
Instead, the NLA will vote on its leader. According to the
press, the front runner appears to be Meechai Ruchupan, one
of the drafters of the interim constitution who has been
heavily criticized for his role in assisting the 1991
military coup makers. Human rights lawyer Somchai, echoing
widely-held views, expressed strong opposition to Meechai,
saying that if Meechai is made president of the NLA, "that
will send a very clear signal of what the process will be."


9. (C) It will be a challenge for the NLA to do credible
work as a legislature since almost all the members will be
part-time, holding on to their current jobs. Activist Gothom
plans to use the resources of the National Economic and
Social Advisory Council to help him research any draft
legislation and be able to comment on it intelligently. Other
members will not have that advantage, and Gothom is concerned
that they may therefore be more amenable to outside
influence. However, since the NLA will only meet for one
year, he conceded that it was difficult to do things

BANGKOK 00006354 003 OF 004


otherwise, since NLA members would not have been willing to
quit their jobs for such a short term in the assembly, and no
one wanted to create more career politicians.


CIVILIAN/MILITARY BALANCE
--------------


10. (C) Human rights advocate Sunai Phasuk expressed concern
that, a month after the coup, the military appears to be
creating a structure that will enable it to retain excessive
influence throughout the coming year, and possibly beyond.
He pointed to the various articles in the interim
constitution placing power with the CNS, and to the
predominance of military figures in the line-up of the
recently announced National Legislative Assembly. Sunai said
that although the CNS sought the advice of members of civil
society in drafting the interim constitution, they completely
ignored the advice that was offered. He said that, in his
analysis, many of the articles in the interim constitution
seem unnecessary unless they want to ensure their hold on
power throughout the year.

11.(C) Activist Gothom was also concerned about the elements
in the interim constitution that the CNS could use to
maintain "inappropriate" influence. However, he took a more
wait-and-see attitude. He hoped that the NLA could, for
example, pass legislation or take other measures to ensure
that the CNS could not impose restrictions on the public in
contradiction to the interim constitution's guarantees of
civil liberties.

ELECTION TIMETABLE
--------------


12. (C) Civil society is split on whether the transition to
new elections can or even should take place faster than the
one year timetable the CNS promised. While the Democrat
party spokesman said that they might argue for a faster
transition, the Democrat party head wrote in an op-ed earlier
this month that, "While we can wait for one year for the new
constitution and elections, the same cannot be said for the
lifting of various restrictions on freedom and rights. This
must be done as soon as possible."


13. (C) Human rights lawyer Somchai was concerned that the
CNS would drag out the transition: "This is the nature of a
military junta. At the beginning the junta made a lot of
promises. Now they are in power and they are approached by a
lot of greedy business people, greedy politicians, and
others. Now they will seek to hold on to power as long as
they can." He argued that, using the 1997 Constitution as a
basis, it shouldn't take very long to complete the new draft.
His colleague Gothom, however, walked poloff through a
step-by-step timetable for choosing the Constitutional
Drafting Committee, drafting the constitution, submitting it
for comment and making amendments to the draft. Of the six
months for constitution drafting, he estimated that about
three would be given over to "getting the ball rolling" and
then responding to public input on the draft. That left
three months for actual drafting, a process that might be
shortened, but not by much. Similarly, once the constitution
was complete and the legal frame work was clear, the Election
Commission would need two months to organize good elections.
Overall, he did not think that the one year schedule could be
shortened by much, and he did not see that issue as one of
the more important concerns.

GROWING SKEPTICISM
--------------


14. (C) Much of the public still appears to accept the coup
and to be willing to give PM Surayud, in particular, a
chance. But some of the activists who welcomed the coup are
beginning to be disillusioned. Human rights activist Sunai
expressed his frustration with the military. He said that
General Sonthi was "clueless" and the other military leaders
around him are preparing "to sacrifice our freedoms for the
sake of stability." He found it increasingly evident that,
while General Sonthi was in over his head and Surayud
struggled to set an agenda and "action plan" for his cabinet,
Privy Councillor Prem is the one "pulling the strings."

BANGKOK 00006354 004 OF 004


Sunai suggested that Prem needs to be informed that the
perceived intransigence of the CNS in restoring civil
liberties is "making the military look very bad."


15. (C) Sunai said how deeply disappointed he was in the
military. He emphasized that he was close to many officers
and, in fact, taught many of them in his capacity as a guest
lecturer at Chulachomklao Royal Military Academy and the
Royal Thai Air Force Academy. He said that he had always
held the military in high regard for their sense of honor and
dedication to the country. As such, he expected that the
coup makers would hold true to the promises made in the hours
and days following the coup to restore civil liberties and
democratic civilian rule as quickly as possible. Now he is
increasingly concerned that the military is taking steps to
maintain its influence over the government for the long term.


16. (C) Human rights lawyer Somchai said that civil society
will begin to organize if they see no progress on meeting
their demands (lifting martial law, restoring civil
liberties, inclusive/transparent process in drafting the new
constitution). He noted that the PAD is working to develop a
network in the provinces. He laughed as he observed that PAD
-- the biggest and most effective anti-Thaksin group -- may
find itself forming new alliances with former foes in the
pro-TRT camp.


17. (C) We asked activist Gothom about the possibility of
the military seeking to maintain its influence over the
government for "the long-term," perhaps with some explicit
role for itself as guarantor of stability. Gothom said that
he expected someone would propose something like this, given
the historical importance of the military. However, he said,
there would be very stiff resistance to any proposal along
these lines. "We've been through this before," he said,
referring to protests in the 1980's and 1990's. In 1992, he
said, they succeeded in removing an explicit military role
from the constitution. Any effort to roll back the clock on
this would be met with great opposition, Gothom said, and he
believed that the military understood that.

COMMENT
--------------


18. (C) In meetings this week between the Ambassador and
members of the CNS (Gen. Winai - ref B, and Gen. Sonthi -
ref A),we have been struck by how they seem genuinely and
completely unaware of this undercurrent of opposition.
Because the government has not blocked any of a number of
demonstrations, or thrown journalists out of their jobs, they
claim that the martial law restrictions are not doing any
harm. They have not given their citizens a good explanation
-- if there is one -- why these restrictions need to remain
in effect. This is now at the root of a growing frustration
with the interim government and with the CNS. Our
interlocutors were glad that the US was raising the issue of
martial law (although one suggested that we find ways to have
other countries raise the issue, perhaps partly in response
to concerns that the US has been the loudest voice in
criticizing the interim government.) The interim government
still has time to dig itself out of this hole, since it seems
to enjoy fairly broad support, or at least acceptance, for
the time being. But they should remember the quick growth
and the surprising strength of the anti-Thaksin movement, an
object-lesson that even the most popular of political figures
can fall quickly from public favor.
BOYCE