Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK6324
2006-10-16 10:08:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:
THAILAND: AMBASSADOR URGES GEN SONTHI TO LIFT
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006324
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS
NSC FOR WILDER, MORROW
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS MARR TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR URGES GEN SONTHI TO LIFT
MARTIAL LAW, RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL LIBERTIES
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006324
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS
NSC FOR WILDER, MORROW
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS MARR TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR URGES GEN SONTHI TO LIFT
MARTIAL LAW, RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL LIBERTIES
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d)
1. (C) Summary. I met with Council for National Security
(CNS) chief GEN Sonthi Boonyaratglin on October 16 to express
our continued concern over the coup and the suspension of
civil liberties. Reminding him that we have already
suspended almost 24 million dollars in assistance, I informed
Sonthi that we may be forced to consider additional measures
if we do not see more progress towards democracy. I
underscored the importance of lifting martial law quickly,
describing for Sonthi the difficulty the President might have
in meeting interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont at APEC
next month if martial law remains in place. Sonthi said he
believes that martial law remains necessary for the time
being to prevent "influential and moneyed interests" from
using undue influence on rural voters and fomenting unrest.
I intend to use upcoming meetings with key civilian figures
in an around the government in the coming days to impress
upon them the importance of restoring civil liberties, first
and foremost of which is lifting martial law, at the earliest
possible date. End Summary.
2. (C) I met privately with General Sonthi at Royal Thai
Army (RTA) Headquarters on October 16. Reminding him of the
strong bonds and years of friendship between our two people,
I underscored the importance of the CNS and interim
government showing sustained, concrete progress on returning
democracy to Thailand. I told Sonthi that, while we took
note of the rapid naming of an interim Prime Minister,
Cabinet, Constitution, and National Assembly, we remain
extremely disappointed by the coup and urge Thailand to
quickly end martial law and restore all civil liberties.
After reminding him of the 24 million dollars of assistance
we suspended under section 508, I told Sonthi that we might
reevaluate other military programs and representational
events not covered by 508 in the near future if we do not see
more progress towards a return to democracy. I explained to
Sonthi that interim Prime Minister Surayud and President Bush
are both scheduled to attend APEC in Hanoi next month. I
described the difficulty President Bush might have in meeting
Surayud together with other ASEAN leaders if Thailand remains
under martial law.
3. (C) Sonthi did not give me a firm date for lifting
martial law. He told me that he believes martial law is
necessary for the time being to prevent "influential and
moneyed interests" from using undue influence over rural
voters and fomenting dissent. He believes that the people
are "comfortable" under martial law and generally support the
need to keep it in place for a short while longer. I told
him that martial law would not be necessary to prevent
political violence and that we were unaware of any nascent
opposition in the countryside that would warrant the
continuation of martial law. I urged him to share with us
any intelligence he might have indicating a counter-coup or
violence was being planned.
COMMENT
4. (C) Sonthi appears to view martial law in strictly
security terms -- a useful tool to maintain order and prevent
potential unrest. He seems not fully cognizant of how
martial law is damaging Thailand's reputation abroad. For
BANGKOK 00006324 002 OF 002
instance, in our meeting Sonthi did not seem to understand
the impact a state of martial law would have on Surayud's
participation at APEC. In the coming days, I intend to meet
with very senior civilian leaders in the interim government
or with connections to it, to continue our ongoing efforts to
impress upon them that the government needs to lift martial
law soon to overcome growing doubt abroad -- and to an
extent, within Thailand as well -- about the sincerity of its
commitment to democratic restoration. END COMMENT.
BOYCE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS
NSC FOR WILDER, MORROW
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MASS MARR TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND: AMBASSADOR URGES GEN SONTHI TO LIFT
MARTIAL LAW, RESTRICTIONS ON CIVIL LIBERTIES
Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d)
1. (C) Summary. I met with Council for National Security
(CNS) chief GEN Sonthi Boonyaratglin on October 16 to express
our continued concern over the coup and the suspension of
civil liberties. Reminding him that we have already
suspended almost 24 million dollars in assistance, I informed
Sonthi that we may be forced to consider additional measures
if we do not see more progress towards democracy. I
underscored the importance of lifting martial law quickly,
describing for Sonthi the difficulty the President might have
in meeting interim Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont at APEC
next month if martial law remains in place. Sonthi said he
believes that martial law remains necessary for the time
being to prevent "influential and moneyed interests" from
using undue influence on rural voters and fomenting unrest.
I intend to use upcoming meetings with key civilian figures
in an around the government in the coming days to impress
upon them the importance of restoring civil liberties, first
and foremost of which is lifting martial law, at the earliest
possible date. End Summary.
2. (C) I met privately with General Sonthi at Royal Thai
Army (RTA) Headquarters on October 16. Reminding him of the
strong bonds and years of friendship between our two people,
I underscored the importance of the CNS and interim
government showing sustained, concrete progress on returning
democracy to Thailand. I told Sonthi that, while we took
note of the rapid naming of an interim Prime Minister,
Cabinet, Constitution, and National Assembly, we remain
extremely disappointed by the coup and urge Thailand to
quickly end martial law and restore all civil liberties.
After reminding him of the 24 million dollars of assistance
we suspended under section 508, I told Sonthi that we might
reevaluate other military programs and representational
events not covered by 508 in the near future if we do not see
more progress towards a return to democracy. I explained to
Sonthi that interim Prime Minister Surayud and President Bush
are both scheduled to attend APEC in Hanoi next month. I
described the difficulty President Bush might have in meeting
Surayud together with other ASEAN leaders if Thailand remains
under martial law.
3. (C) Sonthi did not give me a firm date for lifting
martial law. He told me that he believes martial law is
necessary for the time being to prevent "influential and
moneyed interests" from using undue influence over rural
voters and fomenting dissent. He believes that the people
are "comfortable" under martial law and generally support the
need to keep it in place for a short while longer. I told
him that martial law would not be necessary to prevent
political violence and that we were unaware of any nascent
opposition in the countryside that would warrant the
continuation of martial law. I urged him to share with us
any intelligence he might have indicating a counter-coup or
violence was being planned.
COMMENT
4. (C) Sonthi appears to view martial law in strictly
security terms -- a useful tool to maintain order and prevent
potential unrest. He seems not fully cognizant of how
martial law is damaging Thailand's reputation abroad. For
BANGKOK 00006324 002 OF 002
instance, in our meeting Sonthi did not seem to understand
the impact a state of martial law would have on Surayud's
participation at APEC. In the coming days, I intend to meet
with very senior civilian leaders in the interim government
or with connections to it, to continue our ongoing efforts to
impress upon them that the government needs to lift martial
law soon to overcome growing doubt abroad -- and to an
extent, within Thailand as well -- about the sincerity of its
commitment to democratic restoration. END COMMENT.
BOYCE