Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK6121
2006-10-05 10:12:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAILAND UPDATE: OCTOBER 5

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL ECON MOPS KDEM ASEC TH 
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VZCZCXRO0524
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #6121/01 2781012
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 051012Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2123
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 6121
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2176
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 1539
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHFJSCC/COMMARFORPAC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006121 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON MOPS KDEM ASEC TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND UPDATE: OCTOBER 5

REF: BANGKOK 6030 (MEETING WITH SURAYUD)

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alexander A. Arvizu, reason 1.4 (b) an
d (d)

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 006121

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL ECON MOPS KDEM ASEC TH
SUBJECT: THAILAND UPDATE: OCTOBER 5

REF: BANGKOK 6030 (MEETING WITH SURAYUD)

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Alexander A. Arvizu, reason 1.4 (b) an
d (d)

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Council for National Security (CNS) Secretary General
Winai Phattiyakul told the press that the parliament would
have to initiate the lifting of martial law; involving the
not-yet-formed parliament could significantly delay the
restoration of full civil liberties. An academic advisor to
the Council for National Security (CNS) privately expressed
concern that a cycle of political retribution could delay a
return to democracy, and he said people serving in the
interim cabinet might be discredited by virtue of their
association with the coup. A former Thaksin cabinet member
worried martial law might persist longer than expected, and
he predicted the interim administration would lack the
political skills to handle vocal interest groups. An
outspoken academic critical of interim Prime Minister
Surayud's appointment may face lese majeste charges. Two
Thai men came to the Embassy on October 4 to present a letter
critical of the CNS. End Summary.

CNS SECGEN: PARLIAMENT MUST INITIATE LIFTING MARTIAL LAW
-------------- --------------


2. (C) CNS Secretary General Winai Phattiyakul told the press
on October 4 that the lifting of martial law "has to be
initiated by parliament and endorsed by His Majesty the
King." This runs counter to post's understanding, which is
that the executive branch can initiate the recision of
martial law. Since the CNS has not indicated it is close to
selecting the 250 members of the parliament provided for by
the interim constitution, and it is unclear when the
parliament would begin functioning, a decision by the CNS to
rely on the parliament to initiate the lifting of martial law
would appear to significantly delay this important move. It
also would appear counter to the comment by interim PM

Surayud to the Ambassador that martial law could be rescinded
around the same time that he forms his cabinet (reftel).

CNS ADVISOR PESSIMISTIC
--------------


3. (C) Economic Counselor met October 5 with former Commerce
Minister Narongchai Akrasanee, who serves as a member of the
CNS's advisory committee on economic affairs. Narongchai was
strikingly pessimistic about the current political
environment, noting that deposed Prime Minister Thaksin's
opponents seem to be in a vindictive mood. Narongchai
worried that Thailand might go through a cycle of
recrimination and revenge which would destabilize the
political environment and delay a return to democracy. He
further worried that the courts might go so far as to
dissolve Thai Rak Thai and the Democrat Party, marginalizing
much of Thailand's political class. Narongchai said he would
like in the future to serve as Commerce Minister, but he did
not want to serve in interim PM Surayud's cabinet, because he
felt members of the interim administration would be
discredited by virtue of their association with the coup.

FORMER TRT MINISTER PREDICTS TROUBLE AHEAD
--------------


4. (C) Poloff met October 5 with Suranand Vejjajiva, who held
the position of Minister Attached to the Prime Minister's
Office until the September 19 coup. Suranand said he foresaw
trouble ahead for the Surayud administration, which he
predicted would be slow to lift martial law. (He wondered
aloud whether martial law would persist for the duration of
the interim administration.) He said that the CNS members
aimed to destroy Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai Party (TRT),but
they had sent private signals that they might not feel
compelled to formally dissolve it if defections left it but a
hollow shell of its former self. Suranand observed that
dissatisfaction of TRT faction leaders with Thaksin was
sufficiently well known to the CNS that they might tolerate a
regrouping of many TRT figures in a new party, so long as

BANGKOK 00006121 002 OF 002


Thaksin was not involved.


5. (C) Suranand further predicted that interim Prime Minister
Surayud's administration would face difficult times in the
next three months, especially if it stacked its cabinet with
technocrats and bureaucrats. Suranand predicted that the
first challenge would likely come in the form of labor or
farmers' groups pressing the government to address specific
needs; if the cabinet ministers lacked the political skill to
handle these demands, or if the government were to attempt to
stifle criticism, then public attention would shift its focus
to the non-democratic nature of the interim admininstration
and on the restrictions of civil liberties.

OUTSPOKEN ACADEMIC THREATENED WITH LESE MAJESTE
-------------- --


6. (C) Poloff met October 5 with Giles Ungpakorn, a left-wing
activist professor of political science at Bangkok's
Chulalongkorn University. Ungpakorn assessed the majority
outlook among academics and students as "wait and see"; most
people were dissatisfied with the fact of military
intervention in politics, he said, but most also disliked
Thaksin and preferred to see an end to Thailand's political
crisis. Ungpakorn believed only a minority -- including
himself -- currently qualified as strongly opposed to the CNS
and PM Surayud. He said he and like-minded critics probably
would be more outspoken if not for the current state of
martial law. Nevertheless, he and other activist associates
intended to proceed with plans to organize an October 21-23
Thai Social Forum gathering, involving approximately 2,000
people, to discuss political reform at Bangkok's Thammasat
University. Ungpakorn intended to proceed with this event
irrespective of whether martial law remains in place.


7. (C) Ungpakorn said that, after he publicly denounced
Surayud as an illegitimate Prime Minister, he was notified
that a lawyer named Chaiyong Rattanawan had pressed the
authorities to file lese majeste charges against him. (The
lese majeste charge presumably relies on interpreting
Ungpakorn's criticism of Surayud as a criticism of the King's
action in appointing him.) He also noted that an official
whom he knew in the Special Branch of the Royal Thai Police
had contacted him to express concern for Ungpakorn's safety
or liberty in the event that he would try to lead protests
against the coup. This call might have been an attempt at
intimidation, Ungpakorn said. However, the action of
greatest concern to him was the authorities' move to shut
down Thai access to www.midnightuniv.org, an online academic
forum established by Chiang Mai University scholars. Some
scholars associated with the website have publicly criticized
the interim constitution.

TWO MEN APPEAR AT EMBASSY, PROVIDE LETTER CRITICAL OF COUP
-------------- --------------


8. (C) On October 4, two Thai men visited the Embassy in
order to express political grievances. POL FSN met with the
two men; one identified himself as hailing from northeastern
Thailand (Isan). The two presented a letter written in
awkward English to President Bush dated October 1. The
letter requested that the USG "resist dictator committee of
Thailand" by denying visas to the new Prime Minister, his
cabinet, and to CNS members; it also requested that the USG
not conclude international agreements with the interim
administration. The letter cited media restrictions and the
detention of political figures such as former Thaksin cabinet
members (all of whom have since been released by the
authorities).
ARVIZU