Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK6004
2006-09-29 10:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR PRESSES CDR ON TRANSITION

Tags:  PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM MOPS ASEC TH 
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RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA PRIORITY 6103
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 1534
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RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 006004 

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SIPDIS

TREASURY PASS TO FRB SAN FRANCISCO/TERESA CURRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM MOPS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES CDR ON TRANSITION

REF: A. BANGKOK 6003 (CONSTITUTION CONCERNS)

B. BANGKOK 5973 (MEETING WITH SURAYUD)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 006004

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

TREASURY PASS TO FRB SAN FRANCISCO/TERESA CURRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM MOPS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESSES CDR ON TRANSITION

REF: A. BANGKOK 6003 (CONSTITUTION CONCERNS)

B. BANGKOK 5973 (MEETING WITH SURAYUD)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) The Ambassador on September 29 pressed Council for
Democratic Reform (CDR) Secretary General Winai Phattiyakul
to address concerns that CDR members would retain substantial
influence after the promulgation of the interim constitution.
Winai explained that certain provisions of the interim
constitution would be more moderate than critics feared (ref
A). Detained members of Thaksin's cabinet would soon be
released, but there was no timetable for the restoration of
full civil liberties. Winai asked that the USG put faith in
Privy Councilor Surayud, who seems nearly certain to become
the next Prime Minister. Winai seemed unwilling to
contemplate accelerating elections, as he explained the
difficulty in creating a new democratic system that would not
be as easy to manipulate as that established by the 1997
constitution. End Summary.

TIME FRAME FOR DEVELOPMENTS
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador called on CDR Secretary General Winai
on September 29, to discuss progress toward a transition to a
civilian government and to express concern about rumored
provisions of the interim constitution. (Ref A provides more
detail on those provisions.) Winai opened the conversation
by noting that the interim constitution would be finalized on
September 30; then, CDR leader General Sonthi would name the
next Prime Minister. The King's endorsement of the Prime
Minister could come as early as October 1, or as late as
October 4. The Ambassador noted that October 4 would be
later than the CDR's self-imposed two week deadline; however,
Winai believed Wednesday, October 4, represented the
conclusion of the second week after General Sonthi's
announcement on Wednesday, September 20, of the deadline.

FORMING THE NEXT CABINET
--------------


3. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the next Prime Minister
would be able to select his own cabinet. Winai said that the
Prime Minister would have the freedom to do so, but the CDR
would recommend some names and set certain standards.
Cabinet members should have "no political background" (i.e.,
should not be tied to the Thaksin administration); they
should be well-respected, honest figures who appeal to the
Thai people. The cabinet members also should understand that
their mandate is to improve economic conditions, bring into
being a new constitution, and "fix the path" so that Thailand
has an improved democracy within one year.

COMMENTS ON SURAYUD
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador remarked that, if Privy Councilor
Surayud Chulanont were to become Prime Minister, concerns
would inevitably arise because of the fact of Surayud's
military background. Winai urged the Ambassador not to judge
a book by its cover; it was important to understand that
Surayud had the right mentality to lead Thailand at this time.

PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION
--------------


5. (C) The Ambassador asked whether, as rumored (ref A),the
CDR, after transforming itself into the Council on National
Security (CNS),would select the 100 members of the
Constitutional Drafting Council (CDC). Winai said the CNS
would indeed select the members, but the members would select

BANGKOK 00006004 002 OF 003


from among themselves 35 members for the drafting committee.


6. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the interim civilian
government would be subordinate to the CNS. Winai replied:
"No way at all it will be subordinate. It will be a
partnership." The Ambassador then asked whether the CNS
would have a seat in the cabinet. Winai relied, "Not at all."


7. (C) When asked who would choose the members of the interim
parliament, Winai said that the government and the CNS would
cooperate in the selection process. The Ambassador asked if
the interim parliament would be able to hold a no-confidence
debate. Winai said the parliament could indeed have a
no-confidence debate, but it would not be able to hold a
no-confidence vote. Winai appeared to envision the threat of
a debate as an effective check on the Prime Minister and his
cabinet, but he said a public airing of views would suffice;
there would be no need for a vote, because the interim
government would be in place for "less than one year."

POLITICAL RIGHTS TO REMAIN SUSPENDED
--------------


8. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the decrees issued by the
CDR would remain in effect after the promulgation of the
interim constitution. Winai asserted that those decrees
would no longer be in effect, except for prohibitions on
political activities, which would persist until the lifting
of martial law, or until determined otherwise by the
government. Winai declined to predict when the population
would be allowed to resume political activities, but he said
the CNS would try to restore them as quickly as possible. He
also asserted that the interim constitution would include the
bill of rights from the 1997 constitution.

DETAINEES TO BE RELEASED
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador asked about persons associated with the
Thaksin administration who had been detained without charges
by the security forces. Winai said that they would be
allowed to return to their families "at the end of this week."

ACCELERATING TRANSITION
--------------


10. (C) The Ambassador noted the CNS would likely face
pressure to speed up the timetable for elections. Winai
urged the Ambassador to understand the political environment:
Thaksin had been able to manipulate all the supposedly
independent bodies created by the 1997 constitution,
destroying Thailand's system of checks and balances. Thaksin
had shown that "anyone with a few billion U.S. dollars can
take over Thailand easily." It would not be easy for the
next administration to create independent mechanisms that
would work effectively "for the next round of democracy."
This would require time.


11. (C) Winai urged the Ambassador to convey to Washington
that the CDR members did not aspire for power. Using
military force to bring about political change had damaged
the country, Winai acknowledged -- but the Generals had
assessed that if they had not acted, the damage would be even
greater. If you see that a train is heading for a wreck, it
is justifiable to take a detour in order to avoid a
collision. Winai urged that the USG not push the Generals
into a corner, but rather help them to create a democratic
government featuring effective checks and balances.

COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) It appears some provisions of the interim
constitution have been softened since the circulation of an
initial draft (ref A). We are encouraged by Winai's

BANGKOK 00006004 003 OF 003


assurance that detained former cabinet ministers will be
released very soon; however, we are dismayed that he could
offer no similar assurance about the full restoration of
civil liberties. Winai clearly feels Surayud is the right
man to steer Thailand through this difficult period, and we
also note that, as one who enjoys the trust of the CDR,
Surayud will likely have more authority vis-a-vis the
Generals than someone lacking a military background would.
Winai made it clear that the new administration intends to
stick to its timeframe for the process of drafting a new
constitution and holding elections.
BOYCE