DEMOCRAT PARTY LEADER DISCUSSES COUP AFTERMATH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005972

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

TREASURY PASS TO FRB SAN FRANCISCO/TERESA CURRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/26/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM MOPS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: DEMOCRAT PARTY LEADER DISCUSSES COUP AFTERMATH

REF: BANGKOK 5949 (SEPT 27 UPDATE)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Democrat Party (DP) leader Abhisit Vejjajiva expressed
confidence that Council for Democratic Reform (CDR) leader
General Sonthi would happily relinquish power, but Abhisit
thought the CDR would have difficulty restoring full civil
liberties until taking measures against key Thaksin
administration figures. In a September 28 discussion with
the Ambassador, Abhisit said the prospective selection of
Privy Councilor Surayud Chulanont would best enable the
withdrawal of the military from political life. Abhisit
expressed confidence that his party's image had improved in
recent months, but he did not foresee the disintegration of
Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party. Nevertheless, Abhisit
felt that any significant realignment of politicians would
await the promulgation of the interim constitution and the
formation of the interim civilian administration. Abhisit
also pressed on USG interest in restarting negotiation of a
free trade agreement with the interim civilian
administration, and he noted former Foreign Minister Surin
Pitsuwan's availability for the position of UN Secretary
General. End Summary.

CONCERNED ABOUT THAKSIN'S SIDE, NOT SONTHI
--------------


2. (C) Receiving the Ambassador at Democrat Party
headquarters, Abhisit opened the meeting characterizing
himself as "concerned" about the current political situation.
Abhisit said that, based on his knowledge of General
Sonthi's character, he was confident Sonthi had not carried
out the September 19 coup in order to put himself in a
position of power. However, Abhisit worried that Thaksin
loyalists would try reasserting themselves in political life,
and this possibility would make it difficult for the CDR to
restore full civil liberties. Thaksin's wife, Potjaman, had
recently withdrawn 20 million Baht (approximately 540,000
USD) in cash, and some of this money would surely be used to
gain influence with members of the interim government, if not
members of the CDR itself. Abhisit surmised that Thaksin
loyalists likely had instigated the September 26 burning of
schools in Kamphengphet (reftel).


3. (C) Abhisit said that it probably would be necessary for
the government to prosecute corrupt Thaksin administration
figures, in order to calm the situation sufficiently to allow
full restoration of civil liberties. Toward that end,
Abhisit requested that the Ambassador provide the CDR with
further information about potential irregularities involved
in the RTG's purchase from General Electric of CTX explosives
detection equipment. If the USG could provide the names of
corrupt politicians connected to that purchase, this could
provide a basis for further RTG investigation, with a
salutary effect on the political environment.

BULLISH ON SURAYUD
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4. (C) Privy Councilor Surayud Chulanont probably represented
the best candidate for interim Prime Minister, Abhisit
averred, even though one of the other potential candidates,
UN Conference on Trade and Development Secretary General
Supachai Panitchpakdi, had longstanding ties to the Democrat
Party. Contrasting Supachai's training in economics with
Surayud's Army career, Abhisit said that the military
probably could not soon "return to the barracks" under an
interim Prime Minister with a purely civilian background,
like Supachai.


5. (C) Abhisit observed that there was substantial wrangling

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over key elements of the interim constitution. Early drafts
had included provisions that would bar members of the CDR,
the interim legislature, and the constitutional drafting
assembly from seeking political positions for a two-year
period. Abhisit thought such provisions would send the right
signal. However, lead interim constitution drafter Meechai
Ruchuphan had altered those provisions so as to remove any
restriction on members of the CDR and most others in the
interim government. The Ambassador expressed the importance
of the CDR transitioning to a civilian-led government as soon
as possible, and doing so in a way that would reassure the
international community that the CDR members were not intent
on remaining in power.

TRT LIKELY TO REMAIN, BUT DP LOOKING GOOD
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6. (C) The Ambassador asked Abhisit's view of the future of
TRT. Abhisit believed Thaksin's party would remain part of
the political landscape. Pending lawsuits that might have
resulted in the dissolution of TRT and the Democrat Party
(for improprieties in the April 2006 election) would likely
become moot now that the CDR had scrapped the 1997
Constitution and the associated legal framework. Some in TRT
would be tempted to use the referendum on the next
constitution to try to demonstrate popular opposition to the
September 19 coup, thereby regaining some political momentum,
Abhisit commented.


7. (C) When asked whether he expected an influx of TRT
figures into the Democrat Party, Abhisit said most
politicians were waiting to see how the constitution and
other aspects of the political system would look before
making a move. He had been in contact with some TRT figures
prior to the coup, and there were some people (NFI) he would
like to bring over to the DP if the CDR did not include them
in the interim cabinet. But Abhisit was reluctant to sully
the DP's image by recruiting TRT figures with tainted
reputations, and those who were clean lacked the influence to
boost the DP's prospects in a meaningful way.


8. (C) Even before the coup, DP research had shown the
party's image was improving, and not simply because the DP
was the principal alternative to TRT. Polling showed the gap
between the DP and TRT narrowing from 32 percent to 13
percent. Abhisit claimed a "massive shift" in public
perception of the Democrats, who were increasingly seen as
having meaningful policies and ideas, caring for the poor,
and being responsive to the people's needs. However, Abhisit
acknowledged the DP had trailed TRT in terms of projecting
strong leadership and an ability to achieve its goals.


9. (C) Abhisit lamented the success of the Chavalit
administration (in the mid 1990's) in painting the DP as a
party of the South and the wealthy. This image persisted to
the present day in the Northeast, Thailand's most populous
region. Abhisit was more optimistic about gaining strength
in central and northern Thailand, noting that, had elections
been held in late 2006, he would have anticipated winning
four of ten seats in Chiang Mai, Thaksin's home province
(where the DP won 18 percent of the vote in 2005). In the
northern province of Mae Hong Son, the DP could have won a
majority of the seats at stake, Abhisit projected.


10. (C) Even assuming TRT's continued existence, it would not
be impossible for the DP to win a plurality in the next
national election, Abhisit said. The key would be for the
vote in the Northeast to be split. Abhisit noted that the
Chart Thai party, or even the newly-formed Pracharat Party of
former Interior Minister Sanoh Thienthong, might pull a
meaningful number of votes from TRT in the Northeast.

FTA
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11. (C) Abhisit pressed the Ambassador on whether the USG
would be able to negotiate a free trade agreement with the
interim government. When the Ambassador noted that
negotiations had effectively ended once Thaksin dissolved
parliament and became caretaker Prime Minister, Abhisit
indicated his focus was not on political optics but on legal
restrictions. The DP was watching closely the prospects of a
U.S.-Thai FTA, Abhisit said, implying that the party might
reconsider its previous opposition now that Thaksin's
administration would no longer be positioned to profit from
the agreement.

SURIN PITSUWAN'S OPTIONS
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12. (C) Abhisit noted that former Foreign Minister Surin
Pitsuwan had been rumored as a potential candidate for
Foreign Minister in the soon-to-be-formed interim government.
One possible scenario involved the inclusion of both Surin
Pitsuwan and former TRT Deputy Prime Minister and Commerce
Minister Somkid Jatusripitak in the interim cabinet; this
scenario included Privy Council President Prem Tinsulanonda
becoming interim Prime Minister, Abhisit relayed, since Prem
had extensive experience dealing with political party
figures. Other scenarios even included Surin heading the
interim government, Abhisit said, while Surin also had made
it clear that he was available for the position of UN
Secretary General. Abhisit joked that, while ASEAN candidate

SIPDIS
Surakiart Sathirathai might appear opportunistic in having
jumped from Thaksin's camp to the CDR's, this quick shift
might demonstrate Surakiart's suitability to become UNSYG,
because it showed he could work with all sides in a dispute.

COMMENT
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13. (C) Abhisit appears to be among the many in Bangkok who
see the September 19 coup as a necessary step to rid the
country of Thaksin. He did not appear particularly troubled
by the current limitations on civil liberties and political
party activities, but he clearly anticipated that these would
be relaxed in the near future, especially if the CDR were to
install an interim Prime Minister capable of controlling the
security environment and containing the lingering influence
of Thaksin's loyalists.
BOYCE