Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK5929
2006-09-26 11:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAI OFFICIALS PLEA FOR UNDERSTANDING

Tags:  PGOV PHUM TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
null
Debra P Tous 09/27/2006 10:12:46 AM From DB/Inbox: Debra P Tous

Cable 
Text: 
 
 
C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 05929

SIPDIS
CXBKKSVR:
 ACTION: POL
 INFO: TSA AMB CHRON CONS DAO DATTLO DCM ECON JTF
 JUSMAG NAS PA RMA SA RSO

DISSEMINATION: POL1
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: AMB:BOYCERL
DRAFTED: POL:SUTTONSM
CLEARED: DCM: ARVIZUAA

VZCZCBKI062
OO RUEHC RUEHZS RUEHBY RUEHUL RHEFDIA RHHMUNA
RHHMUNA RHFJSCC RUCPDOC RUEATRS RUEAIIA
DE RUEHBK #5929/01 2691102
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261102Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1909
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 6089
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2140
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHHMUNA/HQ USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHFJSCC/COMMARFORPAC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005929 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

TREASURY PASS TO FRB SAN FRANCISCO/TERESA CURRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH
SUBJECT: THAI OFFICIALS PLEA FOR UNDERSTANDING

REF: BANGKOK 05894 (NEW CONSTITUTION DRAFTER BRIEFS
AMBASSADOR)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005929

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

TREASURY PASS TO FRB SAN FRANCISCO/TERESA CURRAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH
SUBJECT: THAI OFFICIALS PLEA FOR UNDERSTANDING

REF: BANGKOK 05894 (NEW CONSTITUTION DRAFTER BRIEFS
AMBASSADOR)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: The MFA permanent secretary and the ruling
military council's Secretary General reassured the diplomatic
corps that Thailand would return to democratic rule as soon
as possible. The Secretary General personally assured the
Ambassador during a pull-aside that a civilian prime minister
would be named by Sunday. The Thai side asked for
understanding from Thailand's "friends" for the special
circumstances here. They laid our a timetable for the return
to elected government:

-- an interim constitution by Friday
-- an interim PM within the promised two week window
-- quick establishment of a constitution drafting committee
-- "eight months and 15 days" for the drafting and review of
the constitution, and its submission in a referendum to the
public
-- "free and fair elections" within a year from now.


2. (C) Summary continued: The ruling military council will
transform itself into a Council on National Security once it
has transfered power to the interim prime minister and will
retain only limited powers, largely in response to continued
concerns about the possibility of a counter-coup. The
interim civilian government will have an uphill battle to
keep to the timetable for the constitution and elections that
has been promised. End summary.


3. (C) MFA PermSec Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn and NSC Secretary
General Winai Phattiyakul (also SecGen of the Council for
Democratic Reform under the Constitutional Monarchy - CDRM)
called the diplomatic corps for a meeting on 9/25. Krit
admitted that the "coups are wrong and undesirable" and
recognized that many might see the situation as "black and
white." But he hoped that diplomats would recognize that
there were gray areas. He pointed out that the "people as a
whole seem to have welcomed the military intervention." He
also emphasized that the CDRM did not want to hold on to
power itself, but would turn over power to an interim
civilian government as soon as possible, hopefully within two
weeks. Many other governments had already passed judgment on

the military intervention; Krit asked that "friends" continue
to keep their judgments under review and reconsider them in
the light of new information. Because the transition was
peaceful, Thailand hopes to "win back the trust of the
international community in our economy and in our deep
commitment to democracy."


4. (C) Krit pointed out that the CDRM was already restoring
some on the mechanisms of normal government. The Election
Commission would continue to function, and was "already
making progress toward free and fair elections." The
National Counter-Corruption Commission was empowered to
investigate government corruption issues, along with the
Auditor-General. The CDRM had affirmed that the office of the
Ombudsman still functioned, and could receive complaints from
citizens. The National Human Rights Commission would
continue to carry out its mandate.

A ROSE IS A ROSE IS...
--------------


5. (C) Krit said that the CDRM had learned that the initial
rendering of its title (The Council for Democratic Reform
under the Constitutional Monarchy) had caused
misunderstandings and "wrongly suggested some role for His
Majesty in the September 19 intervention." Therefore, the
official title would now be simply the Council for Democratic
Reform CDR) (reftel) During the Q's and A's, Krit returned to
the question of the King's role. He emphasized that the CDR
had their audience with the King "after the process of the
takeover" to report what had happened. "The King had no
foreknowledge" of the coup. "He is above politics. Remember
the past year; he has been cautious not to intervene. He
turned down requests to appoint a prime minister under
Article 7 of the Constitution. That was a clear indication
of how the King applies his role as constitutional monarch."
He added, "We don't want any misunderstanding about this --
hence, the name change."
TIMELINE FOR RETURN TO ELECTED GOVERNMENT
--------------


6. (C) General Winai then laid out the timeline for return to
democratic government. (Note: his presentation closely
mirrored the account we had already received from legal
expert Borwornsak Uwanno - reftel). He also emphasized that
the CDR did not want to hold on to power. They had a legal
advisory group working day and night, and it had completed
the draft interim Constitution. That draft was under
consideration now; deans of the preeminent law faculties of
the country were assisting in the review. The CDR expected
to announce an interim Constitution on September 29. Shortly
thereafter, it would name an interim civilian Prime Minister
and cabinet. (Note: In a pull-aside after the meeting, the
Ambassador emphasized to General Winai how important it was
for the CDR to hold to its announced timetable and transfer
power to a civilian government as soon as possible. Winai
assured the Ambassador that the CDR fully intended to do
this, and predicted that they would be able to name the new
PM by Sunday. end note.) Once the CDR had transfered
authority to the civilian PM, it would become the Council on
National Security, and it would have limited authority
primarily in matters of national security. During the Q's
and A's, they were questioned again about the role of this
Council. Winai emphasized that the new Council would have a
"minimal" mandate to look after national security issues and
ensure that there is a free and fair election. Krit added
that the Council on National Security was necessary to
prevent "counter-coup efforts."


7. (U) The CDR would also name two other bodies. First
would be a legislative body. This would serve as a
Parliament to handle required legislation while the interim
government was in power. The CDR would also name
approximately 2000 people from all walks of life and all
parts of the country, and they would in turn choose 100-200
legal experts who would then draft the new constitution.


8. (U) The drafting process would take six months. The
government would then take one month to example the draft and
consult. It would give the drafting commission 15 days to
make corrections to the draft, and would then prepare to hold
a referendum. They anticipated this would take one month.
According to this timetable, the new constitution would be
ready in "eight months and 15 days." After that, "free and
fair elections" would be organized, within one year from now.

ECONOMIC ISSUES
--------------


9. (U) Winai said that there would be minimal economic
impact. The new airport would open on schedule this week,
and the country's international trade policy would remain
unchanged, including regarding free-trade agreements.

CIVIL LIBERTIES ISSUES
--------------


10. (U) Winai referred to the many questions about the
restrictions on civil liberties, especially freedom of
assembly. "Thai hold these freedoms dear," he said. He
promised that political activities could be resumed when the
situation returns to normal, and that press freedom would be
restored soon. (During the Q's and A's, Winai also
underscored that the CDR had not dissolved any political
parties; the parties would be able to participate in the
elections next year.) Winai concluded saying that the "trust
and confidence of our international partners is necessary for
us to return to normalcy."


11. (U) During the Q's and A's, Winai took the opportunity to
highlight the coup's role in forestalling possible further
violence. He refered to a "concrete intelligence report"
that some pro-Thaksin forces planned to bring supporters to
Bangkok to confront the opposition rally scheduled for
September 20. Winai claimed that "violence was imminent" and
the decision for military intervention had to be made "to
prevent loss of life." It was better to act before a clash
than after, he said.

12. (U) Most questions focused on civil liberties and the
transition to democracy. The Ambassador expressed concern
about the four former officials reportedly detained; he asked
whether they would charged with any offense, or released.
Winai said that the CDR had invited them under its
protection. They would not be charged with any offense, and
they would be allowed to go free "at an appropriate time." He
said that they were not being mistreated, and that their
families were allowed to visit. "We need to take measures to
keep the situation stable," he said. The Australian
ambassador pointed out that the members of the interim
legislature and the 2000-member "electoral college" that will
chose the constitution drafting committee were all appointed
by the CDR, through a process that was inherently not
democratic. The UK representative also asked whether these
bodies would have representatives from upcountry, or would
they have largely Bangkok-based participants? Krit responded
that "everything is under discussion" and that the CDR
planned to have the widest possible involvement. Another
democratic element would be introduced when the draft
constitution was submitted to a referendum. "The points you
make are at the forefront of the minds of those deciding,"
Krit said.

COMMENT
--------------


13. (C) The CDR appears to on track for keeping its first big
commitment, setting up the interim constitution and
transferring power to the interim PM. We will continue to
emphasize the importance of keeping to this timetable. We
were struck by a couple of points in the presentation. One
is that some of the CDR decisions are clearly driven by
concerns of a possible counter-coup. This will make the
transition back to full respect for civil liberties more
difficult. Second is the angst over how to portray the
King's role. On the one hand, the CDR wants the legitimacy
that comes from the perception that the King has accepted, if
not approved, the coupmakers' actions. At the same time,
they do not want to be accused of causing damage to the
King's reputation by having exposed him to international
criticism. (The reference to the King as "an idiot" by a
reporter asking questions at the State Department briefing
has already excited great concern at the MFA. there is also
lingering concern about the book "The King Never Smiles"
which, though banned in Thailand, is on the minds of some.)
We were also struck by the military precision of the
timetable Gen. Winai laid out: precisely eight months and 15
days until the new constitution. The CDR is handing the
interim government a very tough timetable. Getting
Thailand's fractious civil society to go along with the CDR's
precise timetable, while allowing a return to normal civil
liberties, will be a difficult trick.
BOYCE