Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK5796
2006-09-20 08:48:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

VISIT OF PRM ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUERBREY

Tags:  PREF PREL PHUM TH 
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VZCZCXYZ0005
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBK #5796/01 2630848
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 200848Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1759
INFO RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2989
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 2117
RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 2660
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1719
C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 005796 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM TH
SUBJECT: VISIT OF PRM ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUERBREY

REF: BKK 05693

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RALPH BOYCE, REASON 1.4 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 005796

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/30/2016
TAGS: PREF PREL PHUM TH
SUBJECT: VISIT OF PRM ASSISTANT SECRETARY SAUERBREY

REF: BKK 05693

Classified By: AMBASSADOR RALPH BOYCE, REASON 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary. During an August 26-September 2 visit, PRM
Assistant Secretary Sauerbrey informed the RTG of the USG
decision to extend the material support waiver to Karen
refugees in other camps in Thailand. Thai officials
welcomed this development. A/S Secretary Sauerbrey requested
RTG approval for additional U.S. processing of North Korean
refugees. Thai officials responded that they were concerned
that resettlement would draw large numbers of North Koreans
to Thailand. The RTG was uneasy about a U.S. resettlement
program for this group that had no end point. A/S Sauerbrey
expressed concern that the RTG not take actions, such as
deportation, that would endanger the safety of the Petchaboon
Hmong. RTG officials' responses indicated that the Thai
government is struggling to find a solution to this issue,
but in the near term was unlikely to engage in large-scale
deportations. Thai officials reiterated their willingness to
consider proposals to permit Burmese camp refugees to work
legally, but indicated that this would have to occur in the
camps or close nearby. End summary.


2. (C) Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)
Assistant Secretary Ellen Sauerbrey visited Thailand from
August 26-September 2. She met with RTG officials and
representatives from NGOs, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),the International
Organization for Migration (IOM),and the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),conducted a joint visit to
Tham Hin refugee camp with UNHCR High Commissioner Antonio
Guterres, saw USG-funded refugee assistance activities in
Umpiem Mai refugee camp, and held a press roundtable.

Meeting with Thai National Security Council Head
-------------- ---


3. (C) Accompanied by the Ambassador, A/S Sauerbrey met
August 28 with Thai National Security Council chief General
Winai Pattiyakul and informed him of Secretary Rice's
decision to extend the material support waiver, beyond Tham
Hin camp, to members of the Karen ethnic group in six other
camps along the Thai-Burma border. Sauerbrey noted that the

USG was also considering a waiver for ethnic Karenni in the
two remaining boder camps. She added that changes in U.S.
laws, rightfully enacted after 9/11 to protect national
security, had had unintended consequences for refugee
resettlement. Winai responded that Thailand was grateful for
the cooperation with the United States on refugee
resettlement. He welcomed the news on the waiver expansion.
He said he would make sure that all parts of the RTG worked
to support U.S. resettlement efforts. A/S Sauerbrey said the
USG recognized that Thailand had been a generous host to
thousands of refugees over many years.


4. (C) Winai said that he was disappointed by the lower than
expected number of Karen in Tham Hin camp who had taken the
U.S. resettlement option. The Thai government should have
done better in encouraging Tham Hin residents to choose
resettlement. Winai said he had told the Ministry of
Interior to do more to convince them. A/S Sauerbrey stated
that the uncertainty created by the material support issue
may have caused Tham Hin residents to hesitate. There was
also the problem of having situations where one family member
was not eligible for U.S. resettlement because of material
support. It would take a change in U.S. law to allow
approval of the ineligible.


5. (C) A/S Sauerbrey raised North Korean refugees and said
that the USG understood the RTG's sensitivities and had done
its best to handle the issue discreetly. She asked if the
RTG would permit the USG to process additional cases for U.S.
resettlement. Winai responded that the RTG appreciated U.S.
efforts to keep the issue low-profile. The RTG felt
comfortable working with the ROK and the USG. However, the
NGOs involved were not under control and were doing what they
wanted. For example, the recent arrest by Thai immigration
officials of North Koreans was caused by an NGO sheltering
about 200 persons in a 10-room house.


6. (C) Winai said he had recently met with the Deputy Prime
Minister responsible for security matters. They had
discussed North Korean refugees and understood the
implications of U.S. legislation. Winai stated that the RTG
was not comfortable with U.S. resettlement that had no end
point. Estimates of the number of North Koreans in China
were high, up to 200,000. The RTG was quite concerned about
a pull factor. The use of Thailand as a resettlement hub
could cause big problems. It was lucky that the DPRK had not
complained to the RTG about resettlement. This made the
issue easier to address. Winai asked if the USG had any
suggestions.


7. (C) A/S Sauerbrey responded that the number of North
Koreans in China was unclear. The USG did not think that
large numbers of North Koreans would be drawn to Thailand.
Travel through China was difficult. Noting that the USG
understood the RTG policy on case-by-case consideration of
North Koreans, A/S Sauerbrey suggested that the RTG consider
a process whereby North Koreans expressing interest in U.S.
resettlement and held in Thai detention be "expelled" to the
United States. This would allow the RTG to demonstrate that
it was adhering to its immigration law. Winai acknowledged
that the RTG had discussed a case-by-case approach with the
USG, but said that it was hard to see a good solution on this
issue.


8. (C) Turning to the Petchaboon Hmong, A/S Sauerbrey stated
that the USG was concerned that the RTG not take actions,
including deportation, that would endanager the Hmong's
safety. The USG was also concerned about a possible food
shortage among this group. Winai replied that the RTG hoped
over the long term to address the Petchaboon Hmong with the
Lao government. The issue was difficult, but without the Lao
government's help, the issue would be never-ending. Winai
said he had discussed the food situation with the UN country
team and hoped that a recent UN assessment would help solve
the problem. The RTG did not want to make a contribution
because that would send the wrong signal to the Hmong,
including those in Laos, that the Petchaboon Hmong would be
able to stay in Thailand over the long term.


9. (C) Winai said that the RTG would try to move the
Petchaboon group to another, camp-like location closer to the
Lao border in the hope that they would be encouraged to
return to Laos. Most of the group were from Laos, including
some who entered Thailand after the announcement of the Wat
Tham Krabok resettlement program. Some were Hmong from
northern Thailand who had highlander status, but went to
Petchaboon seeking U.S. resettlement. Winai said that the
group was free to leave Petchaboon and return home. However,
they did not seem to want to do this. If resettlement was
not possible, they wanted to stay in Thailand. A/S Sauerbrey
noted that the budget situation was tight, but PRM would look
to see if there might be USG funding available to alleviate
any food shortage.


10. (C) A/S Sauerbrey noted that Thailand had large labor
needs and asked why the RTG could not issue work perQts for
Burma border camp refugees. Work was important for refugees,
especially for young persons, in protracted refugee
situations. Winai replied that the RTG was concerned about
this issue. During a visit to a refugee camp, the Prime
Minister had said that additional refugee vocational training
would prepare Burmese refugees for resettlement or
repatriation. Some Thai investors were interested in
employing refugees as factory workers in locations distant
from the refugee camps and close to cities. The RTG was not
comfortable with this. The refugees might decide not to
return to the camps when their Qployment ended. It would be
better to establish factories close to the refugee camps and
have the refugees leave and return to the camps on a daily
basis. Winai concluded that the RTG agreed that the status
quo could not continue and all would benefit by increased
training, educational, and work opportunities for the border
camp refugees.


11. (C) Winai said that IOM had asked him to encourage the
USG to consider the Wat Tham Krabok site as a transit center
for future resettlement processing. The site's owners had
agreed to the site's use for this purpose and the RTG was
prepared to help. Refcoord responded that PRM was aware of
this idea, but there were many factors to consider, including
the uncertainty until now about future refugee resettlement
flows from Thailand. With the progress on material support,
it might be possible to think about this concept.

Meeting with Ministry of Interior
--------------


12. (C) In an August 28 meeting, Ministry of Interior Deputy
Permanent Secretary Chairerk Distha-Amnaj welcomed A/S
Sauerbrey's news about the material support waiver extension.
In response to a question regarding RTG policy about work
opportunities for camp refugees, he said that the RTG planned
to relocate those Tham Hin refugees who remained after the
completion of the U.S. resettlement program. The RTG would
need some assistance with funding, but was considering a site
ten times the size of Tham Hin. The provincial governor
would have the authority to invite companies to locate close
to the site to provide work opportunities for the refugees.


13. (C) A/S Sauerbrey noted the importance of family unity in
the U.S. refugee resettlement program and asked that the RTG
develop special procedures that would allow timely
resettlement processing and exit permits for immediate family
members who joined a case late in the process or were P3 or
visas 93 beneficiaries. Chairerk responded that persons in
these categories would have to be approved first by the
Provincial Admissions Boards, but there were now fast track
procedures to facilitate this process. A/S Sauerbrey also
urged Chairerk to issue individual identification cards to
refugees, in keeping with previous RTG commitments. Chairerk
responded that the RTG expected to issue the cards before the
end of the year.


14. (C) In response to a question about the Petchaboon Hmong,
Chairerk stated that the RTG wanted to return them to Laos
over the long-term, but the current approach was to "let them
stay for awhile." The RTG was unsure how to deal with this
problem. It would not send the group back to Laos
involuntarily, but returns were possible if conditions were
safe. Chairerk said that some of the group were Thai-Hmong
and the RTG did not want them to disperse from Petchaboon.

Meeting with Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary
-------------- --------------


15. (C) During an August 28 meeting with Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (MFA) Permanent Secretary Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn,
A/S Sauerbrey announced the extension of the material support
waiver and said she was also hopeful that there would be a
change in U.S. law that would help those refugees not covered
by the waiver. Krit welcomed the news on material support
and expressed gratitude for U.S.-Thai cooperation on refugee
matters. Resettlement of Karen was a good solution for a
protracted refugee situation.


16. (C) A/S Sauerbrey said the USG was concerned about the
Petchaboon Hmong situation. A/S Sauerbrey asked if the RTG
had heard anything from the Lao about the 26 Hmong minors.
Krit lauded U.S.-RTG cooperation on the Wat Tham Krabok
resettlement program, but noted that an unexpected fallout
was the Petchaboon Hmong situation. The RTG was trying to
handle the Petchaboon group in a manner consistent with its
humanitarian tradition, while also staying mindful of the
pull factor. The RTG did not envision further resettlement.
The RTG had had little success in discussing this issue with
the Lao government, which denied that the Hmong were from
Laos. Krit said the Lao government was still saying it could
not locate the Hmong minors.


17. (C) A/S Sauerbrey said the USG had great interest in
North Korean refugees and understood Thai sensitivities.
There were now 28 North Koreans in Thailand who were seeking
U.S. resettlement. A/S Sauerbrey said that the USG wanted to
quietly process the group for resettlement. She suggested
the "deportation" idea previously mentioned to General Winai.
Noting that Under Secretary Dobriansky had called him about
the North Koreans, Krit said that the RTG was worried about
the pull factor. The Thai National Intelligence Agency
estimated there were 20,000 North Koreans waiting to enter
Thaiand. There had to be an end in sight to any U.S.
resettlement to provide a sufficient comfort level. The
emergence of smuggling rings related to the North Koreans,
while not yet sinister, was also a concern. The RTG was not
applying a draconian policy and was not acting in a manner
inconsistent with its humanitarian tradition. South Korea
was a clear alternative destination. A/S Sauerbrey responded
that the USG did not envisage a massive flow of North Koreans
going to Thailand. More were moving to Mongolia. (Note:
Following the departure of A/S Sauerbrey, Krit informed the
Ambassador that there might be some progress soon on some of
the pending North Korean processing requests. We
consequently received RTG permission to resettle 16 North
Koreans in Thailand to the U.S. See Reftel. End note.)

Meetings with IOM and USAID
--------------


18. (U) A/S Sauerbrey told IOM Representative for Southeast
Asia Irena Vojackova-Sollorano about the extended Karen
waiver and the likelihood of a Chin ethnic group waiver in
coming months. Vojackova-Sollorano responded that IOM had
still not received Malaysian government permission to open an
office in Kuala Lumpur but was cooperating well with UNHCR
and could handle increased Chin resettlement by sending staff
from Bangkok. She urged A/S Sauerbrey to consider opening a
refugee resettlement transit center at Wat Tham Krabok given
the expanded Karen waiver. Such a center would require $2.5
million in start-up costs for a facility able to handle
2,000-3,000 persons, but IOM expected that these costs would
be repaid within two years by the operational savings of
having a transit center. Camp resettlement programs, such as
Tham Hin, typically last 2-3 years. It would not be cost
efficient to have a residual IOM operation in Tham Hin at the
same time that IOM was setting up operations elsewhere to
support U.S. resettlement efforts in other camps. IOM staff
also provided a overview of their migration and
anti-trafficking activities.


19. (C) In August 30 and 31 meetings, A/S Sauerbrey received
a USAID briefing on its assistance activities for migrant
workers and camp refugees in Thailand and internally
displaced persons in eastern Burma. ARC and IRC
representatives provided information about their PRM-funded
refugee camp activities and their need for additional funding
to conduct income generation and sex and gender based
violence assistance activities. The USCIS District Director
provided a briefing on his office's refugee interviews in the
region and his views on the Chin and Montagnard caseloads.
The head of the Thailand-Burma Border Consortium discussed
recent changes in RTG refugee policy and the background of
the current Burma border refugee situation.


20. (U) This message was cleared by A/S Sauerbrey.
BOYCE