Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK5567
2006-09-11 09:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

THAI DEPUTY PM OPTIMISTIC ABOUT UPCOMING ELECTION

Tags:  PGOV MOPS ASEC TH 
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005567 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV MOPS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: THAI DEPUTY PM OPTIMISTIC ABOUT UPCOMING ELECTION

REF: A. BANGKOK 5466 (PANSAK ON POLITICS)


B. BANGKOK 5463 (BORWORNSAK ON POLITICS)

C. BANGKOK 5423 (SURAYUD ON POLITICS)

D. BANGKOK 5411 (CINC SONTHI ON POLITICS)

E. BANGKOK 5255 (SURANAND ON POLITICS)

F. BANGKOK 5204 (CAR BOMB)

Classified By: DCM Alex Arvizu, reason: 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
-------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005567

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV MOPS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: THAI DEPUTY PM OPTIMISTIC ABOUT UPCOMING ELECTION

REF: A. BANGKOK 5466 (PANSAK ON POLITICS)


B. BANGKOK 5463 (BORWORNSAK ON POLITICS)

C. BANGKOK 5423 (SURAYUD ON POLITICS)

D. BANGKOK 5411 (CINC SONTHI ON POLITICS)

E. BANGKOK 5255 (SURANAND ON POLITICS)

F. BANGKOK 5204 (CAR BOMB)

Classified By: DCM Alex Arvizu, reason: 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Deputy Prime Minister Suwat Liptapanlop predicted PM
Thaksin Shinawatra's Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party would win a
majority of the vote in the upcoming legislative election,
and participation of opposition parties would diminish the
enthusiasm for street demonstrations. In a September 11
lunch with the Ambassador, Suwat said TRT would be better off
if it fell short of its historic February 2005 377-seat
total, so that the party would not appear totally dominant.
Until the election, likely to take place in November, Thaksin
would remain silent on whether he would withdraw from
politics. Suwat downplayed the impact of factionalism in
TRT. He also suggested several areas of focus for reforming
Thai politics. End Summary.

TRT TO TRIUMPH IN ELECTION
--------------


2. (C) Discussing the upcoming election over lunch with the
Ambassador, Deputy Prime Minister Suwat Liptapanlop predicted
with confidence that TRT would win a majority of the seats in
the House of Representatives. However, TRT officials hoped
not to do as well as in February 2005, when the party won 377
of the 500 seats in the House of Representatives; such a
victory would raise criticism of TRT's dominance of the
political landscape, and Thaksin's critics would again
characterize his government as dictatorial. It would be
better for TRT to win slightly more than 300 seats, Suwat
said.


3. (C) Suwat claimed TRT's strength in the election reflected
Thaksin's continuing popularity with the masses. Only around
10 percent of the population hated Thaksin, while around 40
percent of Thais loved him. The remaining 50 percent of the
population comprised a relatively neutral portion of the
electorate, although later in the conversation Suwat
estimated that Thaksin currently had the support of a silent

majority of around 70 percent. Stating with assurance that
the recent alleged car bomb discovered near Thaksin's
residence (ref F) represented a genuine assassination
attempt, Suwat noted this confirmed TRT's popularity, as the
Prime Minister's opponents would not have to resort to such
efforts if Thaksin was politically vulnerable.


4. (C) Based on the Senate's recent selection of five
Election Commission members (septel),Suwat predicted the
legislative election would take place in November. Because
opposition parties would participate in the polling,
Thailand's political energies would focus on the campaign and
then on the ensuing political reform efforts and
parliamentary wrangling -- not on street protests of the
People's Alliance for Democracy, which Suwat believed was
losing steam.


5. (C) Suwat noted the next House of Representatives would be
short-lived, since there was a political consensus to
undertake constitutional reforms, which would presumably be
followed by dissolution of the House. Suwat briefly
identified several priority areas:

- Reviewing the Constitution's stipulated qualifications for
legislative candidates (among the most controversial is the
requirement that candidates hold no less than a bachelor's
degree);

- Revising the procedures for the conduct of a no-confidence
debate on the Prime Minister;

- Amending the restriction that requires legislative
candidates to be members of their political parties 90 days
prior to election day (this provision has been widely
criticized for tying the hands of potential defectors);

- Imposing term limits for the Prime Minister (limits
currently exist for Senators and members of independent
bodies, but not for cabinet members or members of the House

BANGKOK 00005567 002 OF 002


of Representatives); and

- Revising the nature of the Senate, currently an ostensibly
non-partisan, fully elected body.

THAKSIN TO DECIDE AFTER THE POLLS
--------------


6. (C) The Ambassador pressed Suwat on whether Thaksin would
withdraw from politics. Suwat remarked he found it difficult
to address the matter; it would be better to go step by step,
and the next step would be the election. TRT should focus on
its performance at the polls, and after that, Thaksin would
have a choice on how to proceed. However, Suwat hinted that
Thaksin retained a strong interest in the premiership -- if
he did not want it, why put up with all the current hassles,
Suwat asked rhetorically.

TRT FACTIONALISM OVERSTATED
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador asked Suwat's analysis of internal
factionalism in TRT. Suwat dismissed the issue as relatively
unimportant. Although TRT officials acknowledged
factionalism, to some extent this represented delegation of
responsibility; Suwat himself had to manage a group of around
20 key figures. Nevertheless, one should not believe the
existence of power centers within the party imperiled
Thaksin's leadership position. Thaksin knew well how to
exercise power; he could command TRT to follow his bidding,
and everyone would obey. No other TRT figure could rival
Thaksin, who had charisma, power, and (especially) money.


8. (C) Comparing Thaksin to past Thai leaders, Suwat noted
admiringly that Thaksin combined the statesmanship of Anand
Panyarachun, the power of Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, and
the gangster-like scrappiness of General Chatichai
Choonhavan. That being the case, the Ambassador asked, could
Suwat explain how Thaksin wound up in his present
predicament? Suwat noted it was difficult to figure out the
answer; perhaps it was just a matter of fate.

PRIVY COUNCIL RELATIONS WITH THE MILITARY
--------------


9. (C) The Ambassador asked Suwat to describe the role of the
Privy Council in the current crisis. Suwat declined to
discuss the activities of any specific Privy Councilors; he
simply noted that the Council had a good relationship with
the Army, and the Army would not dare to work against the
interests of the Council.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Suwat's confidence in TRT's performance in the coming
election was predictable but not necessarily misguided. Even
Democrat Party contacts acknowledge that TRT will come out on
top when voters go to the polls. The key question remains:
what will Thaksin choose to do once he has his majority in
the new parliament? Our high-level contacts vary in their
predictions and preferences (refs A-E, and septel),but the
consensus view as of today seems to be that Thaksin has a
relatively free hand to make the decision himself; that he
has not yet committed irrevocably -- and certainly not
publicly -- to any course of action; and that the election
results will likely have a significant impact on his ultimate
decision.

BOYCE