THAKSIN ADVISOR HEAPS SCORN ON OPPONENTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005466

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MOPS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: THAKSIN ADVISOR HEAPS SCORN ON OPPONENTS

REF: A. BANGKOK 5349 (BANKS BOMBED)


B. BANGKOK 5204 (CAR BOMB)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Efforts to destroy Prime Minister Thaksin represent
the decrepit Thai royalist oligarchy's desire to overthrow
democracy, according to close Thaksin advisor Pansak
Vinyaratn. In a September 5 meeting with the Ambassador,
Pansak claimed Thaksin intended to withdraw from politics
after the next election, but his opponents would continue to
harass him to try to force him out from office in September.
Pansak assured the Ambassador the August 24 car bomb incident
represented a genuine assassination attempt. He derided the
Army Commander's recent call for negotiations with militants
in southern Thailand and noted the Army was split along
political lines. End Summary.

THAKSIN TO WITHDRAW... IF HE SURVIVES
--------------


2. (C) In a September 5 meeting with the Ambassador, Pansak
Vinyaratn, one of Thaksin's closest advisors and political
strategists, confirmed the Prime Minister's intention to
withdraw from politics in the near future. When the
Ambassador mentioned Thaksin's private remark that he would
take this step after the upcoming legislative election,
Pansak did not dispute the timing. However, he noted that
Thaksin's enemies -- and specifically Privy Council President
Prem Tinsulanonda -- hoped for his ouster in September. Prem
and his allies hoped to get rid not only of Thaksin, but also
Thailand's democratic system, Pansak asserted. The royalist
oligarchy wanted to return to a prior era in which the
Palace, not democratically elected politicians, would reign
supreme.


3. (C) Pansak claimed Thaksin's enemies "want to assassinate
him." They envisioned that this act would force the King to
intervene in politics and prompt a restructuring of the
current system of governance. Pansak assured the Ambassador
that the August 24 car bomb incident (ref B) represented a
genuine assassination attempt. As the Ambassador pressed for
further detail, Pansak acknowledged that the plotters behind
the car bomb likely had further plans in the works, and
Thaksin's family members might become targets.


4. (C) Pansak claimed that Prem had signaled his intentions
and intimidated two cabinet members (Cabinet Secretary
Borwornsak Uwanno and Deputy Prime Minister Wissanu
Krea-ngam) into resigning in June. Pansak claimed that Prem
had sent a clear signal by asking their view on whether
constitutional provisions allowing the King to take on a
political role might be invoked in the event of Thaksin's
death. (Note: This account differs from that provided
directly to the Ambassador by Borwornsak -- septel. End
Note.)

THAKSIN AS A DEMOCRAT LOYAL TO THE THRONE
--------------


5. (C) Machinations from the Palace stung all the more,
Pansak claimed, because Thaksin had consistently shown
respect for the royal court and had defended the King's
interests. Thaksin had sought to protect the King's
reputation when an American author recently published a
tell-all book about the royal family. More importantly,
Thaksin had taken steps to promote and protect the assets of
the Crown Property Bureau (CPB). Thaksin had substantial
assets of his own with Siam Commercial Bank (SCB),in which
the CPB was a major stakeholder -- and an SCB figure who was
also a relative of the Queen (NFI) had even represented
Thaksin in negotiating the highly controversial sale of Shin
Corp to Singapore's Temasek Holdings.


6. (C) The royalists, however, feared that Thaksin's
policies, which benefited and empowered the rural majority,
would erode their own standing. The royalists were against
democracy, he noted, dismissing the critique that Thaksin had
consolidated power to an extreme degree. Pansak cited the
existence of over 2,300 community radio stations and over
1,000 print media outlets as proof that Thais under Thaksin
enjoyed freedom of the press; only a minority of these
outlets were anti-Thaksin -- and, ironically, their revenues
had grown considerably because of the political crisis. (The

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Armed Forces monopolize television broadcasts, Pansak pointed
out.)


7. (C) When the Ambassador asked whether Thaksin had acted
wisely in dissolving the parliament in February, Pansak
retorted that the decision was inconsequential. Whatever
Thaksin did or did not do, his enemies would continue coming
after him; unconstrained by legal or rational justifications,
these opponents would find ways to attack. Tragically, while
the royalists and oligarchs were undermining Thaksin, the
political landscape was bereft of credible alternative
leaders. Given the King's age, it was imperative for the
Thai population to begin preparing psychologically for the
King's passing and for a transition to a system increasingly
reliant on democratic structures rather than royal authority.
The current crisis forestalled such preparation, however.
"It's all about Prem becoming Regent," Pansak warned.

A SPLIT ARMY
--------------


8. (C) Pansak dismissed with annoyance reports that Thaksin
was influencing the upcoming reshuffle of military officers.
However, Pansak acknowledged the military was split along
political lines, and this lack of unity would prevent a move
by Army Commander Sonthi Boonyaratglin against Thaksin.
Pansak harshly derided Sonthi's recent public call for
negotiations with militants active in southern Thailand: "Do
you think we sit on our ass, doing nothing?" It was
impossible to negotiate, however, when one could not identify
the militants' leader. The timing of Sonthi's remark was
also wrong, Pansak said. It sent a signal of weakness to
call for negotiations right after a dramatic series of bomb
attacks on banks in Yala province (ref A).

COMMENT
--------------


9. (C) Pansak adopted a defiant tone, but, although
previously confident that Thaksin would prevail, he now
seemed resigned to the eventual triumph of those whom he
considers to represent Thailand's old order. We noted he
appeared to leave open the prospect of Thaksin being forced
out of politics before the next election, contrary to the
plan the Prime Minister himself had previously confided.
BOYCE