EX-CABINET SECRETARY ASSESSES PM THAKSIN'S POSITION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005463

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM MOPS ASEC TH
SUBJECT: EX-CABINET SECRETARY ASSESSES PM THAKSIN'S POSITION

REF: A. BANGKOK 5423 (SURAYUD MEETING)


B. BANGKOK 5204 (CAR BOMB)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (d).

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (C) Thailand has become a police state, according to
former Cabinet Secretary Borwornsak Uwanno, who claimed the
government tapped the phones of political figures and that
some key Thaksin Shinawatra loyalists remained in place out
of fear. In a September 5 call on the Ambassador, Borwornsak
explained that he resigned in June under pressure from a
member of the Privy Council. The entire Privy Council was
against Thaksin; one Privy Councilor had a tape of the Prime
Minister discussing how to "neutralize" (politically) the
King. Borwornsak cited possible upcoming events that could
lead to further resignations of Thaksin loyalists. He raised
the prospect of military intervention in politics; the
Ambassador stressed the USG would respond negatively to such
a move. Borwornsak was uncertain whether the recent car bomb
incident was genuine, but he claimed he could imagine
assassination attempts against the Prime Minister, whose
family members might also be targeted. End Summary.

RESIGNING UNDER PRESSURE FROM THE PALACE
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2. (C) Former Cabinet Secretary Borwornsak Uwanno called on
the Ambassador on September 5. (Note: Borwornsak, a highly
regarded legal scholar, made headlines when he resigned in
June, citing political conditions. End Note.) He explained
he had decided to resign for various reasons, including the
deterioration of his public credibility as he was
increasingly seen by the elite as a defender of an unpopular
administration. Additionally, he cited ethical qualms with
some of Thaksin's practices, such as efforts to manipulate
the educational system to ensure the Prime Minister's
daughter's entrance into prestigious Chulalongkorn University.


3. (C) Borwornsak cited the Shinawatra family's tax-free sale
of Shin Corp to Temasek Holdings as the last straw for him.
But he said he accelerated his resignation under pressure
from an unspecified member of the Privy Council (he would
only say the person in question was neither Privy Council
President Prem Tinsulanonda, nor the King's principal private
secretary, Asa Sarasin, nor a public critic of Thaksin).

SIPDIS
That Privy Councilor, citing concern for Borwornsak's
reputation, urged him to quit, and to do so without delay.
Borwornsak related that after he resigned, he received
congratulatory messages from all Privy Councilors. The
entire Privy Council was against Thaksin, he asserted, adding
that Privy Councilor Surayud Chulanont had a tape recording
that featured the Prime Minister talking to members of his
entourage about how to "neutralize" (politically) the King,
Thaksin asserting also that he exerted significant influence
over Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn. (In an aside, Borwornsak
also complained that Thaksin had spoken of the Crown Prince
and written letters to him in a manner that appeared
disrespectful of the Crown Prince's royal heritage.)

"THAILAND HAS BECOME A POLICE STATE"
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4. (C) When he informed Thaksin of his decision to resign,
Borwornsak noted, Thaksin did not appear surprised.
Borwornsak surmised that Thaksin knew of his plans from
electronic surveillance of his phone; he said that military
and police sources had informed him that the phones of over
500 individuals were being monitored, with the drug
suppression law and money laundering law provided to phone
service providers as justification. Such efforts would be
understandable if the targets were criminals, but for Thaksin
to monitor political officials in this manner was excessive.
"Thailand has become a police state," he said, and appeared
democratic only on the surface. (Note: At the end of the
meeting, Borwornsak provided the Ambassador with his new cell
phone number but noted that, if contacted, he would use
another phone, whose number he did not provide, to return the
Ambassador's call. End note.)


5. (C) Borwornsak cited also Thaksin's heavy-handed response
to militant activity in southern Thailand. When the
Ambassador asked whether extra-judicial killings in southern
Thailand and elsewhere reflected state policy, Borwornsak
paused to consider his response carefully. Policemen carried

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out killings, he said, and the perpetrators received
promotions, as if as a reward. Their higher-ups (NFI) "just
close their eyes" -- there was no proof linking top officials
to extra-judicial killings.


6. (C) Citing Thaksin's recent negative public comments about
long-time loyalist Deputy Prime Minister Somkid Jatusripitak,
Borwornsak related that numerous other Thaksin supporters
were interested in resigning. Deputy Prime Minister
Surakiart Sathirathai, under pressure from his wife, wanted
to resign but stayed on only in order to have a shot at
becoming UN Secretary General. Other cabinet members,
including Somsak Thepsutin, Pinit Jarusombat, and Suranand
Vejjajiva, also wanted to leave the cabinet, but they feared
possible reprisals from Thaksin. (Borwornsak did not clarify
what sorts of reprisals he considered likely, but he implied
they would be severe.)

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR A TRANSITION
--------------


7. (C) More cabinet members might resign if only given some
sort of justification by a dramatic event, Borwornsak
observed. He cited several possible catalysts that could
prompt such a move:

- Further large-scale demonstrations by the People's Alliance
for Democracy;

- Incidents of political violence;

- An upcoming court ruling on a case brought by a plaintiff
named Reuangdet (LNU),who sued the Taxation Department after
an initial finding that he owed tax on a sale of shares; the
court's verdict could undermine Thaksin's claim that the
tax-free determination for the Shin Corp sale was legitimate.


8. (C) Borwornsak dismissed the possibility of political
conditions improving if Thaksin were to withdraw from
government office but install a "puppet" of his as Prime
Minister. (Leading candidates to stand in for Thaksin
included House Speaker Bhokin Bhalakula, whom Borwornsak
stated had earned Thaksin's gratitude by providing Thaksin
with early notice of the 1997 devaluation of the Baht, and
Agriculture Minister Sudarat Keyuraphan.) Citing reports
from members of Thaksin's close entourage, Borwornsak claimed
that Thaksin had sent retired General Mongkol Ampornpisit to
lobby Privy Council President Prem to ease up pressure on
Thaksin in the event that the Prime Minister were to withdraw
from politics. However, Borwornsak noted that no one could
guarantee the course of legal cases against Thaksin.


9. (C) Borwornsak said he could envision violence leading to
political intervention by the military, which would lead to
the establishment of an interim government to carry out
reforms. Borwornsak said he could envision no other way out
of the current crisis, and he asked how the USG would view
such an interim government. The Ambassador stated clearly
that the USG would oppose the military overthrow of a
democratically elected government.

CAR BOMB
--------------


10. (C) Borwornsak professed uncertainty about the nature of
the alleged August 24 car bomb incident (ref B). Regardless
of the nature of that incident, though, he believed Thaksin's
enemies might try to kill the Prime Minister; he told the
Ambassador that since 2005 he had requested Health Ministry
officials to test the food provided for cabinet meetings for
poison. He stated twice that he believed that Thaksin's
family members might also become targets for Thaksin's
opponents.

COMMENT
--------------


11. (C) Borwornsak is a preeminent legal scholar, former
member of the commission that produced Thailand's current
Constitution, and, until recently, a top government official
who played a critical liaison role with the Palace. We take
seriously his concern about domestic surveillance,
authoritarian tendencies, and the possibility of Thaksin
carrying out reprisals against his political enemies.
However, we note that there are credible scenarios -- such as
that raised by Privy Councilor Surayud Chulanont (ref A),
entailing a poor performance of Thaksin's party in the next

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election -- which might pave the way for Thaksin's exit with
far less upheaval that the prospective military intervention
that Borwornsak raised.
BOYCE