AMBASSADOR'S SEPTEMBER 1 MEETING WITH PRIVY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 005423

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM MOPS TH
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S SEPTEMBER 1 MEETING WITH PRIVY
COUNCILOR SURAYUD CHULANONT

REF: A. BANGKOK 5411 (ARMY CINC)

B. BANGKOK 5349 (BOMBS IN YALA)

C. BANGKOK 5335 (MILITARY ON DEFENSIVE)

D. BANGKOK 5204 (CAR BOMB DISCOVERED)

E. BANGKOK 4610 (MORE ON RESHUFFLE)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason: 1.4 (b) and (d).

SUMMARY
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1. (C) Privy Council member Surayud Chulanont envisions Prime
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra might be forced to withdraw from
political life through a relatively poor performance by his
Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party in elections likely to take place
in coming months. In a September 1 four-eyes meeting with
the Ambassador, Surayud observed that TRT had serious
factional problems and seemed to have less money available
than in prior elections. Nevertheless, if TRT were to win a
solid majority, Thaksin might intend to return as Prime
Minister when forming the next government, Surayud said.
Often named as a potential successor to Thaksin, Surayud said
he was trying to maintain a low profile. Surayud dismissed
the possibility of a coup; he did not mention the most recent
bombings in southern Thailand. He expressed ambivalence
about whether the recent car bomb incident presented as an
attempt to kill Thaksin was genuine or a hoax. End Summary.

A SCENARIO FOR THAKSIN'S EXIT FROM POLITICS
--------------


2. (C) The Ambassador called on Privy Councilor Surayud
Chulanont at his residence on September 1. Surayud appeared
confident that the King would be able to appoint a new
Election Commission (EC) in the coming weeks, upon conclusion
of Senate processes, and the legislative election could take
place in a few months -- if not in October then soon after
the King's birthday, in December. Surayud indicated no
serious concern about the EC's ability to run a credible and
legitimate election.


3. (C) Surayud noted several indications that TRT might not
perform as well in the coming election as previously:

- TRT appeared to be "hollowing out"; in addition to the
discontent on the part of dovish figures within the party,
Surayud cited deteriorating support from Deputy Prime
Minister Suwat Liptapanlop, whom Surayut claimed could
influence ten million votes, principally in the northeast,
which is seen as a TRT stronghold.

- TRT appeared to have less money available to deploy for the
coming election. While Thaksin remains extraordinarily
wealthy, Surayud observed that Thaksin was "stingy" and
preferred to spend others' money in elections -- but now,
there were fewer eager donors for TRT.

- Rival parties would do better than in previous elections.
The Democrat Party, although facing a funding crunch, would
perform well in Bangkok and southern Thailand, while the
Chart Thai party of former Prime Minister Banharn
Silapa-Archa would improve its showing in central Thailand,
Surayud believed.


4. (C) The Ambassador noted that Thaksin might find his
opponents' attacks against him would diminish if he were to
withdraw from politics. Surayud agreed but characterized
Thaksin as paranoid and unwilling to believe he would face
less pressure and less of a threat to his assets. Surayud
believed Thaksin's intention was to win as many votes as
possible in the coming election, claim a mandate, and return
as Prime Minister. However, Surayud believed TRT might
underperform its prior showing (the party won around 60
percent of the vote in April's annulled election),raising
doubt about Thaksin's ability to claim a mandate.

PALACE DISCOURAGES COUP, CONSIDERS IT UNLIKELY
-------------- -


5. (C) The Ambassador noted Privy Council President Prem
Tinsulanonda's July 14 speech to cadets at the Chulachomklao
Royal Military Academy, in which Prem had made remarks widely
interpreted as critical of Thaksin. Surayud said Prem
intended to boost the morale of the military and send a
signal to Thaksin; he added that Prem, despite rumors to the
contrary, opposed the idea of a coup and had made this clear

BANGKOK 00005423 002 OF 002


to Surayud and also to Army Commander General Sonthi
Boonyaratglin. Surayud told the Ambassador he considered
Sonthi as a solid professional and an unemotional person --
not the type to carry out a coup. When the Ambassador
remarked that, given Thai history, it might be unwise to
think a coup would be impossible, Surayud simply laughed in
response. The Ambassador observed that conventional wisdom
held that Prem, Surayud, and Privy Councilor Palakorn
Suwanrath represented Thaksin's key foes, Surayud simply
replied, "That's how he (Thaksin) sees it."


6. (C) The Ambassador raised the upcoming reshuffle of top
military officers. Surayud believed that ongoing
machinations within the military (ref C) reflected the
efforts of Thaksin loyalists from the Prime Minister's class
in the pre-cadet Academy (Class 10) to secure maximum
advantage before Thaksin might be further weakened. These
officers were eager to move into key positions, but Surayud
believed they were not yet capable of holding them. He
specifically cited the case of General Pornchai Kranlert,
Thaksin's likely choice to replace Sonthi in 2007 -- Surayud
described him as unintelligent. (Note: We hear Pornchai
hoped for promotion to the position of Deputy Army Commander.
End Note.)


7. (C) Recalling a prior conversation with Thaksin, the
Ambassador asked Surayud's opinion of the Prime Minister's
claim that he had sought to place Class 10 loyalists in key
military positions not so that they could keep him in power
through extra-constitutional efforts, but simply so they
could block such efforts by others. Surayud noted this
strategy would be consistent with Thaksin's style.

CAR BOMB
--------------


8. (C) When the Ambassador raised the recent discovery of an
alleged car bomb near Thaksin's residence (ref D),Surayud
remarked that he was unsure whether this represented a
genuine plot against Thaksin, rating the odds as "50-50" but
noting that a majority of people seemed to consider it a hoax.

KEEPING A LOW PROFILE
--------------


9. (C) Surayud mentioned at the close of the meeting that he
was maintaining a low profile, given the common perception of
animosity between himself and Thaksin, and speculation he
might replace Thaksin if the political crisis were to require
that the King appoint a new Prime Minister not from the
parliament. Surayud mentioned that, after Prem's July 14
speech, he (Surayud) had deferred an invitation to speak to
military cadets.

COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) We were struck by Surayud's seeming optimism that
Thaksin might be gently forced from office in the event of a
below-expectations performance by TRT in upcoming elections,
caused by factionalism within TRT, a stronger showing by
rival parties, and reduced funding for campaign activities.
We also noted that, despite the August 31 bombings in Yala
(ref B),Surayud had nothing to say about the South. Like
Army Commander Sonthi (ref A) -- and everyone else in town --
he is focused on the political drama in Bangkok, not the
threats far away in the South.
BOYCE