SCENESETTER FOR PACOM DEPUTY J2 TOM MCNAMARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 005268

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

PACOM FOR J2 AND FPA HUSO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2016
TAGS: OTRA PREL MARR PGOV TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR PACOM DEPUTY J2 TOM MCNAMARA

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Alex A. Arvizu. Reason 1.4 (a a
nd d)


1. (C) Summary. Mr. McNamara, your trip to Bangkok will
allow you to observe the difficulties the Thai military face
in sharing intelligence and information. A lack of basic
analytical skills coupled with information firewalls between
the services and with other agencies hampers the Thai
military's ability to collect and analyze information and
share useful intelligence with other agencies and friendly
countries. Several Thai officers acknowledge the problems
that exist and want to work with us to improve intelligence
capabilities. Your interlocutors will express a desire to
have more U.S. training and we see opportunities to build
closer links between the Thai Army and USARPAC. Thailand
affords the United States a unique platform in Asia.
Congress recently approved our implementing an ambitious
program in Thailand, Indonesia and Sri Lanka designed to
improve our ability to monitor ship traffic on the Andaman
Sea and in the Strait of Malacca to intercept suspect
vessels. Our largest exercise, Cobra Gold, is America's only
annual joint/combined multilateral training exercise in the
Asia Pacific Region and now includes the active participation
of Japan, Singapore and Indonesia. Thai troops deployed to
Afghanistan and Iraq and we are working closely with the Thai
to make them better able to address separatist elements in
the Muslim majority South. We are also working with U.S.
Embassies in the region to better address counter terrorism
throughout SE Asia. Our IMET program is a major success --
senior leaders in all the services are graduates. END
SUMMARY.

THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP


2. (C) Bilateral relations with Thailand are very good. The
goodwill generated by America's quick and massive response to
the December 26 2004 tsunami was palpable. Thailand is a
Treaty Ally and has been firmly supportive of the
International War on Terror and has participated in Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
American businesses have over $20 billion in direct
investment in Thailand. The United States is Thailand's
largest export market and its second-largest foreign
investor.


3. (C) Nonetheless, there are points of friction. Human
rights remains a key concern. On October 25, 2004, poorly
trained Thai military and civilian security forces forced
nearly 1,300 Thai Muslim protesters into trucks to be
transported to a military base nearly three hours away. 78
protesters died en route. Our protests over Thai Police
involvement in approximately 1,300 extrajudicial killings
during the 2003 Thai "war on drugs," rankles the Thai
Government. Likewise, Thailand's policy of "constructive
engagement" with the military junta in Burma and provision of
economic assistance to Rangoon is a source of continuing
frustration for us. The Thai government supports democracy
in Burma but maintains, not altogether convincingly, that
engagement with the SPDC is the only realistic approach it
has to make progress on the major cross-border flows of
refugees, illegal economic migrants, and methamphetamines it
faces from Burma.

THE OVERALL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP


4. (C) The U.S.-Thai security relationship is based on over
50 years of close cooperation. Thai soldiers, sailors and
airmen participated in the Korean and Vietnamese Conflicts
and Thai peacekeepers served in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Thailand is the fourth largest participant in the U.S.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.
Thailand's willingness to allow the United States to use
Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for our regional tsunami
assistance program was key to making Operation Unified
Assistance a success. In fact, PACOM recently designated
Utapao as the most important Cooperative Security Location
(CSL) in the Asia Pacific Region. While we avoid using the
term "CSL" with the Thai due to their sensitivities about
bases, Utapao remains vital to our interests in the region.
In your meetings with Thai officials, you will want to note
the overall strength of the relationship -- highlighting our
history and underscoring the importance of our tsunami
cooperation, exercise program, increased tempo of USN ship
visits (most recently, the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike
Group),and cooperation in the War on Terrorism.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION


5. (SBU) In 2001, telecommunications multimillionaire Thaksin
(Prime Minister TOCK-SIN) Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai
(TRT) party won a decisive victory on a populist platform of
economic growth and development. Thaksin was reelected in
February 2005, winning 377 out of 500 seats in the
Parliament. Following allegations of corruption of the Prime
Minister, peaceful anti-government demonstrations grew as
thousands marched in the streets of Bangkok to demand
Thaksin's resignation. Thaksin dissolved the Parliament in
February 2006 and declared snap elections in April. The
opposition boycotted the April elections, leading to a
political stalemate. Following Royal intervention, the
judiciary annulled the April election and new elections are
expected to take place in October or shortly thereafter.
Protesters have not returned to the streets and the Thai
military has not intervened. Notably, Army CINC General
Sonthi Boonyaratglin has been praised for his professional
and apolitical handling of the military throughout the
impasse. The government remains in caretaker status.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND SOUTHERN THAILAND


6. (C) Southern Thailand, in particular the southernmost
Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat,
has experienced episodic violence since it was incorporated
into the Siamese Kingdom in 1902. However, since January
2004, we have witnessed a dramatic increase in the level of
violence. Press reports indicate that over 1,300 persons
have been killed either by militants or by security forces
during this period. Local Muslim separatist militants have
attacked symbols of Thai and Buddhist authority, civilians,
and local citizens suspected of collaborating with the
Government. There continue to be daily incidents of
violence. In March 2005, Thaksin appointed a National
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) headed by highly respected
former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun to look for
alternative solutions to the long-running insurgency. The
NRC published its recommendations in June but the Government
has not actively south to implement them.


7. (C) Southern separatists direct their anger at the
government in Bangkok, not at the United States. Since a
U.S. presence or perception of U.S. involvement in the South
could redirect that anger towards us and link it to the
international jihadist movement -- a link that is currently
absent -- we ensure that any offers of assistance or training
pass the "location and label" test. Put simply, we keep U.S.
military personnel away from the far South and we make sure
that we do not label any assistance or training as directly
linked to the southern situation. Likewise, we work to avoid
feeding rampant, outlandish speculation that we are somehow
fomenting the violence in the South in order to justify
building permanent bases -- a very sensitive issue in
Thailand. We do not want to jeopardize our access to key
military facilities in Thailand like Utapao Naval Air
Station.

REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY


8. (C) A key U.S. objective in the region is to improve
Maritime Security. We are working closely with PACOM to
encourage Thailand and others to support the Regional
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). Working with PACOM,
PACFLT and Washington, we recently won approval to implement
an ambitious project aimed at promoting domain awareness in
the Andaman Sea. This project is a layered approach to
assist the Thai military secure territorial waters while also
providing coverage of the northern shipping lanes feeding
into the Strait of Malacca. It will combine a High Frequency
Radar capable of reaching Sumatra, with a constellation of
overlapping x-band radars to provide radar coverage of the
waters off the west coast of Thailand. The initiative would
also improve the Royal Thai Navy's interdiction capabilities
and has the potential to be linked to other facilities in the
region. We are working closely with U.S. Embassies in Sri
Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to create a
regional network aimed at improving maritime security
throughout the region.

MILITARY COOPERATION


9. (C) Perhaps due to their lack of a colonial heritage, Thai
leaders are far more willing to host multilateral exercises
than are others countries in Asia. Unlike Japan, which only
hosts annual bilateral exercises due to legal prohibitions
over collective security, or Australia, which avoids
multilateral exercises so as not to "dumb down" its own
training opportunities, the Royal Thai Government supports
multilateral exercises as a way to show regional leadership.
So long as our concepts are properly sold to Thai military
and political leaders, we should be able to continue to
modify exercises to meet our regional security objectives --
including an ability to establish a near-continuous presence
in the region.


10. (C) We conduct a wide range of major exercises and
training programs with Thailand each year, including Cobra
Gold. Cobra Gold 2006 included almost 7,000 U.S. troops
working together with Thai counterparts in field training
exercises ranging from Military Operations in Urban Terrain
and Air Assault Operations to Naval Special Forces protecting
offshore natural gas platforms. The Command Post Exercise
included participation by U.S., Thai, Japanese, Singaporean
and Indonesian forces and focused on peace keeping
operations. Cobra Gold in the coming years will be a
centerpiece of our Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI),
designed to train 15,000 regional peacekeepers by 2010. As
mentioned, Utapao, the Thai Navy Air Base used as the primary
staging area for U.S. disaster relief efforts in the region
following the December 2004 tsunami, has long been a critical
support hub for U.S. aircraft transiting the region. Over 420
DOD aircraft use it each year. Our largest air exercise,
Cope Tiger, involves Thailand, the United States and
Singapore. USN aircraft from the USS Abraham Lincoln
participated in Cope Tiger in 2005 while the Lincoln was
stationed off of Aceh during Operation Unified Assistance.
We have also been working closely with PACFLT to give our
major naval exercise, CARAT, a more regional flavor in the
coming years.

THE ROLE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN THE REGION


11. (C) Southeast Asia continues to feel the rising influence
of China and India. While emphasizing the vital role of the
U.S. in the region -- and Thailand's desire to intensify U.S.
engagement -- Thai leaders also focus on developing stronger
relations with the two regional powers. Bangkok views both
countries as sources of unlimited consumer demand and hope to
conclude Free Trade Agreements with both nations. It
surprises many visitors from Washington to learn that the
Thai military has a number of Chinese weapons systems in its
arsenal. While Thai military links with the United States
are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai links,
China's growing influence in Thailand and Southeast Asia is
evident in business, the arts, the media and the military.
The PLA Navy has close links with the RTN and recently
conducted a major ship visit to Phuket. After jointly holding
a limited naval exercise in the Andaman Sea last fall,
Thailand and China are exploring conducting joint SAR
exercises. The RTN has acquired several ships from China over
the past decade. China is refurbishing tanks and air defense
equipment provided to Thailand in the late 1980's.
Mil-to-mil exchanges between China and Thailand have expanded
in recent years as has the number of bilateral military VIP
visits.

THAI MILITARY STRUCTURE


12. (C) The relative power and influence of the Royal Thai
Army (RTA) dwarfs the other services. As such, the Royal
Thai Army Commander, GEN Sonthi, traditionally wields more
real power than the Supreme Commander. Thailand's armed
forces, which had a history of interfering in the country's
politics, have not done so since 1992 and appear to be
reconciled to constitutional roles of defense and security.
Their exposure to U.S. civil-military values through their
extensive participation in IMET training deserves some credit
for this transformation of their attitude towards democracy.

THE ROLE OF THE ARMY


13. (C) The Royal Thai Army (RTA) is a legacy force faced
with serious modernization issues. Although 30 years have
passed, the RTA is still primarily designed to defeat the
large conventional threat that Vietnam represented in the
mid-1980's. On paper, the RTA would seem to possess the
capability to defeat a large conventional attack -- it seems
to possess an impressive number of main battle tanks, TOW
missiles, and helicopters. Digging deeper, however, one
quickly discovers real equipment problems. 80 of Thailand's
100 M60A3 main battle tanks are inoperable, TOW missiles are
past their useful life expectancy and, at any given time,
only 30 of the RTA's 96 UH-1 helicopters are operational.


14. (C) Much of this decline in effectiveness is due to the
budget constraints that were imposed from 1997-2001 after the
Asian Financial Crisis. Since that time, budgets have
increased slightly, but not to pre-1997 levels. Accordingly,
the RTA must selectively choose how to modernize. Serious
corruption in the procurement process is still widespread --
and acknowledged by many Thai officers. Consequently, the RTA
relies on JUSMAGTHAI and the Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
system for many of their high-profile procurement programs.


15. (C) The RTA's transformation vision, unpublished and
informal as it is, is to become lighter and more mobile with
upgraded C4I systems that will make it more agile
operationally. On the C4I front, much work remains. The RTA
HQ and subordinate commands use commercial dial-up Internet
services and email accounts, if they use email at all.
However, they do have VTC capability and use it frequently.


16. (C) The RTG's CT effort in the South has been plagued by
Thaksin repeatedly changing his policies and lead agencies.
Shortly after taking power, Thaksin decided to dissolve the
joint civilian-police-military Task Force which since the
1980s had successfully contained the separatist-related
violence. The loss of that coordinating body increased the
natural propensity of the Thai bureaucracy to stovepipe
information and not cooperate operationally. The problems
caused by this lack of coordination have been compounded by
the constant shifting of both the civilian and military
leadership responsible for the South. In addition, Thaksin
has often set unrealistic deadlines for his deputies to
"solve" the southern problem and has been inconsistent in his
policy statements, creating a situation where the operational
leadership has a weak mandate and lack of strategic focus.
Now, he finally appears settled on Army CINC GEN Sonthi (who
is a Muslim with a Special Forces Background) as his chief
military representative. Sonthi recently assured the
Ambassador that the Army was rebuilding its intelligence and
political network in the South, which is a good sign.
Nonetheless, there is little guarantee that the Government
won't switch course again in response to an actual or
perceived setback.


17. (C) While the RTA has a long history working with the
U.S. Army, recently we have also been working with MARFORPAC
and III MEF to improve links between the U.S Marine Corps and
the RTA. In many ways, our Marines are ideal training
partners for the RTA and field exercises in Thailand afford
our Marines many opportunities they don't have elsewhere in
Asia. We will host the USS Essex Amphibious Assault Ship
during Cobra Gold and are looking for other training
opportunities in the coming months.

THE NAVAL RELATIONSHIP


18. (C) While our overall relationship with the Thai military
is good, our links with the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) are not as
strong as those with the Royal Thai Army or Air Force. The
RTN is smaller than the other services and tends to be less
willing to be open with U.S. counterparts. This has not been
the case historically, and we are working to reverse the
trend through projects like the Andaman Sea Maritime Security
Initiative and the increased tempo of USN ship visits to
Thailand. The April 19-24 visit of the USS Abraham Lincoln
Carrier Strike Group was well received by the RTN, received
front page and prime time media coverage, and was a
successful opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of the
U.S.-Thai security relationship.


19. (C) In addition to supporting our annual CARAT exercise
with Thailand, JUSMAGTHAI has worked closely with RTN Special
Warfare units to increase their capacity. USN SEALS have
helped to provide their Thai counterparts with some
impressive capabilities. For instance, Thai SEALS regularly
conduct exercises aimed at protecting oil and gas platforms
in the Gulf of Thailand. This NSW relationship was
graphically demonstrated during the tsunami response when USN
and RTN SEALS rapidly deployed to Phuket to assist in the
recovery efforts. The Prime Minister was photographed in a
recovery boat manned by the SEALS. Despite their improved
professionalism, the Thai SEALS are not well-supported by
senior RTN officials.

THE AIR FORCE RELATIONSHIP


20. (C) Our premier air force exercise with Thailand is Cope
Tiger. Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) officials have disagreed
with our suggestions to combine Cope Tiger with Cobra Gold --
and in fact have told us that they will not agree to move
Cope Tiger and will plan to hold the exercise bilaterally
with Singapore, or even invite a third country, if we insist
on moving it. We are working closely with PACAF, MARFORPAC
and PACFLT to develop a way to support the exercise.


24. (C) Although Utapao is an RTN facility, PACAF has been
designated PACOM's executive agent in assessing what upgrades
are needed there. Thai officers and U.S. officials in country
agree that Utapao needs some safety enhancements in order to
continue to be safe for us to use.


25. (C) Last year, Thailand announced its plans to replace
aging F-5s in the RTAF fleet. We have urged Thailand to
either use its defense budget to perform mid-life upgrades
(MLU) on its existing F-16s or to buy F-16 Block 52s. A vast
majority of senior RTAF officers favor the F-16 over SU-30.
However, Russian officials and Israeli contractors have
reportedly offered inducements to senior RTAF officers to buy
Russian and PM Thaksin has reportedly promised President
Putin that he would look favorably on Sukhoi's bid. While
the Government remains in caretaker status, the fighter deal
is in suspense, but we suspect it will heat up again quickly
after the elections.

INTELLIGENCE SHORTFALLS


26. (C) The RTA, RTN, and RTAF do not share intelligence
effectively with each other or with RTSC or the MOD. Thai
military analysts do not have access to intelligence from all
sources and are slow in processing information. This is due
not only to technical limitations -- although these exist --
but is also a result of institutional resistance among the
services to sharing information. RTSC J2 has recently
expressed interest in modernizing and harmonizing
intelligence capabilities, but appears at a loss at how best
to proceed. One possible avenue to explore would be for us
to host more seminars for Thai intelligence officers from all
services in order to break down the walls separating them and
in order to enhance harmonization. Likewise, there are real
opportunities to use our impressive exercise program to
improve training for Thai intelligence officers. Most
scenarios in our exercises simply deliver intelligence
information already processed to game players.


27. (C) Given the intelligence stovepipes, it will be
important in your meetings to tailor your remarks to each
service. Insights and observations relevant to the Royal
Thai Army, for instance, may be of little use to another
service. Given the "Army-centric" nature of the Thai
military, we see an opportunity to solidify intelligence
sharing between USARPAC and the RTA. Some RTA officials have
expressed a willingness to provide us their raw intelligence
and analysis on the South if we could provide our critique of
their analysis in return. We could use your assistance in
understanding a legal way to enhance the USA-RTA intelligence
relationship.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT


28. (U) We look forward to making your visit to Thailand a
success.

BOYCE