F-16: AMBASSADOR RAISES WITH PM THAKSIN

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 000524

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/MLS MHIGGINS
OSD/ISA FOR BGEN ALLEN
PACOM FOR FPA HUSO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR TH
SUBJECT: F-16: AMBASSADOR RAISES WITH PM THAKSIN

REF: BANGKOK 500 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d)


1. (C) Summary. Both Prime Minister Thaksin and his Chief
Policy Advisor indicated to the Ambassador on January 26 that
the RTG is leaning towards purchasing mid-life upgrades
(MLUs) from Lockheed Martin for its F-16 fighter fleet as
well as procuring some SU-30 fighter aircraft, probably
through barter trade, as a way to improve economic links with
Russia. The Ambassador reminded the PM that, in his meetings
with the President and Secretary Rumsfeld in September,
Thaksin left the distinct impression that he would not/not
procure Russian aircraft. The Ambassador told Thaksin that
acquiring SU-30s could make it more difficult for the United
States to release sensitive technologies to Thailand that
might be compromised and suggested that it might affect
Thaksin's relationship with senior U.S. officials, especially
in light of the implied assurances he provided earlier. End
Summary.

KEY THAI OFFICIAL SUGGESTS THAILAND HOPES TO SATISFY BOTH THE
UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA


2. (C) At a January 26 reception, the Ambassador pulled
aside Pansak Vinyaratn, Chief Policy Advisor to the Prime
Minister, to express his concern -- based on recent articles
in the Thai press and discussions (reftel) with senior Thai
military officials -- that suggested Thailand planned to
purchase MLUs from Lockheed Martin as well as conclude a
barter deal with Russia for SU-30s. While expressing
satisfaction over the possible MLU purchase, the Ambassador
reminded Pansak that Thaksin had left the impression with the
President and Secretary Rumsfeld that Thailand would not/not
procure Russian planes.


3. (C) Pansak as much as confirmed our suspicions by saying
"don't worry, the Russian planes would be kept completely
separated from our American aircraft." The Ambassador seized
on Pansak's remarks, telling him that a Russian procurement
would create practical problems that could jeopardize future
transfers of sensitive U.S. technologies to Thailand, hurt
U.S.-Thai interoperability, and possibly affect Thailand's
ability to eventually procure the Joint Strike Fighter.

THAKSIN SEES THE PROCUREMENT SOLELY IN POLITICAL TERMS


4. (C) Later that day, at the Mahidol Awards Ceremony
hosted by the King, the Ambassador pursued the issue at
length with the Prime Minister, suggesting that such a
procurement could become a bilateral problem. The Ambassador
told Thaksin that the Prime Minister had left senior U.S.
officials, including the President himself, with the clear
impression that Thailand would not procure Russian aircraft.
The Ambassador reminded Thaksin that, during their September
meeting, the President had strongly encouraged Thaksin not
only to buy from Lockheed Martin but also not to buy any
Russian planes. Later, during his meeting with Secretary
Rumsfeld, Thaksin had commented on what an effective
presentation the President had made and left a clear
impression that he would not procure Russian planes. The
Ambassador suggested that, in light of those implied
assurances, any acquisition of SU-30s could hurt Thaksin's
standing with the White House and the Pentagon.


5. (C) Thaksin unconvincingly responded that "I never said
yes or no to the President," and explained that he was simply
hoping to open the Russian market to Thai goods.
Nonetheless, it was clear by his expression and manner that
Thaksin understood the seriousness of this issue.


6. (C) The Ambassador explained that fighter aircraft
purchases by treaty allies are a "hot button" issue for us at
all times and suggested that Thaksin find other ways to
improve his relationship with Russia that would not come at
the expense of his relationship with the United States.

COMMENT


7. (C) It is clear that Thaksin has made a political
promise to President Putin to procure Russian aircraft. It
is unclear whether he can recast his commitment to Moscow --
perhaps by purchasing other Russian equipment -- in a way
that will not affect the fighter sale. We are also uncertain
how large a potential procurement of SU-30s is being
contemplated, but every indication is that it will be much
smaller than the likely deal with Lockheed Martin. RTAF
sources suggest they might procure as few as six aircraft.
Post seeks instructions from the Department on next steps and
whether it would be possible for a senior U.S. official to
either call or send a letter to Thaksin and reinforce the
points the Ambassador made.
BOYCE