SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 005230

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINR TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: UPDATED VIOLENCE STATISTICS

REF: BANGKOK 001134 (SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: CRUNCHING THE

NUMBERS)

Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton. Reason 1.4 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary. Our analysis of newly available statistics
suggests that the violence in the first half of 2006
continued to ebb and spike at levels consistent with 2004 and
2005, possibly with a slight downward trend. The frequency
of bomb attacks may be increasing by a small amount, but
shooting attacks remain the most prevalent form of violence
in the deep South. New information from southern police
statistics seems to undercount the number of incidents in
2004, but provides a useful trend line for understanding the
dynamic of violence in Thailand's three southernmost
provinces in 2005 and 2006. In particular, this information
supports our assessment that province-wide attacks like the
multiple bombings in June 2005, October 2005 and June 2006 do
not result in a significant increase in deaths or injuries,
although they do garner much attention. Overall, the
lethality of insurgent attacks has not changed significantly;
data suggests that the number of victims per month may be
declining. Finally, civilians--whether operating in a
government capacity or as private citizens--remain those most
likely to be effected by violence. Approximately 78 percent
of victims in the deep South this year are civilians. End
Summary.


NEW SETS OF STATISTICS ON OVERALL VIOLENCE
--------------


2. (C) Reftel outlined our attempt to provide some
quantitative measure to the violence in Thailand's deep
South. Based upon our review of a limited pool of
comprehensive statistics, we found the information supplied
by Dr. Sisomphop of Prince of Songkhla University (PSU) to be
the most reliable and well sourced data available. According
to this set of statistics (hereafter referred to as the PSU
data) we argued that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the
level of violence had not sharply increased in 2005 from the
year prior, but had remained in the same general range and
was characterized by dynamic spikes and ebbs.


3. (C) Since that cable, we have received updated PSU data,
and new information compiled by the British Embassy in
Bangkok, based upon statistics from Police Region IX forward
command in Yala. At first glance, this data suggests that
the frequency of violence in 2005 was significantly higher
than the year before. The UK data reports 975 incidents or
attacks in 2004 and 2084 occurrences in 2005. The PSU data,
however, lists 1843 incidents in 2004 and 1703 incidents in

2005.


4. (C) While the PSU data is based partially on police
reports, press information and Dr. Sisomphop's field
research, the UK information is wholly derived from Police
Region IX statistics. Neither should be considered 100
percent accurate, but for the purpose of understanding trends
in the violence over the past two years, the PSU data appears
to be more reflective of reality. When plotted together on a
month-to-month timeline, the PSU and UK information varies in
a striking--and uniform--manner. Both data sets reflect
similar dynamics (i.e. increases in attacks during April
2004, decreases in December 2005),but the number of
insurgent-related incidents reported by police are
consistently lower than that reported by PSU from January
2004 until April 2005. After this point, the number of
incidents reported by police is always higher than the number
reported by the PSU study.


5. (C) Recall that, following the upsurge in insurgent
violence in southern Thailand in 2004, government officials
spent most of that year (and some of 2005) denying that there
was, in fact, an insurgency in the South. Officials from the
Prime Minister on down blamed the rise in violence on local
criminals, smugglers and drug kingpins. By 2005, the
government began to acknowledge that there was indeed a
resurgent separatist movement active in the three southern
provinces. Therefore, we believe that official statistics
from 2004--like the UK information--likely undercounted the
number of insurgent-related incidents--instead labeling them
as "normal" crime--because official policy dictated that
there was no new major separatist campaign. Casualty figures
from the attack on the Kru Se mosque and the demonstration at
Tak Bai were not included in the UK information, further
lowering 2004 totals. Further muddying the picture, official

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statistics from late-2005 and 2006 may be slightly inflated.
Anecdotal reporting from some of our contacts in the police
and academia suggests that some "normal" crime is now being
characterized as insurgent-related, given the monetary
rewards now available to victims of separatist violence.
Characterizing these incidents as insurgent attacks also
gives the police an excuse for not solving them.

ATTACKS IN 2006
--------------


6. (C) In an attempt to discern some--albeit loose--trends,
we compared the average number of attacks reported in each
data set for 2006, with the monthly average from each
separate set of statistics from 2004 and 2005. According to
the PSU information, an average of 153 attacks occurred per
month in 2004, 140 per month in 2005 and 63--so far--per
month as of May 2006. The British data suggests that 2004
saw a monthly average of 81 attacks, 2005 saw an average of
173 attacks and 2006 is averaging out at 163 attacks per
month. According to the UK information, the first half of
2005 was more violent than the same period in 2006, with 1082
attacks in the first six months of 2005 and only 894 attacks
in the first half of 2006. The PSU data only covers January
through May, with 79 (Jan),74 (Feb),97 (March),52 (April) and
15 (May) incidents respectively. The UK's police-derived
data ends in June, with 203 (Jan),117 (Feb),182 (March),
116 (April),109 (May),and 167 (June) incidents reported.

ATTACK TYPE
--------------


7. (C) The UK police-derived data is one of the few sets that
breaks down attacks by type for 2006, offering some rough
insights into trends. The information confirms our earlier
assessment that shooting attacks remain the most prevalent
form of violence but the number of bombings are slightly
rising. According to the UK data, in 2005 there was a
monthly average of 76 shootings and 20 bombings. For the
first half of 2006, there was an average of 76 shootings and
25 bombings. The average number of bombings per month in
2006 is slightly skewed, however, by a flurry of bomb attacks
on June 15. The monthly breakdown of bombings is: eight
(January),14 (February),18 (March),19 (April),14 (May)
and 76 (June).

WIDESPREAD ATTACKS CONTINUE
--------------


8. (C) Single-day spikes in violence, like the rash of
attacks across all three provinces on June 15, often garner
significant press attention and lead to speculation that the
insurgency is growing in intensity. The data does not
support this assertion, however. Historically, province-wide
attacks every few months have been the norm since 2004. In
that year, there were over 36 arson attacks on March 18, a
series of approximately 80 arson, bombing and shooting
attacks April 22-23, and almost a dozen bombs on August 3-5.
In 2005, there were widespread attacks April 13, a sharp
surge in shooting attacks in June (the UK data lists a total
of 329 attacks, though this may be inflated),and at least 18
separate arson, bomb and shooting incidents on July 14.
Almost 50 coordinated attacks occurred across the three
southern provinces in October, followed by another spike in
attacks on November 7, 2005 and January 18, 2006.


9. (C) More significantly, these coordinated upsurges in
violence do not result in a comparable increase in
casualties. According to both the UK and PSU data, the
monthly rate of deaths and injuries does not correspond with
the number of attacks. When graphed out over time, the
number of attacks per month presents a dynamic trend of ebbs
and spikes, while the number of deaths and injuries remains
in the same range. This makes sense to us, given that many
of the incidents reported during single-day surges in
violence are simple arson attacks, vandalism, small
firecracker-like explosions and the use of metal spikes on
public roads. According to the UK data, the combined number
of victims (deaths plus injuries) for 2005 was 1,669,
providing a monthly average of 139 victims. For the first
six months of 2006, the monthly average is 134, based on a
total of 809 victims as of July 1. By comparison, the
monthly victim average for the first half of 2005 was 142.


10. (C) Dr. Sisomphop's PSU data, while only covering the
period until May 2006, also supports the contention that
single-day spikes in coordinated violence does not lead to

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comparable increases in deaths and injuries. The PSU
information, however, portrays a decline in the number of
victims from 2005 to 2006. According to this data set, there
were a total of 1,466 victims in 2004, 1,510 in 2005 and 452
for the first five months of 2006, yielding monthly averages
of 122, 126 and 90.4, respectively. Taken separately, the
first five months of 2005 averaged 138 victims per month, far
higher than the same period in 2006.

WHO ARE THE VICTIMS?
--------------


11. (C) Neither the PSU nor UK police-derived information for
2006 breaks down victim totals by religion or government
affiliation. A separate, publicly released report by the
Region IX police, however, reveals that the overwhelming
majority of victims in the South remain civilians. This
information unfortunately does not provide 2004 and 2005
statistic for comparison. According to this report, which
covers January until the first week of August 2006, 31
police, 11 soldiers and 322 civilians have died in
insurgent-related violence during this period. (Note. This
report does not delineate between civilians serving in an
official capacity such as Interior Ministry officials, school
teachers and non-government private citizens. End Note.)
Eighty-one police, 80 soldiers and 424 civilians were
injured. In total, 78 percent of victims were civilians.
BOYCE