SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF THE USS KITTY HAWK

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 005148

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

USS KITTY HAWK FOR RDML MCCLAIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/21/2016
TAGS: OVIP MARR PREL PGOV TH
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF THE USS KITTY HAWK

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d)


1. (C) Summary. Admiral McClain and the men and women of the
USS Kitty Hawk Carrier Strike Group, your trip to Bangkok is
a terrific opportunity to demonstrate America's commitment to
regional security and meshes with a series of initiatives the
United States has with Thailand. Thailand affords the United
States a unique platform in Asia. Congress recently approved
our implementing an ambitious program in Thailand, Indonesia
and Sri Lanka designed to improve our ability to monitor ship
traffic on the Andaman Sea and in the Strait of Malacca to
intercept suspect vessels. Our largest exercise, Cobra Gold,
is America's only annual joint/combined multilateral training
exercise in the Asia Pacific Region and now includes the
active participation of Japan, Singapore and Indonesia.
Thailand participates in the annual CARAT exercise and is an
ally in the War on Terror. Thai troops deployed to
Afghanistan and Iraq and we are working closely with the Thai
to make them better able to address separatist elements in
the Muslim majority South. We are also working with U.S.
Embassies in the region to better address counter terrorism
throughout SE Asia. Our IMET program is a major success --
senior leaders in all the services are graduates. We are
working towards having the CINC of the Royal Thai Army, GEN
Sonthi Boonyaratglin, participate in the DV fly out. General
Sonthi (SAWN-TEA) is the Thai military's point man on
countering the insurgency in Southern Thailand. END SUMMARY.

THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP


2. (C) Bilateral relations with Thailand are very good. The
goodwill generated by America's quick and massive response to
the December 26 2004 tsunami was palpable. Thailand is a
Treaty Ally and has been firmly supportive of the
International War on Terror and has participated in Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).
American businesses have over $20 billion in direct
investment in Thailand. The United States is Thailand's
largest export market and its second-largest foreign
investor.


3. (C) Nonetheless, there are points of friction. Human
rights remains a key concern. On October 25, 2004, poorly
trained Thai military and civilian security forces forced
nearly 1,300 Thai Muslim protesters into trucks to be
transported to a military base nearly three hours away. 78
protesters died en route. Our protests over Thai Police
involvement in approximately 1,300 extrajudicial killings
during the 2003 Thai "war on drugs," rankles the Thai
Government. Likewise, Thailand's policy of "constructive
engagement" with the military junta in Burma and provision of
economic assistance to Rangoon is a source of continuing
frustration for us. The Thai government supports democracy
in Burma but maintains, not altogether convincingly, that
engagement with the SPDC is the only realistic approach it
has to make progress on the major cross-border flows of
refugees, illegal economic migrants, and methamphetamines it
faces from Burma.

THE OVERALL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP


4. (C) The U.S.-Thai security relationship is based on over
50 years of close cooperation. Thai soldiers, sailors and
airmen participated in the Korean and Vietnamese Conflicts
and Thai peacekeepers served in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Thailand is the fourth largest participant in the U.S.
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.
Thailand's willingness to allow the United States to use
Utapao Naval Air Station as the hub for our regional tsunami
assistance program was key to making Operation Unified
Assistance a success. In fact, PACOM recently designated
Utapao as the most important Cooperative Security Location
(CSL) in the Asia Pacific Region. While we avoid using the
term "CSL" with the Thai due to their sensitivities about
bases, Utapao remains vital to our interests in the region.
In your meetings with Thai officials, you will want to note
the overall strength of the relationship -- highlighting our
history and underscoring the importance of our tsunami
cooperation, exercise program, increased tempo of USN ship
visits (most recently, the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike
Group),and cooperation in the War on Terrorism.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION


5. (SBU) In 2001, telecommunications multimillionaire Thaksin
(Prime Minister TOCK-SIN) Shinawatra and his Thai Rak Thai
(TRT) party won a decisive victory on a populist platform of
economic growth and development. Thaksin was reelected in
February 2005, winning 377 out of 500 seats in the
Parliament. Following allegations of corruption of the Prime
Minister, peaceful anti-government demonstrations grew as
thousands marched in the streets of Bangkok to demand
Thaksin's resignation. Thaksin dissolved the Parliament in
February 2006 and declared snap elections in April. The
opposition boycotted the April elections, leading to a
political stalemate. Following Royal intervention, the
judiciary annulled the April election and new elections are
expected to take place in October or shortly thereafter.
Protesters have not returned to the streets and the Thai
military has not intervened. Notably, Army CINC General
Sonthi has been praised for his professional and apolitical
handling of the military throughout the impasse. The
government remains in caretaker status.

COUNTERTERRORISM AND SOUTHERN THAILAND


6. (C) Southern Thailand, in particular the southernmost
Muslim majority provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat,
has experienced episodic violence since it was incorporated
into the Siamese Kingdom in 1902. However, since January
2004, we have witnessed a dramatic increase in the level of
violence. Press reports indicate that over 1,000 persons
have been killed either by militants or by security forces
during this period. Local Muslim separatist militants have
attacked symbols of Thai and Buddhist authority, civilians,
and local citizens suspected of collaborating with the
Government. There continue to be daily incidents of
violence. In March 2005, Thaksin appointed a National
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) headed by highly respected
former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun to look for
alternative solutions to the long-running insurgency. The
NRC published its recommendations in June and these are being
broadly debated.


7. (C) Southern separatists direct their anger at the
government in Bangkok, not at the United States. Since a
U.S. presence or perception of U.S. involvement in the South
could redirect that anger towards us and link it to the
international jihadist movement -- a link that is currently
absent -- we ensure that any offers of assistance or training
pass the "location and label" test. Put simply, we keep U.S.
military personnel away from the far South and we make sure
that we do not label any assistance or training as directly
linked to the southern situation. Likewise, we work to avoid
feeding rampant, outlandish speculation that we are somehow
fomenting the violence in the South in order to justify
building permanent bases -- a very sensitive issue in
Thailand. We do not want to jeopardize our access to key
military facilities in Thailand like Utapao Naval Air
Station.

REGIONAL MARITIME SECURITY


8. (C) A key U.S. objective in the region is to improve
Maritime Security. We are working closely with PACOM to
encourage Thailand and others to support the Regional
Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI). Working with PACOM,
PACFLT and Washington, we recently won approval to implement
an ambitious project aimed at promoting domain awareness in
the Andaman Sea. This project is a layered approach to
assist the Thai military secure territorial waters while also
providing coverage of the northern shipping lanes feeding
into the Strait of Malacca. It will combine a High Frequency
Radar capable of reaching Sumatra, with a constellation of
overlapping x-band radars to provide radar coverage of the
waters off the west coast of Thailand. The initiative would
also improve the Royal Thai Navy's interdiction capabilities
and has the potential to be linked to other facilities in the
region. We are working closely with U.S. Embassies in Sri
Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines to create a
regional network aimed at improving maritime security
throughout the region.

MILITARY COOPERATION


9. (C) Perhaps due to their lack of a colonial heritage, Thai
leaders are far more willing to host multilateral exercises
than are others countries in Asia. Unlike Japan, which only
hosts annual bilateral exercises due to legal prohibitions
over collective security, or Australia, which avoids
multilateral exercises so as not to "dumb down" its own
training opportunities, the Royal Thai Government supports
multilateral exercises as a way to show regional leadership.
So long as our concepts are properly sold to Thai military
and political leaders, we should be able to continue to
modify exercises to meet our regional security objectives --
including an ability to establish a near-continuous presence
in the region.


10. (C) We conduct a wide range of major exercises and
training programs with Thailand each year, including Cobra
Gold. Cobra Gold 2006 included almost 7,000 U.S. troops
working together with Thai counterparts in field training
exercises ranging from Military Operations in Urban Terrain
and Air Assault Operations to Naval Special Forces protecting
offshore natural gas platforms. The Command Post Exercise
included participation by U.S., Thai, Japanese, Singaporean
and Indonesian forces and focused on peace keeping
operations. Cobra Gold in the coming years will be a
centerpiece of our Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI),
designed to train 15,000 regional peacekeepers by 2010. As
mentioned, Utapao, the Thai Navy Air Base used as the primary
staging area for U.S. disaster relief efforts in the region
following the December 2004 tsunami, has long been a critical
support hub for U.S. aircraft transiting the region. Over 420
DOD aircraft use it each year. Our largest air exercise,
Cope Tiger, involves Thailand, the United States and
Singapore. USN aircraft from the USS Abraham Lincoln
participated in Cope Tiger in 2005 while the Lincoln was
stationed off of Aceh during Operation Unified Assistance.
We have also been working closely with PACFLT to give our
major naval exercise, CARAT, a more regional flavor in the
coming years.

THE ROLE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN THE REGION


11. (C) Southeast Asia continues to feel the rising influence
of China and India. While emphasizing the vital role of the
U.S. in the region -- and Thailand's desire to intensify U.S.
engagement -- Thai leaders also focus on developing stronger
relations with the two regional powers. Bangkok views both
countries as sources of unlimited consumer demand and hope to
conclude Free Trade Agreements with both nations. It
surprises many visitors from Washington to learn that the
Thai military has a number of Chinese weapons systems in its
arsenal. While Thai military links with the United States
are deeper and far more apparent than Sino-Thai links,
China's growing influence in Thailand and Southeast Asia is
evident in business, the arts, the media and the military.
The PLA Navy has close links with the RTN and recently
conducted a major ship visit to Phuket. After jointly holding
a limited naval exercise in the Andaman Sea last fall,
Thailand and China are exploring conducting joint SAR
exercises. The RTN has acquired several ships from China over
the past decade. China is refurbishing tanks and air defense
equipment provided to Thailand in the late 1980's.
Mil-to-mil exchanges between China and Thailand have expanded
in recent years as has the number of bilateral military VIP
visits.

THAI MILITARY STRUCTURE


12. (C) The relative power and influence of the Royal Thai
Army (RTA) dwarfs the other services. As such, the Royal
Thai Army Commander, GEN Sonthi, traditionally wields more
real power than the Supreme Commander. Thailand's armed
forces, which had a history of interfering in the country's
politics, have not done so since 1992 and appear to be
reconciled to constitutional roles of defense and security.
Their exposure to U.S. civil-military values through their
extensive participation in IMET training deserves some credit
for this transformation of their attitude towards democracy.


13. (C) While the RTA has a long history working with the
U.S. Army, recently we have also been working with MARFORPAC
and III MEF to improve links between the U.S Marine Corps and
the RTA. In many ways, our Marines are perfect ideal
partners for the RTA, and field exercises in Thailand afford
our Marines many opportunities they don't have elsewhere in
Asia. We hosted the USS Essex Amphibious Assault Ship during
Cobra Gold this year and are looking for other training
opportunities in the coming months.
THE NAVAL RELATIONSHIP


14. (C) While our overall relationship with the Thai military
is good, our links with the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) are not as
strong as those with the Royal Thai Army or Air Force. The
RTN is smaller than the other services and tends to be less
willing to be open with U.S. counterparts. This has not been
the case historically, and we are working to reverse the
trend through potential projects like the Andaman Sea
Maritime Security Initiative and the increased tempo of USN
ship visits to Thailand. The April 19-24 visit of the USS
Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group was well received by the
RTN, received front page and prime time media coverage, and
was a successful opportunity to demonstrate the benefits of
the U.S.-Thai security relationship.


15. (C) In addition to supporting our annual CARAT exercise
with Thailand, JUSMAGTHAI has worked closely with RTN Special
Warfare units to increase their capacity. USN SEALS have
helped to provide their Thai counterparts with some
impressive capabilities. For instance, Thai SEALS regularly
conduct exercises aimed at protecting oil and gas platforms
in the Gulf of Thailand. This NSW relationship was
graphically demonstrated during the tsunami response when USN
and RTN SEALS rapidly deployed to Phuket to assist in the
recovery efforts. The Prime Minister was photographed in a
recovery boat manned by the SEALS. Despite their improved
professionalism, the Thai SEALS are not well-supported by
senior RTN officials.

RANGE TIME DURING CARRIER VISITS


16. (C) We want to work with Seventh Fleet and CTF-70 to
establish an SOP with the Thai to enable our carrier air
wings to conduct training in Thailand. We appreciate the
collegial attitude evidenced by officers from the USS Kitty
Hawk, CTF-70 and Seventh Fleet as we negotiated range time
for this visit. During your meetings with RTN officials, it
would be useful to express our sincerity in developing a
procedure we can use in the future that will make our carrier
visits to Thailand even more successful.

WE LOOK FORWARD TO YOUR VISIT


17. (U) We look forward to your visit to Thailand and look
forward to working with you to make the DV fly out and the
reception aboard the USS Kitty Hawk a success.
BOYCE