Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK355
2006-01-19 10:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER: AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON'S VISIT TO

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL PTER TH PSI BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000355 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

JAKARTA FOR AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER TH PSI BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON'S VISIT TO
THAILAND

Classified By: CHARGE ALEX ARVIZU. REASON: 1.4 (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000355

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

JAKARTA FOR AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER TH PSI BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON'S VISIT TO
THAILAND

Classified By: CHARGE ALEX ARVIZU. REASON: 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Bilateral relations with Thailand have been
generally excellent. Thailand is a security treaty ally and
has been firmly supportive of the Global War on Terror.
American businesses have over $20 billion in direct
investment in Thailand, the second largest investor after
Japan. Thailand and the U.S. have long enjoyed a close
security relationship. Thailand is a Major Non-Nato Ally
(MNNA) of the United States. For years, Thailand has hosted
the Cobra Gold annual exercise, our largest multilateral
exercise in Asia. Over time, that exercise has transformed
from a bilateral event designed to thwart a Vietnamese
invasion of Thailand to a multilateral exercise to train for
peace keeping and disaster relief preparations. Recent
exercises have allowed American and Thai troops to train with
militaries from Singapore, Japan, the Philippines and others.
We are now planning for Cobra Gold 2006 which will include
possible participation by Indonesia in addition to Singapore
and Japan. We are convinced that we and the Thai can work
with other militaries to support key U.S. objectives in Asia
such as improving responses to terrorism, enhancing peace
keeping, promoting interoperability with U.S. forces, and
improving maritime security -- while continuing to provide us
a vital platform in the region from which to respond to
future contingencies. In 2004-5, thanks to years of working
with the Thai military, the United States was able to quickly
deploy over one thousand American soldiers, marines, sailors
and airmen to Utapao Naval Air Base and set up a regional
relief operation. Thai cooperation in the Global War on
Terrorism is excellent. The capture of the JI terrorist
Hambali in 2003 highlighted the willingness of Thailand to
work against international terrorism

THE SOUTH AND TERRORISM


2. (C) The most pressing security concern for the Thai
remains the unrest in Thailand's deep south provinces

bordering Malaysia. The violence continues to occur almost
daily with over one thousand persons reported killed over the
past two years either by militants or government actions.
The ongoing violence has historic roots going back a century
and is based on local grievances from poor treatment by the
government and a desire to separate the region from the Thai
state. There still is not any direct evidence of operational
links between Thai separatists and outside terrorist.
Incidents such as Tak Bai (in which some 80 Muslim men died
in security forces' custody following an October, 2004
demonstration),Thaksin's harsh rhetoric and often ham-fisted
police tactics, as well as a serious lack of coordination and
information sharing between security agencies have probably
exacerbated the violence and public alienation in the region.


3. (C) The National Reconciliation Commission (NRC),
appointed by Thaksin last year and led by former PM Anand
Panyarachun, one of the most respected leaders in Thailand,
is expected to announce a set of policy recommendations
policy recommendations in March. Critics of Thaksin maintain
that he is likely to pay lip service to the NRC's
recommendations while still tending to some of his more
authoritarian tendencies in his approach to the south.
Nonetheless, Thaksin has committed his government to
implementing education and economic reforms to benefit
southerners -- a move we encourage -- and we urge him to
listen seriously to the suggestions of the NRC. The Thai
government does not seek a U.S. presence in the south and is
sensitive over rumors of U.S. involvement in the violence.
Nonetheless, we have worked closely to find areas where we
can help. We have stepped up our human rights training of
Thai troops rotating into the south to improve their ability
to control crowds and conduct other operations in a way that
complies with international norms. We are also working with
the Thai to improve their intelligence sharing and gathering
capabilities.

PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE


4. (C) Despite our efforts since 2003, the RTG has not yet
formally endorsed the PSI Statement of Principles. Prime
Minister Thaksin has told senior USG officials that another
"Muslim" ASEAN nation (read Malaysia or Indonesia) should
endorse PSI first or concurrently with Thailand, so as to
avoid the appearance that Thailand is getting too far in
front of its neighbors and because of concern over how
endorsement might be perceived vis-a-vis the situation in the
South.

OUTSTANDING ISSUES


5. (C) For most of the Thaksin administration, we have been
at odds over our respective approaches to Burma --
essentially agreeing to disagree. The RTG under Thaksin has
claimed that though it agrees that the regime must show
progress in bringing out national reconciliation, Bangkok
must stay engaged with the SPDC in order to keep a dialogue
open on issues that directly affect Thailand such as illegal
immigration from Burma and narcotics smuggling. We have
maintained that Thailand has appeared to go beyond this to
the appoint of being perceived as an apologist for the
regime. Lately, at our urging, the Thai have begun to move
closer to regional and international opinion, by publicly
criticizing the SPDC on its continued detention of Aung San
Suu Kyi and resistance to national reconciliation.


6. (C) We have also criticized the RTG for some of its
human rights practices. A bloody crackdown on alleged drug
vendors during a "war on drugs campaign" in 2003 and actions
by security forces in the south, notably the aforementioned
incident at Tak Bai, have been publicly raised by us in our
annual human rights reports and in public fora, as well as in
our private conversations with Thai officials.


7. (C) Your meetings with Thai officials, as well as your
dinner with academic and press observers of the south, will
give you an opportunity to thank the Thai for their
cooperation with us in the Global War On Terrorism, most
notably their deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq,
their capture of Hambali in Ayudhaya in 2003 and their role
in promoting regional cooperation in fighting international
terrorism. It will also be a chance for you to urge the Thai
to sign on to the PSI Statement Of Principles and to
underscore Thailand's commitment to fully join the
international community to combat the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction and their precursors.
ARVIZU