Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK3219
2006-05-26 10:20:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

GREATER COMPETITION IN THAILAND'S ELECTRIC POWER

Tags:  ENRG EPET EINV KPRV TH 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8935
RR RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHBK #3219/01 1461020
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261020Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9107
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1862
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003219 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, EB, AND EB/ESC/IEC/ENR
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR
COMMERCE FOR JEAN KELLY
ENERGY FOR IN AND PI
JUSTICE FOR STUART CHEMTOB
TREASURY FOR OASIA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG EPET EINV KPRV TH
SUBJECT: GREATER COMPETITION IN THAILAND'S ELECTRIC POWER
SECTOR?

REF: A. 05 BANGKOK 7124

B. 06 BANGKOK 1861

C. 05 BANGKOK 6761

BANGKOK 00003219 001.2 OF 003


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 003219

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EAP/MLS, EB, AND EB/ESC/IEC/ENR
STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR
COMMERCE FOR JEAN KELLY
ENERGY FOR IN AND PI
JUSTICE FOR STUART CHEMTOB
TREASURY FOR OASIA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG EPET EINV KPRV TH
SUBJECT: GREATER COMPETITION IN THAILAND'S ELECTRIC POWER
SECTOR?

REF: A. 05 BANGKOK 7124

B. 06 BANGKOK 1861

C. 05 BANGKOK 6761

BANGKOK 00003219 001.2 OF 003



1. SUMMARY: The Royal Thai Government (RTG)'s unsuccessful
attempt to privatize the state-owned electric power producer
EGAT Plc has unexpectedly revived hopes for greater
competition in the electric power sector. In view of EGAT's
reversion to its former status as a state-owned enterprise,
as a result of Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) decisions
in November 2005 and March 2006, the energy bureaucrats
drafting the nation's Power Development Plan (PDP) are
considering allocating less capacity to EGAT and its
subsidiaries and making the next round of bidding by
independent power producers (IPPs) more competitive. The
test will be the guidelines the RTG sets for the next round
of IPP bidding, expected in early 2007. Advocates of greater
competition have not yet carried the day. EGAT is still the
overwhelmingly dominant player in the sector. A permanent
regulator for the sector is not yet in place, and Thailand's
broader regime of competition policy is underdeveloped, a
contentious issue in our bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA)
talks. End Summary.


2. EGAT'S REVERSION TO SOE STATUS: As set out in REFs A and
B, the RTG's attempt to partially privatize the Electric
Generating Authority of Thailand ended in complete failure.
In November 2005, the SAC suspended the initial public
offering (IPO) of shares pending its decision on whether the
royal decrees transforming the state agency into a public
company called EGAT Plc and transferring various assets to
the the newly organized company were legal. In March 2006,
the court ruled in favor of petitioners who claimed that the
process by which EGAT Plc was formed was illegitimate. EGAT
has since reverted to state-owned enterprise (SOE) status,
and the RTG does not have plans to move forward with
privatization anytime soon. The "caretaker" status of the
government has put almost all policy initiatives on hold, and
the policy of privatizing SOEs is particularly unpopular with

the critics of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, largely
because of its association with his government and the
perception that Thaksin and/or his "cronies" would somehow
make a profit from the privatization.


3. DRAFTING A NEW PDP: Notwithstanding the ongoing
political crisis, the energy bureaucrats are drafting a new
power development plan (PDP) so as to prepare for a new round
of bidding by IPPs. According to the Economic Policy and
Planning Office of the Ministry of Energy, the completed PDP
is expected in July or August. The round of bidding was
initially scheduled to take place last year, but it was
delayed in part because of the controversy surrounding EGAT's
now failed IPO. Going forward, the single most important
decision in the new PDP concerns the allocation of capacity
to the private sector, explains Dr. Bart Lucarelli, Chairman
of the Energy Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce
in Thailand. The more capacity that is allocated to the
private sector, the more likely that international players
will submit serious bids because they will see a future
beyond the present round in Thailand's electricity market.


4. ALLOCATION OF NEW CAPACITY: According to the RTG's
original plan in 2005, EGAT was guaranteed 50 percent of all
new capacity between 2011-2015, as explained in REF C. Dr.
Lucarelli and others were sharply critical of that decision
at the time, particularly when it appeared that EGAT
affiliates and subsidiaries EGCO and RATCH would be allowed
to bid on the 50 percent of capacity to be allocated to IPPs.
Analysts covering the sector agree that, if EGCO and RATCH
were not allowed to participate in the country's first round
of IPP bidding since 1994, then it would allow more
international players to move into the electricity market.
Since both companies have low costs and large footprints in
the country, they are seen to have a big advantage over
outsiders. &If RATCH and ECGO are allowed to bid, some
bidders will drop out,8 explained Mark Hutchinson, Head of
Research at Mullis Captital, an investment bank specializing
in energy deals. "Putting together a bid is an expensive
process. But even so, there are some very competitive

BANGKOK 00003219 002.2 OF 003


international players that would like to be in this market."


5. STANDING UP TO EGAT: Since the collapse of EGAT,s
privatization, there has been a perceptible shift in official
thinking toward EGAT among energy bureaucrats. While there
is no concrete indication that the new PDP will allocate
anything less than the 50 percent of capacity previously
envisioned, Embassy contacts confirm that the number has been
a subject of discussion among the energy bureaucrats. The
regulators have also moved in other ways to contain EGAT's
influence on the sector. The Electricity Regulatory Board
(ERB) has stood firm on not allowing companies (such as ECGO
and RATCH) in which EGAT owns a stake greater than 25 percent
from bidding on the capacity allocated to IPPs. The
bureaucrats are also considering imposing similar
restrictions on management control. Although the caretaker
Minister of Energy appears unwilling to lead any push against
EGAT, Dr. Vichit Lorjirachunkul, a key member of the ERB,s
IPP Bid Solicitation Subcommittee, is pushing for an
allocation arrangement where all electric power that EGAT
purchases from offshore sources (in Cambodia and Laos, for
example) counts against EGAT's 50 percent. The Ministry of
Energy position is that offshore production count equally (by
being subtracted from the total before allocation is made to
either EGAT or the IPPs. Additionally, the IPP Bid
Solicitation Subcommittee is considering other restrictions
based on Stock Exchange of Thailand regulations that would
place limits on state enterprise representation on boards of
IPPs. SET regulations say that connected companies in which
cross-holding exceeds 10 percent must be barred from bidding
in a particular project, to avoid a conflict of interest.


6. RATIONALE: While many motives come into play behind the
regulators, recent shift to a more independent posture
vis--vis EGAT, the most important objective reason flows
from the failure of the EGAT IPO. The logic behind
allocating half of new capacity to EGAT assumed that the
power producer was a company that would have access to
capital markets. Now that EGAT will be a wholly state-owned
enterprise for the foreseeable future, it will be dependent
upon the government for financing, and few observers believe
that the RTG will have sufficient resources. There is also
growing recognition that EGAT could use subsidiaries to bid
on contracts reserved for IPPs in order to successfully scare
away competitors whose presence could lead to lower prices
for consumers. "If a company doesn't already have a project
in Thailand that it can build off of, then they will probably
stay away from the next round of IPP bidding, according to
one industry source. "For the remaining players, the quality
of the bids is likely to be lower because they are unlikely
to put the proper money into a bid that they are unlikely to
win."


7. EGAT'S CONTINUED DOMINANCE: EGAT's recent interest in
purchasing Glow Energy, either directly or through a
subsidiary, stands as evidence of its tendency to try to
maintain a dominant position within the sector. Glow is a
local IPP, in which Belgium-based Suez has a 67.3 percent
stake. Control of the company came into question in March
because of the merger of Suez with Gaz de France, which led
to speculation that Suez would liquidate its holding in the
local IPP. EGAT President Kraisri Karnasutra publicly
expressed EGAT's desire to buy Glow, the only remaining IPP
with which it does not already have a connection. The
controversy died down when it became clear that Suez does not
plan to put Glow up for sale, a point Glow management
confirmed to econoff. Additionally, analysts have expressed
concern that projections of future power demand by both EGAT
and the RTG represent another means of bolstering EGAT's
position. By underestimating future demand, for example, IPP
bidding could be postponed. Then, in the event of a
projected power shortage, EGAT would be in a position to win
no-bid approval for its own power construction projects.
While hardly certain, such scenario is on the minds of
potential investors, who have conveyed these concerns to the
RTG.


8. COMPETITION POLICY: Compounding the problem for would be
investors in the power sector is Thailand,s undeveloped

BANGKOK 00003219 003.2 OF 003


regime of competition policy. Many experts such as Dr.
Piyasavasti Amranand criticized RTG plans for the EGAT IPO in
2005 on the grounds that the government failed to establish
an independent regulator beforehand. With respect to RTG
competition policy generally, Dr. Duenden Nikomborirak,
Research Director for Economic Governance, Sectoral Economics
Program, at the Thailand Development Research Institute
(TDRI),has also emphasized that, "Thailand has a law only on
paper; its implementation has been obstructed by the lobbying
of big business and political intervention." The result is
that Thailand lags behind Singapore, Indonesia, and even
Vietnam. State enterprises are effectively exempt from
Thailand's 1999 Trade Competition Act. The lack of a
definition under Article 25 for "dominant player" in
particular renders the act a paper tiger in countering
anti-competitive behavior other than outright monopoly, she
concludes. This lack of a definition has led to the
dismissal of complaints against pay television UBC and brewer
Chang Beer. No one in the power industry is looking to the
Trade Competition Act to check EGAT's anti-competitive
behavior.


9. COMMENT: The Embassy concurs with Dr. Lucarelli, who
told Econoff that recent moves to balance EGAT's power are
welcome and should be encouraged. The health of the electric
power sector is critical to Thailand,s continued economic
growth, and liberalization of the sector would enhance the
competitiveness of the Thai economy both by example for other
sectors and through greater efficiency, especially if passed
along to users in the form of lower electricity rates. In
the absence of EGAT,s privatization any time soon, the next
round of IPP bidding represents the most promising
opportunity to introduce greater competition into the power
sector. In view of both the place of the sector in the
economy and U.S. business interest in its development, when
bilateral FTA talks resume, U.S. negotiators may expect that
conditions in the power sector will be a highly visible
measure of the RTG,s commitment to the principles set forth
in the competition provisions of the agreement.
BOYCE